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PREFACE 
 
At the broadest level, the goals of this dissertation are, first, to state a problem that any 
successful form of naturalism must be able to address; second, to apply this problem to 
the semantic projects of Donald Davidson, John McDowell, Huw Price, and Robert 
Brandom—all of whom work at the intersection of the analytic and pragmatist 
traditions—and to argue that none can satisfactorily address this problem; and third, to 
argue that the reason these figures cannot address this problem is that their acceptance 
of the priority of the propositional leads them to take truth (or some successor property 
of judgments) to be the fundamental semantic notion, when they instead ought to accept 
the priority of the inferential and take validity to be the fundamental semantic notion. 
Respectively, these three goals are addressed in the three chapters of this dissertation.  
 Dialectically speaking, my primary interlocutors and intended audience for this 
dissertation are analytic pragmatists. As a tradition, analytic pragmatism has something 
of a family-resemblance character to it, having as much to do with a roughly shared 
intellectual genealogy as it does with a tendency towards overlapping (though far from 
identical) philosophical commitments. Key figures in this intellectual genealogy include 
Kant, Hegel, Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, Rudolf Carnap, the later 
Wittgenstein, Wilfrid Sellars, W. V. O. Quine, and Richard Rorty. Alternatively, common 
analytic pragmatist commitments include a critical if not combative approach to 
metaphysics, a more or less liberal form of naturalism, an acknowledgement of 
normativity, a phenomenalist approach to semantics, an emphasis on pragmatics in 
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addition to or instead of semantics, a general mistrust of the notion of representation, 
and a positive appraisal of the linguistic turn. I identify myself with this analytic 
pragmatist tradition, and as such the arguments I provide and the conclusions I draw 
throughout this dissertation are intended to be most convincing to those already within 
this tradition. For those who are outside of this tradition, the less naturalistic, the less 
anti-metaphysical, and the less anti-representational their views are, the less convincing 
my arguments and conclusions will be. 
 Before I move on to summarizing each chapter, it is worth pausing to 
acknowledge that not every pragmatist would recognize what I am calling analytic 
pragmatism as being a genuine variety of pragmatism. The core complaint that these 
pragmatists have is usually that for a variety of pragmatism to be genuine it must deal 
with the immediate experiences of living, breathing people, but this is precisely what the 
analytic pragmatist’s acceptance of the linguistic turn rules out. According to this line of 
thinking, analytic pragmatists study human language use because they conceive of 
language as an ever-present intermediary between people and their worlds, thus 
making the phrase ‘immediate experience’ a contradiction in terms. Therefore, what we 
need is not to continue the confused analytic uptake of pragmatism, as carried out by 
Sellars, Quine, and Rorty, but to return to the pre-analytic days of James and Dewey.  
 This complaint is not wholly unfounded; however, the case in favor of this 
complaint tends to be overstated and the complaint itself has considerably less critical 
weight than these other pragmatists would imagine. Concerning the case in favor of this 
complaint, the first and most obvious problem is that it overlooks the almost universal 
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tendency among analytic pragmatists who make the linguistic turn to prioritize 
pragmatics in their philosophies of language, either in addition to or instead of 
semantics.  
 Second, and less obviously, things simply aren’t as simple as they would need to 
be for these other pragmatists’ case to unproblematically establish their complaint. On 
the one hand, the analytic pragmatists’ focus on language and the (supposedly) 
resulting denial of immediate experience gets presaged in as early a pragmatist as 
Peirce with his semiotics and his critique of intuitionism, respectively.1 On the other 
hand, those supposed pragmatists who make the linguistic turn do not end up 
developing one and the same theory of experience. One need only look at Quine’s 
focus on descriptive relations between stimuli and sensory receptors2 and Sellars’s 
contrasting focus on the normative space of reasons to appreciate this point.3 Since the 
above complaint seems to depend on such post-turn theories being at root the same, I 
say so much the worse for it. As we can see, on both the pre- and post-analytic ends of 
things, the picture just isn’t as simple as the critical pragmatists would like it to be. 
 More to the point, even if the case for the complaint were sound the complaint 
itself does not have much critical weight. Suppose analytic pragmatism is not genuinely 
pragmatic; so what? This charge in isolation reeks of the no-true-Scotsman fallacy. For 
the charge to have its intended weight, the other pragmatists would have to establish 
that a theory must be genuinely pragmatic if it is to be true (or is to meet some other 
independently established standard). However, to establish this conditional requires that 
                                                       
1 See in particular Peirce, “Questions”; also Peirce, “Some Consequences.” 
2 See in particular Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized.” 
3 See in particular Sellars, “Empiricism.” 
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these pragmatists not write off analytic pragmatism at the outset, but instead delve into 
first-order philosophical issues with the analytic pragmatist and let the cards fall where 
they may. If the analytic pragmatist is convincing, then so much the worse for the 
complaint. 
 With this said, let me now summarize what first-order issues I will be discussing 
in this dissertation, and where I argue the cards will ultimately fall in respect to these 
issues.  
 In Chapter One, I develop an objection that any naturalist must meet and that I 
level against analytic pragmatist approaches to intentionality. I begin by surveying 
contemporary debates concerning naturalism and by arguing that ‘naturalism’ 
designates any consistent view that is committed to the following thesis: some subset of 
the natural sciences serve as some sort of standard by which to judge philosophical 
investigation. I spend the rest of Chapter One showing that the naturalist’s commitment 
to this thesis presupposes that she meet what I call the Objectivity Demand and entails 
that she meet what I call the Deflationary Demand. The Objectivity Demand is that the 
naturalist must be able to acknowledge the objectivity of the sciences, because it is the 
objectivity of the sciences that justifies the naturalist in prioritizing the sciences in the 
manner that she does. So as not to beg questions against my naturalist interlocutors, I 
spend the bulk of Chapter One developing a sense of ‘objectivity’ that is neutral 
between the common metaphysical sense of ‘objectivity’ (whereby something is 
objective iff it is true or part of the external, mind-independent world) and the equally 
common epistemic sense (whereby something is objective iff it is justified in some 
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especially praiseworthy manner). The Deflationary Demand is that the naturalist must 
ensure that her philosophical investigations are not only internally consistent but also 
consistent with the aspects of the sciences that she takes to be authoritative over her 
philosophizing. The Pincer Objection is that these two demands operate at cross 
purposes to one another, thus raising the prima facie worry that both demands cannot 
be met consistently. 
 In Chapter Two, I survey and critique the works of Davidson, McDowell, Price, 
and Brandom. Starting with Davidson, he is inspired by the works of Alfred Tarski and is 
a champion of truth-theoretic semantics. However, whereas Tarski realizes that the 
infamous Liar’s Paradox (i.e. the sentence, ‘This sentence is false’, is true if it is false 
and false if it is true) requires him to relativize any truth-predicate to the language in 
which it is used, Davidson argues for an unrelativized notion of truth. I argue that this 
leaves Davidson without a satisfactory response to the Liar’s Paradox, meaning that he 
cannot meet the Deflationary Demand from Chapter One.  
 McDowell likewise fails the Deflationary Demand, but for different reasons. 
McDowell’s account of sense perception in many ways mirrors more traditional accounts 
of rational intuition, and since these latter accounts contradict what the sciences tell us 
about ourselves, if McDowell is to meet the Deflationary Demand then he seemingly 
must be able to identify some feature of sense perception that distinguishes it from 
rational intuition. The McDowellian response is that things only seem this way to me 
because I am in the grips of a philosophical illness that needs treatment. But, I argue, if I 
am philosophically ill then my illness is a side effect of one of McDowell’s treatments, 
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and so my concern about McDowell and the Deflationary Demand is appropriate and 
cuts against his position.  
 Unlike Davidson and McDowell, Price meets the Deflationary Demand but does 
so in such a way that prevents him from meeting the Objectivity Demand. This is 
because Price adopts a minimalist approach to semantics, whereby disquotational 
schemata (such as ‘ ‘P’ is true iff P’) exhaust the content of semantic predicates (such 
as the truth predicate). I argue that such an approach leaves semantic predicates 
relativized to a particular language, and that such relativization leaves Price unable to 
acknowledge the objectivity of the sciences (in my neutral sense from Chapter One).  
 Finally, Brandom in many ways defends a more detailed version of Price’s 
minimalism, one that he develops precisely to address the sort of critique I level against 
Price. In particular, Brandom argues that objectivity is a phenomenon that emerges 
when scorekeepers within a language game attribute certain commitments to others and 
undertake certain commitments themselves, but I argue that this makes objectivity 
language-relative in the same problematic way as with Price. Ultimately, for both Price 
and Brandom everything comes down to a scope ambiguity. What they are able to 
prove is that everyone has one and only one framework by which to structure their 
inquiries. But what they need to show, and can’t, is that there is one and only one such 
framework that everyone has. 
 In Chapter Three, I appraise the situation for analytic pragmatist approaches to 
semantics after my critiques from Chapter Two, and recommend that we attempt to 
salvage what is good in such approaches by modifying some common analytic 
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pragmatist commitments with an eye towards addressing the Pincer Objection. 
Therefore, there are two components to the task I set for myself in this chapter: first, I 
must establish that the view I defend is continuous with the analytic pragmatist tradition, 
and second, I must establish that the view I defend makes headway against the Pincer 
Objection.  
 Beginning with the first component, I survey the intellectual genealogies that the 
analytic pragmatists from Chapter Two provide for their own views, and note that Kant’s 
claim that thoughts without content are empty and intuitions without concepts are blind 
is a significant influence for all four. This leads them to take the contents of propositions 
to be the primary explanans of semantic theorizing and the semantic properties of those 
propositions to be the primary explanandum. My recommendation is to modify the 
commitment from the previous sentence to read: the contents of propositions are the 
primary explanans of semantic theorizing and the semantic properties of inferences are 
the primary explanandum. I argue that this modified commitment is continuous with the 
analytic pragmatists’ unmodified commitment because the modified commitment just is 
the Kantian view transposed into contemporary vocabulary. The key detail is that Kant 
wrote before the rise of classical predicate logic, and once we transpose Kant’s view 
from the language of categorical logic into that of predicate logic we see that the 
synthetic a priori judgments at the heart of his critical project become quantified 
conditionals that encode inferences. The final result is that Kant’s question, How are 
synthetic judgments a priori possible?, is transposed to read: How are materially valid 
inferences possible? The notion of inferential validity takes the place of propositional 
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apriority, and Kant’s analytic-synthetic distinction is replaced by an analogous one 
between formal and material validity.  
 Moving to the second component of Chapter Three, I argue that much falls into 
place about how to address the Pincer Objection once we have the transposed question 
in mind. In the first instance, I understand validity in terms of its usual textbook definition 
of guaranteed truth-preservation. From there, I note that there are a number of 
naturalistically sound paradigms for understanding how non-logical terms can contribute 
to the guarantee of validity. Alternatively, to account for the truth-preservation of validity 
in naturalistically sound terms, I pursue a broadly Peircean approach by arguing that the 
truth predicate is coextensional with an ideal-justification predicate. By accounting for 
both the guarantee of validity and the truth-preservation of validity in naturalistic terms, I 
provide a schematic (and therefore incomplete) account of how analytic pragmatist 
approaches to intentionality that take seriously the transposed Kantian question can 
address the Pincer Objection. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
THE PINCER OBJECTION TO NATURALISM 
 
§1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, this chapter is where I pose what I call the 
Pincer Objection to naturalism. This is the problem I mentioned in the first goal of this 
dissertation, and I develop it by showing how a commitment to naturalism requires that 
two competing demands be met—the Objectivity Demand and the Deflationary 
Demand. To achieve this purpose, I begin in §2 by developing my account of 
naturalism. From there, I use §3 to characterize the Objectivity Demand and to show 
how a commitment to naturalism requires that this demand be met. Similarly, §4 does 
for the Deflationary Demand what §3 does for the Objectivity Demand. Finally, §5 
outlines the tension that exists between these two demands, thus demonstrating how 
they jointly constitute a prima facie objection to naturalism. This is the Pincer Objection, 
and I carry it forward into my discussions of analytic pragmatist semantics across 
Chapters Two and Three. 
 Second, this chapter serves as an opportunity to introduce most of the technical 
vocabulary that I will be using throughout this dissertation. My strategy is to introduce 
terms as they become relevant to the first purpose of this chapter—and not all at once—
so I should warn my reader that there will be terminological discussions throughout this 
chapter, some more tangential than others. 
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§2. Naturalism 
Starting with naturalism, the stock thing to say is that there are many forms of 
naturalism, maybe as many as there are naturalists. And because the word ‘naturalism’ 
has become something of a praise term in recent decades, many a philosopher has 
sought to label her position as naturalistic regardless of the manifest conflicts between 
her own view and the views of other purportedly naturalistic philosophers. The 
unfortunate side effect is that ‘naturalism’ has lost any clear and distinct sense that it 
might once have had.  
 There is, of course, some truth in these platitudes, but I think the heterogeneity of 
naturalism is too often exaggerated. In this section, I argue that the following is a 
characteristic thesis shared by most naturalists from the analytic and pragmatist 
traditions of recent decades:  
Characteristic Thesis of Naturalism (CTN): Some subset of the natural sciences 
serve as some sort of standard by which to judge philosophical investigation.  
 
The two things to notice about CTN are that the sciences play a privileged role in 
characterizing naturalism and that there are two quantifiers, each marking a degree of 
freedom along which naturalists can differentiate their views from one another. Along 
the first degree, a naturalist can decide which subset of the natural sciences to prioritize, 
and along the second degree a naturalist can decide what sort of standard this subset of 
the sciences offers. My argument in support of CTN’s adequacy at characterizing 
naturalism proceeds by considering Mario De Caro and David Macarthur’s wide-ranging 
discussion of naturalism in the introduction to their edited volume, Naturalism in 
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Question, and showing how CTN is able to accommodate the various distinctions they 
draw between different types of naturalism. 
 To see why the sciences play the privileged role that they do in CTN, we must 
understand the reason two related ways of characterizing naturalism fail. First, 
naturalism could be characterized as the view that all there is is nature. Such a 
characterization is tautologically true of naturalism, but for this reason it is also 
thoroughly uninformative—if one does not already know what naturalism is one would 
not know what nature is, and vice versa. For this reason, De Caro and Macarthur begin 
by focusing on the common attempt of characterizing naturalism “in terms of the 
rejection of supernatural entities.”4 The hope is that, by contrasting the supernatural to 
the natural, both gain a determinacy that they would not have on their own. However, 
this second characterization merely reiterates the problem of the first, because “the 
category of the supernatural is no clearer and no less controversial than the category of 
the natural.”5 At best, we can define the supernatural as the not-natural, but then the 
two ways of characterizing naturalism produce one and the same tautological yet 
uninformative characterization. It is only by looking at the empirical results of our 
scientific practices of inquiring into nature that we can begin to provide a non-
tautological account of the natural and supernatural—hence the importance of the 
sciences in CTN. 
 From here, the key distinction that De Caro and Macarthur draw between types 
of naturalism is that between scientistic versions of naturalism on the one hand, and 
                                                       
4 De Caro and Macarthur, Naturalism in Question, 2. 
5 De Caro and Macarthur, Naturalism in Question, 2. 
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liberal versions on the other.6 Since each type has its own internal complexities, I will 
address each in turn, highlighting how they relate to CTN. 
 For De Caro and Macarthur, there are three common commitments within 
scientistic naturalism, each of which highlights a different sort of standard that the 
sciences might pose for philosophical investigation. First, there is the ontological 
commitment that “the entities posited by acceptable scientific explanations are the only 
genuine entities that there are.”7 If this is correct, then the sciences pose an ontological 
standard for the naturalist in the sense that they dictate what the proper ontology is for 
philosophical investigation. Second, there is the methodological commitment that “it is 
only by following the methods of the natural sciences—or, at a minimum, the empirical 
methods of a posteriori inquiry—that one arrives at genuine knowledge.”8 If this is 
correct, then the sciences pose a methodological standard for the naturalist in the sense 
that they dictate what the proper epistemological method is for gaining philosophical 
knowledge. Finally, there is the semantic commitment that “the concepts employed by 
the natural sciences are the only genuine concepts we have and that other concepts 
can only be retained if we can find an interpretation of them in terms of scientifically 
respectable concepts.”9 Again, if this is correct, then the sciences pose a semantic 
standard for the naturalist in the sense that they dictate what concepts one can 
                                                       
6 De Caro and Macarthur most frequently use the term ‘scientific naturalism’ to designate 
the first version, although they acknowledge that, on their usage, ‘scientific naturalism’ and 
‘scientistic naturalism’ can be used interchangeably (see De Caro and Macarthur, Naturalism 
in Question, 14). Because I will not be using these phrases interchangeably, I reserve the 
phrase ‘scientistic naturalism’ for the view De Caro and Macarthur focus on, while using the 
phrase ‘scientific naturalism’ to designate the genus, of which scientistic naturalism and 
liberal naturalism are species. More on this below. 
7 De Caro and Macarthur, Naturalism in Question, 7. 
8 De Caro and Macarthur, Naturalism in Question, 7. 
9 De Caro and Macarthur, Naturalism in Question, 7. 
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meaningfully use when conducting philosophical investigations. De Caro and Macarthur 
rightly point out that a scientistic naturalist need not be committed to all three of these, 
as “the ontological and methodological [commitments] can come apart, in principle,”10 
but they also concede that “of course, scienti[st]ic naturalism tends toward a global 
doctrine, committed to all of these versions together.”11 The second degree of freedom 
in CTN is purposefully agnostic on this issue, as one need not hold philosophy to only 
one scientific standard to be a naturalist, nor need one hold philosophy to all such 
standards. One need only hold philosophy to at least one scientific standard. 
 De Caro and Macarthur identify four common liberal naturalist commitments, 
three of which highlight the importance of the first degree of freedom in CTN. First, 
liberal naturalists tend to shift “from concern with nonhuman nature to human nature,”12 
and CTN allows for this shift by remaining agnostic as to whether the set of the sciences 
includes or excludes “the so-called ‘human or social sciences,’ including intentional 
psychology, sociology, and anthropology.”13 Second, liberal naturalists tend to take “a 
nonreductive attitude to normativity in its various guises.”14 Assuming that the human 
sciences are included in the set of the sciences, CTN easily accommodates this attitude 
as normativity is often precisely what is at issue when people distinguish the human 
from the physical sciences. Additionally, this attitude is consistent with certain 
approaches to biology, although this is admittedly a more controversial point.15 Finally, 
                                                       
10 De Caro and Macarthur, Naturalism in Question, 6. 
11 De Caro and Macarthur, Naturalism in Question, 7. 
12 De Caro and Macarthur, Naturalism in Question, 14. 
13 De Caro and Macarthur, Naturalism in Question, 5. 
14 De Caro and Macarthur, Naturalism in Question, 14. 
15 See, in particular, Ruth Millikan’s account of proper function in Millikan, Language. 
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liberal naturalists are more apt to reject the unity of the sciences, opting instead for a 
pluralist conception of them as being irreducible to one another.16 This is a possibility 
that I have implicitly acknowledged in my consistent use of ‘the sciences’ instead of 
‘science’, and the fact that CTN quantifies over the sciences (plural) means that it is 
consistent with this liberal naturalist commitment. Taken as a whole, these three 
commitments should highlight the importance of the first degree of freedom in CTN, as a 
naturalism that prioritizes only fundamental physics will look very different from one that 
prioritizes physics, chemistry, and biology—and both will look different from one that 
prioritizes both the physical and the human sciences. 
 The final commitment of liberal naturalism is where things get tricky. According to 
De Caro and Macarthur, we must “distinguish the rejection of First Philosophy from the 
stronger claim that philosophy is continuous with the sciences.”17 To accept the image 
of philosophy as First Philosophy is to accept two related claims: first, that philosophy is 
authoritative over the sciences in the sense that philosophy can judge, independently of 
the sciences, the propriety of the sciences’ claims; and second, that philosophy is 
foundational for the sciences in the sense that the sciences must be grounded on an 
antecedently developed philosophy.18 Alternatively, the thesis that philosophy is 
continuous with the sciences is “the idea that philosophy has no autonomy with respect 
to the sciences. Philosophy, on this conception, is science in its general and abstract 
reaches.”19 Given these characterizations of First Philosophy and the continuity thesis, 
                                                       
16 See De Caro and Macarthur, Naturalism in Question, 15-16. 
17 De Caro and Macarthur, Naturalism in Question, 15. 
18 See De Caro and Macarthur, Naturalism in Question, 6. 
19 De Caro and Macarthur, Naturalism in Question, 6. 
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the final liberal naturalist commitment is that philosophy is doing something simply 
different from the sciences, and so philosophy is neither First Philosophy nor is it 
continuous with science. In this manner, “philosophy [is], at least in some areas and 
respects, autonomous from scientific method.”20 
 The worry that this final commitment might raise is that the sort of autonomy of 
philosophy from the sciences that the liberal naturalist defends is inconsistent with the 
standard-setting role that CTN cedes to the sciences, but this is not De Caro and 
Macarthur’s point. Although they admit in their introduction to another volume that “a 
necessary condition for a view’s being a version of Liberal Naturalism is that it rejects 
Scienti[st]ic Naturalism,” this is the case because liberal naturalists reject the 
pejoratively scientistic attitude of scientistic naturalism while maintaining its 
commendably scientific underpinnings.21 To understand this contrast between the 
scientistic and the scientific, we must remember that scientistic naturalists maintain that 
the entities of the sciences “are the only genuine entities,” that the methodologies of the 
sciences are the only genuine methodologies, and that the concepts of the sciences 
“are the only genuine concepts.”22 Notice that each of the scientistic naturalist’s uses of 
‘only’ encodes two distinct claims: first, that the entities, methodologies, or concepts of 
the sciences are genuine; and second, that no other entities, methodologies, or 
concepts are genuine. The first is the scientific claim while the conjunction of both is the 
scientistic claim, and De Caro and Macarthur’s point is that the liberal naturalist’s final 
                                                       
20 De Caro and Macarthur, Naturalism in Question, 15. 
21 De Caro and Macarthur, Naturalism and Normativity, 9. 
22 De Caro and Macarthur, Naturalism in Question, 7. 
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commitment is to accepting the scientific first claim while rejecting the scientistic 
conjunction.23   
 Now that this final commitment has been clarified, we can see not only that it is 
consistent with CTN, but that it highlights an aspect of CTN’s second degree of freedom 
that we have so far ignored. If, in our philosophical investigations, we were to say 
something inconsistent with the ontology, methodology, or semantics of a certain 
science, we would have to conclude either that the science’s ontology, methodology, or 
semantics is not genuine or that our philosophical investigations are not genuine.  
Therefore, by accepting the scientific claim that the entities, methodologies, or concepts 
of the sciences are genuine, the liberal naturalist accepts that the sciences pose one 
sort of standard for philosophical investigation—namely, the sciences dictate the 
ontologies, methodologies, or semantics with which our philosophical investigations 
must be consistent. And as such, the liberal naturalist accepts a version of CTN.  
 The aspect of CTN’s second degree of freedom that this highlights is that the 
three types of standard I discussed above—ontological, methodological, and 
semantic—are far from an exhaustive list. The disagreement between liberal and 
scientistic naturalists highlights a distinction that runs across these three types. 
Whereas both agree that genuine philosophy must be consistent with the sciences in 
the sense that philosophy cannot be contrary to the sciences, only scientistic naturalists 
make the stronger claim that genuine philosophy must be continuous with the sciences 
                                                       
23 See De Caro and Macarthur, Naturalism in Question, 15; also De Caro and Voltolini, “Is 
Liberal.” 
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in the sense that philosophy “is science in its general and abstract reaches.”24 In this 
manner, the sciences can pose a consistency standard or a continuity standard for 
philosophical investigation, and either type of standard can be posed in the ontological, 
methodological, or semantic registers. Another common distinction that cuts across 
those already discussed is that between using some idealized portion of the sciences as 
a standard and using some portion of the sciences, as currently developed, as a 
standard. There are surely more such distinctions that one could draw, but what is 
important is that the second degree of freedom is rich enough to account for a number 
of disagreements amongst naturalists. 
 At this point, I hope to have shown that CTN is not too narrow in its 
characterization of naturalism. I have done this by arguing that all of the various types of 
naturalism that De Caro and Macarthur consider can be developed in terms of CTN, 
namely by giving more determinacy to CTN’s two degrees of freedom. The issue I have 
not considered is whether CTN is too broad in its characterization of naturalism. On this 
front, I must engage in a bit of stipulation, but I believe that it is warranted stipulation: for 
a view to satisfy CTN, it must, at the very least, entail that philosophy be consistent with 
some aspect of the sciences. If this were not the case, then the view could be (explicitly 
or implicitly) inconsistent, and since anything follows from a contradiction the distinction 
between naturalism and non-naturalism would then break down. Once this consistency 
standard is in place, CTN easily rules out the more obvious non-naturalist views, i.e. 
those involving deities or miracles or other such things that contradict the laws of 
science. It is an open question as to whether CTN additionally rules out those views 
                                                       
24 De Caro and Macarthur, Naturalism in Question, 6. 
 10 
whose naturalist credentials are commonly under debate, such as those committed to 
the existence of numbers or values or modally robust properties. But this is how things 
should be, with the issue settled through considered debate and not terminological fiat. 
 
The following terminological conventions are useful in summarizing the important points 
from this section. Going forward, ‘naturalism’ designates any consistent view that is 
committed to CTN. Because the sciences play a privileged role in CTN, ‘scientific 
naturalism’ is something of a redundancy; however, I still use this phrase when it is 
important to emphasize this privileged role of the sciences. Alternatively, ‘non-
naturalism’ designates any view committed to the negation of CTN, whether or not it is 
also committed to CTN. Finally, although De Caro and Macarthur use the phrases 
‘scientistic naturalism’ and ‘liberal naturalism’, I find this way of speaking inapt for the 
ideas that they develop. For one, the similarity of the phrases ‘scientistic naturalism’ and 
‘scientific naturalism’ is apt to breed confusion. More substantively, ‘scientistic 
naturalism’ and ‘liberal naturalism’ do not designate two distinct views, but instead two 
families of views, and the boundaries of these families begin to blur into one another at 
a certain point. Consider someone like Ruth Millikan, who acknowledges normativity but 
does so by prioritizing biology as opposed to the more distinctly human sciences. The 
idea that ‘scientistic naturalism’ and ‘liberal naturalism’ designate rigid categories breaks 
down here, as the appropriate judgment to make is not the absolute one that Millikan is 
either a scientistic or a liberal naturalist. Instead, what are appropriate are the 
comparative judgments that her naturalism is more liberal than certain naturalists and 
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less liberal than others. For these reasons, I prefer the phrases ‘conservative 
naturalism’ and ‘liberal naturalism’, as these phrases better highlight the continuity 
between the various forms of naturalism while still acknowledging the marked 
differences at either end of the spectrum.  
 
§3. The Objectivity Demand 
Once we accept CTN, the first question we should ask ourselves is: what premise 
entitles us to hold CTN? Common sensically, what makes naturalism an attractive 
position is the track record of the sciences. They seem to be better at what they do than 
any other mode of inquiry, to the point where the laws and theorems of the sciences 
seem to be correct full stop if they are correct at all, and not merely correct for some 
person or community or correct given some practice or end. This categorical form of 
correctness is a key trapping of objectivity, and without such objectivity the sciences 
would be authoritative only for the particular people or communities engaged with the 
particular practices or ends associated with the sciences. Therefore, it is this objectivity 
that would allow the sciences to be authoritative over philosophy in the manner encoded 
by CTN, and for this reason naturalists must be able to acknowledge the objectivity of 
the sciences—ideally in a positive manner by explaining how such objectivity is 
possible, but at least in a negative manner by not saying anything that makes it 
impossible. This is the Objectivity Demand I will carry forward throughout this project. 
 I take it that this common sense story is correct as far as it goes, but it leaves the 
most important question unanswered: what exactly does ‘objectivity’ mean? In recent 
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decades, there has been fierce debate over whether there is anything like a single 
meaning of ‘objectivity’, and if so what that meaning might be. In this section, I quickly 
survey the literature on this debate, arguing that although many different meanings get 
ascribed to ‘objectivity’, these meanings are species of two more general meanings of 
‘objectivity’. Unfortunately, this leaves the Objectivity Demand ambiguous between 
these two meanings, so to make the Objectivity Demand determinate I construct a third 
general meaning for ‘objectivity’, one that is presupposed by the other two. 
 
a. J- and T-Objectivity 
The best way of understanding these two senses of ‘objective’ is to recognize that they 
both connect objectivity with a traditional condition for knowledge, with the difference 
being whereas the first focuses on the justification condition, the second focuses on the 
truth condition. The justification-focused sense of ‘objectivity’—j-objectivity for short—
applies most often to people or practices. A person is j-objective insofar as she has 
certain cognitive virtues that allow her to produce proper justification for her beliefs, and 
a practice is j-objective insofar as it instantiates these virtues. Different philosophers 
endorse different virtues, but common candidates are impartiality, disinterestedness, 
freedom from bias, and value neutrality. Because of this connection with the justification 
condition for knowledge, j-objectivity has more to do with the process of inquiry, not its 
final products, and in many speakers’ mouths ‘j-objective’ is roughly synonymous with 
‘rational’. Finally, j-objectivity is a degreed notion in the sense that a person or practice 
can be more or less j-objective. 
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 The truth-focused sense of ‘objectivity’—or t-objectivity—applies most often to 
facts, where a fact is t-objective insofar as it concerns reality and not mere appearance. 
As such, t-objectivity has more to do with the products of inquiry, and ’t-objective’ is 
roughly synonymous with ’real’. This leads t-objectivity either to be a binary notion in the 
sense that a fact either is t-objective or is not t-objective, or to be intimately bound up 
with such a notion (i.e. truth or reality). To summarize the difference between these two 
senses of ‘objectivity’, it helps to think in terms of Thomas Nagel’s familiar metaphor: in 
being j-objective we attempt to adopt the view from nowhere, and once we achieve the 
view from nowhere what we see is t-objective. 
 For some philosophers, distinguishing between j-objectivity and t-objectivity is 
sufficient for disambiguating the meanings of ‘objectivity’. Thomas Nagel, for one, holds 
such a view, maintaining that “[j-]objectivity is a method of understanding” and “only 
derivatively do we call [t-]objective the truths that can be arrived at” through j-objective 
methods.25 Bernard Williams holds a similar view when discussing what he calls the 
absolute conception of objectivity, stressing that “we must concentrate not in the first 
instance on what our beliefs are about, but on how they represent what they are 
about.”26 Williams’s hope is that by representing things j-objectively we can come into 
contact with the t-objective world. In an enlightening discussion of Nagel and Williams 
(among others), Arthur Fine highlights the distinction between j- and t-objectivity, saying 
that “the way inquiry is conducted can be objective but so can the results of inquiry,” and 
comments that Nagel and Williams’s “central image, the viewpoint of no-one in 
                                                       
25 Nagel, View, 4. See also Nagel, View, 3-5. 
26 Williams, Ethics, 138. See also Williams, Ethics, 111-112 and 138-140. 
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particular, displays this double edge nicely.”27 Much of Fine’s essay revolves around his 
distinction between procedural objectivity (i.e. j-objectivity) and the objectivity of the 
products of inquiry (i.e. t-objectivity), with his major contributions being to further 
disambiguate between species of each sense of objectivity28 and to reinterpret both 
senses in terms of trust.29 Finally, Nicholas Rescher says things perhaps most clearly of 
all: 
The issue of the objectivity of claims and contentions has two principal sides or 
aspects. One is object-oriented…. This sort of ontological objectivity turns on the 
pivotal contrast between that which is in some way connected with existing things 
and that which is somehow ideational and mind-bound. The salient distinction 
here is that between real things and mere appearances. 
 However, the second … mode of “objectivity” … relates to the 
appropriateness of claims or contentions, addressing the question of whether a 
claim is impersonally and generically cogent rather than personal and 
idiosyncratic…. Objectivity in this sense has to do not with the subject matter of a 
claim but with its justification.30 
 
Rescher ultimately reverses Nagel’s and Williams’s claim, arguing that ontological (i.e.  
t-) objectivity is a presupposition of and therefore grounds cognitive (i.e. j-) objectivity;31 
however, all three disambiguate ‘objectivity’ by taking recourse to j- and t-objectivity. 
 However, not all philosophers identify only two meanings of ‘objectivity’. Guy 
Axtell identifies three such meanings, Stephen Gaukroger identifies five, Heather 
Douglas identifies eight, and Marianne Janack identifies fourteen.32 Nevertheless, these 
                                                       
27 Fine, “The Viewpoint,” 14. Much of Fine’s essay revolves around his distinction between 
procedural objectivity (i.e. j-objectivity) and the objectivity of the products of inquiry (i.e. t-
objectivity). 
28 See Fine, “The Viewpoint,” 18. 
29 See Fine, “The Viewpoint,” 17-18. 
30 Rescher, Objectivity, 3-4. 
31 See Rescher, Objectivity, Chapter Seven. 
32 Janack’s list of meanings of ‘objectivity’ includes only 13 items. However, she later refers 
to “all 14 of these meanings” (Janack, “Dilemmas,” 276), suggesting to me that item 10 on 
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additional meanings can, for the most part, be seen as species of either j- or t-
objectivity. 
 Starting with Axtell, although his pluralism leads him to distinguish a number of 
meanings of ‘objectivity’ from one another, only three are of general interest and 
therefore relevant to our current discussion.33 The first two, what Axtell calls cognitive 
objectivity and what he calls either ontological or metaphysical objectivity, are simply j- 
and t-objectivity, respectively.34 It is his third, axiological approach to objectivity that is of 
interest to us. For Axtell, the key insight of this approach is that “many philosophical 
debates presumed to be metaphysical or epistemological in character actually stem 
from divergent judgments of value.”35 In particular, the debate concerning the meaning 
of ‘objectivity’ can be seen as one such debate, if it is assumed that there can be only 
one genuine meaning. The promise is of Axtell’s axiological is to show how: 
by charitably separating ‘moderate’ and ‘presumptuous’ versions of each [i.e. 
realism and idealism], the debate might move beyond its present impasse…. To 
the extent that the modest claims of realism [which prioritizes t-objectivity] and 
idealism [which prioritizes j-objectivity] can be consistently maintained, both 
principles [i.e. both t- and j-objectivity] could be mutually acknowledged.36 
 
In this manner, the axiological approach to objectivity does not result in a competitor to 
j- and t-objectivity, but instead a synthesis of the two. 
 Moving on to Gaukroger, although he identifies five possible meanings of 
‘objectivity’, he only takes three seriously. According to the two meanings that he 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
her list—“objectivity as having to do with things as they are in themselves; objectivity as 
universality” (Janack, “Dilemmas,” 275)—should be interpreted as two distinct items. 
33 See Axtell’s index entry for ‘objectivity’ for a list of the other meanings, most of which are 
of only passing or specialized interest for Axtell (Axtell, Objectivity, 245). 
34 See Axtell, Objectivity, 1-3 and 19-23. 
35 Axtell, Objectivity, 39. 
36 Axtell, Objectivity, 42. 
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downplays, “an objective procedure is one that allows us to decide between conflicting 
views or theories”37 and “something is objective if it leads to conclusions which are 
universally accepted,” respectively.38 Gaukroger downplays the former because it 
provides a necessary but insufficient condition for objectivity, while he downplays the 
latter because it provides a test for (as opposed to a definition of) objectivity. 
Nevertheless, both can be seen as components to j-objectivity insofar as they both 
specify a condition that our objective justificatory practices must meet. Of the meanings 
that he takes seriously, one says that “an objective judgement is a judgement that is 
free from prejudice or bias,”39 and another says that “an objective judgement is a 
judgement which is free of all assumptions and values.”40 Again, these are both 
varieties of j-objectivity, as they both relate to the process of justifying judgments. What 
separates them is that the first requires that distorting assumptions or values be 
eliminated while the second requires that any assumptions or values be eliminated. 
According to the final meaning that Gaukroger identifies, “objectivity consists in accurate 
representation,” or in other words, objectivity consists in t-objectivity.41 In each of these 
five cases, the relation to j- or t-objectivity is obvious. 
 Douglas organizes her eight meanings of ‘objectivity’ under three banners, 
objectivity1, objectivity2, and objectivity3. The three meanings that Douglas associates 
with objectivity2 identify the senses in which “individual thought processes” can be 
                                                       
37 Gaukroger, Objectivity, 6. 
38 Gaukroger, Objectivity, 10. 
39 Gaukroger, Objectivity, 4. 
40 Gaukroger, Objectivity, 5. 
41 Gaukroger, Objectivity, 9. 
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objective,42 while the three that she associates with objectivity3 identify the senses in 
which “social processes involved in knowledge production” can be objective.43 As a 
result, all six are varieties of j-objectivity, with the former three focusing on the j-
objectivity of persons and the latter three on the j-objectivity of practices. Concerning 
objectivity1, Douglas notes that “an objective result under this mode would be one that 
gained a grasp of the real objects in the world,” leading one to expect that objectivity1 is 
a variety of t-objectivity.44 However, Douglas “attempts to remain agnostic over the 
realism issue” at the heart of t-objectivity, leading her to formulate her two meanings of 
‘objectivity1’ in j-objective terms. In short, ‘objectivity1’ designates those aspects of j-
objectivity that most readily lead one to infer the existence of t-objective facts. Again, my 
account of j- and t-objectivity allows us to make sense of each of these eight meanings. 
 Finally, Janack’s fourteen meanings of ‘objectivity’ are a bit of a hodge-podge; 
she provides a list of all fourteen, but spends little time explicitly discussing any one of 
them individually. As such, my comments here will be cursory at best. The majority of 
the meanings that Janack identifies have clear connections to j-objectivity. Items 1, 2, 4, 
5, 7, 8, and 11 of her list identify objectivity with value neutrality, lack of bias, rationality, 
psychological distance, impersonality, impartiality, and disinterestedness (respectively). 
Each of these are virtues that, when instantiated, purportedly make people more j-
objective, and as such what I have said about Douglas’s objectivity2 above applies 
equally here. Similarly, items 3, 12, and 13 identify objectivity with scientific method, 
commensurability, and intersubjective agreement (respectively); all relate to communal 
                                                       
42 Douglas, “Irreducible Complexity,” 458. 
43 Douglas, “Irreducible Complexity,” 461. 
44 Douglas, “Irreducible Complexity,” 456. 
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practices of inquiry, and so all can be understood in terms of Douglas’s objectivity3. 
Since objectivity2 and objectivity3 are both species of j-objectivity, so too are these 10 
meanings that Janack surveys. Of the remaining 4 meanings, two have obvious 
connections to t-objectivity: item 9 identifies objectivity with “having to do with facts” and 
the first part of item 10 identifies it with “having to do with things as they are in 
themselves.”45 And finally, item 6 (“objectivity as ‘world-directedness’ ”) and the second 
part of item 10 (“objectivity as universality”) play a similar role as Douglas’s objectivity1, 
highlighting something about j-objectivity that purportedly allows us to bridge the gap to 
t-objectivity.46 In short, my distinction between j- and t-objectivity proves adequate even 
for Janack’s liberal disambiguation of ‘objectivity’.  
 By surveying this debate over the meaning(s) of ‘objectivity, we should now 
appreciate that my accounts of j- and t-objectivity capture the two poles around which 
the debate is structured. Some, like Nagel, Williams, Fine, and Rescher, are explicit 
about this point, while even those like Axtell and Janack who identify more than two 
meanings acknowledge the especial importance of j- and t-objectivity.47 
 
b. CPS-Aptness 
But even though I have established that the debate on the meaning of ‘objectivity’ 
centers around the distinction between j- and t-objectivity, this is of little immediate help 
for characterizing the Objectivity Demand. True, the Objectivity Demand is now only 
                                                       
45 Janack, “Dilemmas,” 275. For why I say ‘the first part of item 10’ and not just ‘item 10’, 
see note 32 above. 
46 Janack, “Dilemmas,” 275. 
47 See Axtell, Objectivity, 1-3. See also Janack’s distinctions between objectivityr and 
objectivityc at Janack, “Dilemmas,” 268, and between procedural objectivity and 
metaphysical objectivity at Janack, “Dilemmas,” 278. 
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doubly ambiguous—and not three, five, eight, or fourteen times over—but this ambiguity 
is unfortunately ambiguity enough. One strategy for rectifying this would be to argue that 
the Objectivity Demand should be formulated in terms of either j- or t-objectivity, but to 
do so would involve taking a substantive position within the realist/anti-realist debate. 
Since this debate is especially lively among the sort of analytic pragmatist thinkers 
whose work is at the core of my dissertation project, pursuing this strategy would 
ultimately be question begging.  
 To avoid this problem, I pursue the alternate strategy of formulating the 
Objectivity Demand in terms of a third sense of ‘objectivity’, one that is both inferentially 
weaker than either of the senses I have surveyed above yet presupposed by both. This 
third sense of ‘objectivity’ applies primarily to sentences, and instead of being connected 
with truth or justification, it is connected with what I call categorical-propriety-status-
aptness (CPS-aptness). Because what is at issue here is the aptness of sentences to 
have some status, and not that status itself, I designate this sense of ‘objectivity’ a-
objectivity. However, before I begin to characterize a-objectivity itself, I must mention 
four points about what I mean by ‘CPS-aptness’. 
 The first point concerns what I mean by ‘propriety’. Here, I am adopting the idiom 
of Robert Brandom, who takes language use to be a practice that is normatively rich in 
the sense that it is governed by rules of a peculiar kind. Unlike physical laws, which are 
rules that dictate how physical bodies must act, linguistic rules dictate how linguistic 
entities ought to be used. The important difference is that in the former case physical 
bodies actually do act in the manner prescribed by the rules that govern them, whereas 
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this need not be the case for linguistic entities. ‘Propriety’ is then the genus term that 
designates the sort of rules of which linguistic rules are a species—namely those that 
prescribe what merely ought to be done, but may or may not actually be done.  
 The second point concerns what I mean by ‘propriety status’. A linguistic entity, 
such as a sentence, is either governed by a propriety or it is not so governed, and if it is 
governed by a propriety then it is either appropriate or inappropriate to that propriety. 
Appropriateness and inappropriateness are then the two propriety statuses a sentence 
can have. To take a familiar example, consider the following propriety: 
T-Propriety - It is prima facie appropriate to assert what is the case and prima 
facie inappropriate to assert what is not the case.  
 
The t-propriety governs sentences such as ‘Snow is white’, and we designate such a 
sentence as being true when it is appropriate to the t-propriety and false when it is 
inappropriate. In this manner, truth and falsity are the two propriety statuses that a 
sentence like ‘Snow is white’ might have, while given certain details about the physical 
world and our usage of language, we know that the particular sentence ‘Snow is white’ 
actually has the propriety status of being true. Alternatively, the t-propriety does not so 
much as govern a non-assertional sentence such as ‘Is snow white?’, and so ‘Is snow 
white?’ does not have a propriety status relative to the t-propriety (although it may have 
such a status relative to some other propriety). 
 The third point concerns what I mean by ‘categorical propriety’. Given that 
humans have developed multiple different languages, and that within any one language 
we do many different things, it is natural to conceive of language as being made up of 
various language games. But once we do this, we realize that each linguistic propriety 
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does not govern every language game. In fact, a difference in proprieties is precisely 
what individuates language games one from another. With this in mind, a categorical 
propriety is one that applies across all (relevant) language games. Consider again the t-
propriety. There are strong arguments to the effect that this propriety governs 
assertions, regardless of what language game one is playing. The prima facie qualifier 
marks that other proprieties (categorical or otherwise) may trump the t-propriety, but 
nonetheless it is a genuine propriety—even when it is being trumped. In this manner, a 
categorical propriety need not be one that is legislative all-things-considered. 
 Finally, the fourth point concerns what I mean by ‘aptness’. In particular, we 
should notice that there is an ambiguity in how ‘aptness’ is often used. On the one hand, 
for something to be propriety-status-apt could mean that it meets at least one condition 
for being either appropriate or inappropriate to the propriety for which it is apt, 
regardless of whether it meets all conditions (or even a single sufficient condition). On 
the other hand, for something to be propriety-status-apt could mean that it is either 
appropriate or inappropriate to the propriety for which it is apt. To understand the 
difference, consider the sentence ‘Colorless green ideas sleep furiously’. It is in the 
indicative mood, so its syntax allows it to be embedded within Tarski’s disquotational 
schema, so it meets one condition for being either true or false. For this reason, it is 
truth-apt in the first sense of ‘aptness’. However, it is arguable that this sentence is 
simply nonsensical and therefore not semantically meaningful. Assuming this to be the 
case, this sentence would not be truth-apt in the second sense, although it is in the first 
sense. Going forward, I will be using ‘aptness’ in the second sense.  
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c. CPS-Aptness in Practice 
Before I move on to characterizing a-objectivity in terms of CPS-aptness, there is an 
obvious question I should address: given that I have used truth and truth-aptness as an 
example throughout the previous four points, why do I not characterize a-objectivity in 
terms of the more familiar notion of truth-aptness? As I hope is clear already, CPS-
aptness is the genus concept of which truth-aptness is a species. Whereas what makes 
something CPS-apt is the fact that it is appropriate or inappropriate to a categorical 
propriety, for something to be truth-apt is for the categorical propriety to which it is apt to 
be characterized in a certain manner—usually in terms of a notion of correspondence or 
of accurate representation. Because these notions are commonly put in question by my 
analytic pragmatist interlocutors in this project, it would be blatantly question-begging on 
my part to insist that a-objectivity be understood in terms of the controversial species-
concept of truth-aptness, so I have spent my efforts above developing (what I hope will 
prove to be) the uncontroversial genus-concept of CPS-aptness. 
 However, neologism is apt to breed confusion, so it is worth pausing to go over 
some additional species of CPS-aptness. On the one hand, there are strong reasons to 
think assertions are not the only speech acts governed by categorical proprieties. 
Consider imperatives, which are arguably governed by the following propriety: 
A-Propriety: it is prima facie inappropriate to command someone over whom you 
do not have authority and prima facie appropriate (or at least not inappropriate) to 
command someone over whom you do have authority. 
 
This propriety accounts for why it is appropriate for a drill sergeant to command, “Drop 
and give me 20!,” when this imperative is directed at her recruits while training them, but 
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inappropriate were she to direct this imperative at the keynote speaker of a philosophy 
conference during the speaker’s Q&A session. The A-Propriety is (arguably) in effect in 
both cases, despite the marked differences in the language games surrounding the 
practices of basic training and academic conferences.  
 On another hand, there seem to be categorical proprieties that govern all types of 
speech act. Consider the following: 
R-Propriety: it is prima facie inappropriate to utter something irrelevant to the 
current context and prima facie appropriate (or at least not inappropriate) to utter 
something relevant to the current context. 
 
This (arguably) applies equally to the assertion, ‘4 is the square root of 16’, the question, 
‘What’s up?’, and the exclamation, ‘God damnit!’ We can easily imagine ‘4 is the square 
root of 16’ being appropriate to utter in the context of a math class, but it would 
generally be inappropriate to utter this while in the middle of a game of basketball. 
Similarly, ‘What’s up?’ is a perfectly appropriate question when first seeing a friend or 
acquaintance after some time away from each other, but it is generally inappropriate to 
ask this question a second time of the same person immediately after he or she has 
finished answering you the first time. Finally, for the secular among us ‘god damnit!’ can 
be an appropriate exclamation to make in a number of contexts, but even we 
understand the inappropriateness of uttering it unprovoked in the middle of a church 
service. Arguably, the single R-Propriety not only applies across the highly varied 
language games associated with math classes, basketball games, interactions with 
friends, and church services, but it also applies to assertions, questions, exclamations, 
and any other type of speech act uttered in these or other language games.  
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 Moving more directly to the issue of why I use CPS-aptness as the operative 
notion, and not truth-aptness, let us consider some pragmatist alternatives to the T-
Propriety from above: 
WA-Propriety: it is prima facie appropriate to assert what you have warrant to 
assert and prima facie inappropriate to assert what you do not have warrant to 
assert; 
 
IJ-Propriety: it is prima facie appropriate to assert what would be justified ‘at the 
end of inquiry’ and prima facie inappropriate to assert what would not be justified 
‘at the end of inquiry’; 
 
SK-Propriety: it is prima facie appropriate to utter something that scorekeepers in 
your community take to be appropriate to utter and it is prima facie inappropriate 
to utter something that scorekeepers in your community take to be inappropriate 
to utter; 
 
H-Propriety: it is prima facie appropriate to utter something that tends to ‘keep the 
conversation going’ and prima facie inappropriate to utter something that tends to 
prevent the conversation from ‘going’. 
 
Respectively, these proprieties are meant to line up with a Deweyan account of 
warranted assertibility,48 a Peircean account of ideal justification,49 Brandom’s 
phenomenalist account of scorekeeping,50 and a flat-footed reading of Rorty’s account 
of hermeneutics.51 With these proprieties stated, it should not be difficult to imagine how 
they apply to individual utterances.  
                                                       
48 See Dewey, Logic; also Price, “Truth.” 
49 See Peirce, “Questions”; Peirce, “Some Consequences”; Peirce “Fixation”; Peirce, “How to 
Make”; also Price, “Truth.” 
50 See Brandom, Making It Explicit, especially 291-293. 
51 See Rorty, Philosophy, 313-394. I say that the C-Propriety lines up with a flat-footed 
reading of Rorty because, as I understand his distinction between epistemology and 
hermeneutics, Rorty’s intention is not to argue against epistemology’s concern with a 
categorical T-Propriety and replace it with hermeneutics’s different but no less categorical C-
Propriety. Instead, in arguing against epistemology Rorty is arguing against categorical 
propriety as such, and his replacement is a hermeneutics that consists in a collection of 
non-categorical proprieties. 
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 Starting with the WA- and IJ-Proprieties, let us consider the sentence, ‘Snow is 
white’. Asserting this sentence would be appropriate to the WA-Propriety iff the asserter 
has seen snow, or read a textbook about snow, or received testimony from someone 
who is knowledgeable about snow, or has some other sort of evidence in favor of 
snow’s being white. Alternatively, such an assertion would be appropriate to the IJ-
Propriety iff, after the asserter and his community were to inquire into the issue, the 
evidence would still support the assertion. In both cases, there is a break from the T-
Propriety insofar as what is decisive is not the whiteness of snow itself, but the 
asserter’s epistemic access to the snow’s whiteness.  
 Turning to the SK- and H-Proprieties, we see that it is no longer the asserter’s 
epistemic access to snow’s whiteness that is decisive, but instead his intersubjective 
relation to other members in his community. Under the SK-Propriety, it is appropriate for 
the asserter to say that snow is white iff his peers ‘let him get away with it’, meaning that 
either they do not disagree with him about whether snow is white or they treat the issue 
as to whether snow is white to be an issue where no-fault disagreement is possible.52 
And under the H-Propriety, such an assertion is appropriate iff it leads to some 
combination of more discussion, more productive discussion, and more important 
discussion between the asserter and his peers. 
 Hopefully this all-to-brief discussion of ‘Snow is white’ gives my reader the clues 
needed to apply these four proprieties to less schematic examples. But instead of 
focusing on further examples, it is time to highlight certain more general points about 
                                                       
52 See Price, “Truth” for more on no-fault disagreement. 
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CPS-aptness that emerge from considering all seven proprieties I have discussed so 
far.  
 First, I should reiterate the dialectical purpose of these examples. I do not take it 
that I have proven, through rational argument, that all of these proprieties are 
categorical. In fact, in Division Four of Chapter Two I will be arguing that Brandom 
cannot acknowledge categorical proprieties, so if I am right there then the SK-Propriety 
is not categorical because it cannot be so. Alternatively, in Chapter Three I will be 
arguing in favor of a version of IJ-Propriety, so I take it that this propriety can be 
categorical in nature. However, all of this is to come later. For now, I am discussing 
these proprieties simply in order to give my reader a better handle on what I mean by 
‘categorical propriety’ and ‘CPS-aptness’, not to do any substantive philosophical work 
using these phrases. 
 Second, assuming that these proprieties are categorical, what makes them 
categorical is the fact that they apply across all (relevant) language games. This cross-
language-game quality is what is decisive as to whether a propriety is categorical, and 
so by extension it is decisive as to whether something is CPS-apt or a-objective 
because my notions of CPS-aptness and a-objectivity are built around my notion of 
categorical propriety. Importantly, it is not the external world, nor our epistemic access 
to the external world, nor our engagement with members of various communities that is 
decisive, as we can see by the fact that the T-, WA- and IJ-, and SK- and H-Proprieties 
differ along these three dimensions but are all equally categorical proprieties. Since I am 
about to account for a-objectivity in terms of categorical propriety, this means that a-
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objectivity has to do with commensurability between language games, and not 
necessarily the external world, our access to the external world, or our intersubjective 
relations to one another. 
 The final sentence of the previous paragraph leads into the third point worth 
highlighting: given the way I have developed my notion of categorical propriety, the 
notion of a-objectivity I am about to develop is merely a necessary component of what 
most people would consider a fully developed account of objectivity. My claim to come 
will be that my account of a-objectivity is both inferentially weaker than and 
presupposed by the accounts of j- and t-objectivity above. This entails that if something 
is j- or t-objective then it is a-objective. However, it need not entail that if something is a-
objective then it is j- or t-objective, for the simple reason that these latter notions are 
more closely associated with the external world and our access to it than is a-objectivity. 
I say more on these issues shortly. 
 The fourth point worth noting is that, as I have formulated them, all seven 
categorical proprieties include a prima facie qualifier. I have not argued that such a 
qualifier is a necessary component of a categorical propriety, and it would take me too 
far afield from the topic of this section to do so now. However, I am inclined to think that 
this is the case. Wittgenstein’s later works are particularly relevant here, as they 
highlight the many and varied things we do with language.53 A common conclusion 
based on Wittgenstein’s observations about this functional pluralism of language is that 
the sort of commensurability between language games that I associate with categorical 
propriety is illusory, but I think such a conclusion is too strong. Surely, Wittgenstein’s 
                                                       
53 See in particular Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. 
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observations highlight that there are many proprieties at work within our use of 
language, that not all proprieties apply to all uses of language, and that any one 
propriety (categorical or otherwise) can and does get overridden by other proprieties 
(categorical or otherwise) in our actual use of language. This final point in particular tells 
against the claim that there are categorical proprieties of language use that apply all 
things considered, but it does not tell against the weaker claim that there are categorical 
proprieties that apply merely prima facie. For this reason, the lesson I take from the later 
Wittgenstein is not that there are no categorical proprieties, but that such proprieties are 
only prima facie proprieties. 
 Fifth, and finally, it is worth foreshadowing how I will be using the notion of 
categorical propriety within the Objectivity Demand as a critical tool in Chapter Two. 
Generally speaking, it is not difficult to identify what each analytic pragmatist purports to 
be a categorical propriety within his or her view. However, the difficulty resides in 
characterizing the operative words or concepts within these categorical proprieties in a 
way that is both naturalistically sound (more on this in §4 below) and allows for the 
possibility of categorical propriety in the first place. As such, my critique of Huw Price 
and Robert Brandom will not be that they do not provide us with a propriety that they 
purport is categorical. Instead, my critique is that the propriety they have chosen, 
despite its categorical purport, cannot actually be categorical because of the role that 
this propriety plays within their overall semantic theories. 
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d. A-Objectivity 
With my notions of categorical propriety and CPS-aptness (hopefully) clarified, let us 
move on to characterizing a-objectivity. As I said, a-objectivity is connected with CPS-
aptness and applies primarily to sentences. Namely, a sentence is a-objective iff it is 
CPS-apt. As such, a-objectivity does not focus exclusively on either the process or the 
product side of inquiry, but instead focuses on the stable, product-like entities with which 
the process of inquiry is conducted. 
 Now that we understand to a first approximation what a-objectivity is, we need to 
see how it is both inferentially weaker than j- or t-objectivity and presupposed by both. 
Doing this is important not only for ensuring my account of the Objectivity Demand is not 
question begging in the manner mentioned above, but also for giving us a deeper 
understanding of a-objectivity itself. 
 The claim that a-objectivity is inferentially weaker is easy to prove. Whereas 
someone’s being j-objective has implications concerning that person’s epistemic status 
and something’s being t-objective has implications concerning that thing’s metaphysical 
status, a sentence’s being a-objective does not by itself have any such epistemological 
or metaphysical implications. Alternatively, assuming that a-objectivity is presupposed 
by j- and t-objectivity, anything that follows from a sentence’s being a-objective will 
equally follow from a person’s being j-objective or a thing’s being t-objective in relation 
to that sentence. 
 That a-objectivity is presupposed by t-objectivity is similarly easy to prove. For us 
to speak about reality requires that we have sentences with which to speak. And for us 
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to speak t-objectively about reality, these sentences must be evaluable in terms of truth 
or some successor form of categorical propriety, which is just to say that these 
sentences must be a-objective. In this sense, a-objectivity is presupposed by t-
objectivity. 
 Finally, proving that a-objectivity is presupposed by j-objectivity is a more 
substantive task. In outline, my argument for this is: 
P1. For all x, if x is justifiable, then x is an assertion. 
P2. For all x, if x is justifiable, then x has a stable meaning. 
P3. For all x, if x is an assertion and has a stable meaning, then x is categorical-
propriety-apt. 
P4. For all x, if x is categorical-propriety-apt, then x is a-objective. 
∴ C. For all x, if x is justifiable, then x is a-objective. 
 
Although P4 encodes a terminological point that follows from my account of a-objectivity 
above, the remaining premises are controversial. As such, I need to argue for each in 
turn. 
 
d. i. Preliminaries to My Arguments for P1-3 
Before I address each premise individually, I must address two issues that will apply 
throughout my defense of each premise. First, I am assuming that there is a distinction 
to be drawn between utterances, sentences, and meanings. To gain an understanding 
of this distinction, consider the following examples. If I say or write ‘Snow is white’, I 
have made an utterance, and although I can refer to this utterance in another utterance 
(perhaps by saying ‘What I just said is true’), I am not able to make this same utterance 
again. However, if I were to say ‘Snow is white’ at one time, then say ‘Snow is white’ at 
another time, I would be making different utterances of the same sentence. In this 
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manner, sentences classify types of utterances. Similarly, if I were to say ‘Snow is 
white’, ‘White is the color of snow’, and ‘Schnee ist weiß’, I would be making three 
utterances of three different sentences, but these sentences would all have the same 
meaning (at least under normal circumstances). Finally, if I were to say ’Snow is white’ 
and ‘Grass is green’, I would be making two utterances of two different sentences, each 
with a different meaning (again, assuming normal circumstances). At this point, I remain 
agnostic as to what is the proper ontological story to tell to support this three-way 
distinction, whether it be the minimal Sellarsian story of dot quotes and functional 
roles,54 or the substantive Platonic story of non-natural forms,55 or something between 
these extremes. What is important are the type-token relations between these three 
concepts. Going forward, unless I say otherwise I will be speaking at the level of 
sentences. 
 The second issue to address concerns what I mean by ‘speech acts’. On my 
usage, a speech act is anything that has a performative linguistic force. Primarily, it is 
utterances that are speech acts. This is because different utterances of the same 
sentence can have different forces (think of how ’You’re so smart’ can be either a 
sincere compliment or an ironic insult). However, sentences and meanings can be 
considered speech acts in a derivative sense, insofar as utterances of a sentence 
normally have the same force within the same language game, or insofar as sentences 
that share a meaning normally perform the same speech act within the same language 
game, respectively. Again, I remain agnostic as to what is the proper story to tell about 
                                                       
54 See Sellars, “Meaning.” 
55 See Plato, Republic, Books VI and VII. 
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normalcy,56 and unless I say otherwise I will be speaking about sentences when 
speaking about speech acts. 
 
d. ii. Argument for P1 
Returning to the premises of my argument, let us begin at the beginning, with P1. The 
first thing I need to do in my defense of P1 is to specify what it means for something to 
be justifiable. The purpose of inquiry is to turn up evidence, and that something gains 
the status of being justified once enough positive evidence has accrued in its favor. For 
something to be justifiable is simply for it to be the sort of thing to which evidence 
(whether positive or negative) is able to accrue.  
 From here, the next step in my argument for P1 is to argue that if something is a 
non-assertion then it is not justifiable. This is a contentious enough claim that 
counterexamples, if they exist, should be ready at hand, and so my defense of this claim 
consists in a survey of supposed counterexamples. First, let us consider non-assertional 
types of speech act. For many of these, the evidence-accrual model that is definitive of 
justifiability is plainly inappropriate. For instance, an interrogative like ‘Is it raining?’ is a 
call for evidence, and not something that is itself in need of evidence.57  
 For other types of speech act, it is less clear that the evidence-accrual model is 
inappropriate. Consider an imperative like ‘Drop and give me 20!’. This is a call to 
action, but one that is evaluable in terms of justification in at least two ways. First, a 
                                                       
56 For one such story, see Millikan, Language. 
57 Of course, a speech act like ‘ ‘Is it raining?’ is an appropriate question’ would be one for 
which the evidence-accrual model is appropriate, but this is simply because we have 
embedded the original interrogative into an assertional speech act. 
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person must have the proper justification to be entitled to perform this speech act, and 
second the act called upon to be performed ought to be one that is justified in some 
relevant sense. For now, I note that we are no longer talking about the speech act itself, 
but instead the performer of and perlocutionary effect of the speech act, respectively, so 
there is no reason to suspect that the speech act itself is in need of evidence. I say 
more about how justifiability relates to persons or non-linguistic actions shortly.  
 Finally, consider an observative like ‘Lo, a rabbit!’. Focusing on its surface 
grammar leads one to think that such a speech act does not have the assertional force 
of a speech act like ‘I see a rabbit’, and yet both would seem to play the same evidential 
role within inquiry. However, this is not how things stand, as this is precisely the error 
that Sellars diagnoses in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.” If ‘Lo, a rabbit!’ is 
non-assertional, then it cannot play the same role as ‘I see a rabbit’ does in the game of 
giving and asking for reasons. Therefore, ‘Lo, a rabbit!’ is not justifiable; instead, it 
reports a mere appearance for which evidence is inappropriate. Alternatively, if ‘Lo, a 
rabbit!’ plays the same role as ‘I see a rabbit’ does, it is because ‘Lo, a rabbit!’ is, 
despite its surface grammar, an assertion and therefore not a counterexample to my 
claim that if something is a non-assertion then it is not justifiable. 
 Let us now move on to things other than speech acts. One thing that might come 
to mind is that concepts can have a justified use within a language game. For instance, 
the concept of an electron has a justified use in the physical sciences because it allows 
us to predict certain phenomena (such as those that occur within a computer) and to 
design certain instruments (such as electron scanning microscopes). Does this not 
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entail that the concept of an electron is justifiable, since actuality proves possibility? My 
response is that this very well may be the case, but if so only because concepts are 
justifiable in the derivative sense of being used within assertions that are justifiable. This 
response maintains that assertions are the only things that are justifiable in the first 
instance, and thereby proves that concepts are not a counterexample to my claim. 
 Returning to where we left off with imperatives, what about persons or non-
linguistic actions? Why aren’t they justifiable and therefore counterexamples? Again, my 
response is to concede that they are justifiable, but instead of being justifiable in a 
derivative sense they are more likely to be justifiable in a distinct sense from the one I 
am using here. Instead of being justifiable in an epistemic sense that has to do with 
evidence-accrual through inquiry, persons and actions are justifiable in a practical or 
moral sense that has to do with either social positioning or furthering what is good. 
These are perfectly interesting senses of ‘justification’, but they are not of particular 
relevance to the current discussion. 
 At this point, I hope to have highlighted the sorts of strategies I would use when 
faced with a supposed counterexample to the claim that if something is a non-assertion 
then it is not justifiable. The first, as seen in the cases of non-assertional speech acts, is 
to claim that for some more or less obvious reason, the evidence-accrual model of 
justifiability is inappropriate for the supposed counterexample. The second, as seen in 
part in the case of observatives, is to claim that the supposed counterexample actually 
functions as an assertion, despite appearances to the contrary. The third, as seen in the 
case of concepts, is to concede that the supposed counterexample is justifiable, but in a 
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derivative sense. And finally, the fourth, as seen in the case of persons or non-linguistic 
actions, is to concede that the supposed counterexample is justifiable, but in a distinct 
sense that is irrelevant to our current concerns. With these strategies mapped out, it is 
now up to my dialectical opponent to produce a counterexample that cannot be 
accommodated through some combination of these strategies. Otherwise, I take it that 
this argument justifies a commitment to the claim that if something is a non-assertion 
then it is not justifiable. 
 The final step in my defense of P1 is the obvious step of noting that the second 
step establishes the contrapositive of P1. Since contrapositives are equivalent I have 
thereby established P1. 
 
d. iii. Argument for P2 
Moving on to P2, my defense comes in three steps. First, because P2 introduces the 
new concept of stability, I must specify what it means for a sentence to have a stable 
meaning. On my usage, there are two components to stability: diachronic stability and 
synchronic stability. A sentence S has a diachronically stable meaning within a 
language game L and across some period of time t1-t2 iff S has the same meaning, or 
an adequately similar meaning, within L across t1-t2.58 A sentence S has a 
synchronically stable meaning across a set of language games {L1, L2,…, Ln} at a time 
t iff that sentence’s meaning is either directly or indirectly synchronically stable across 
                                                       
58 I define ‘diachronic stability’ in terms of either sameness of meaning or similarity of 
meaning in order to remain agnostic on the issues concerning synonymy and the analytic-
synthetic distinction that Quine, “Two Dogmas” raises. At this stage, nothing hinges on 
whether sameness or similarity is taken to be the operative concept. 
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{L1, L2,…, Ln} at t. S has a directly synchronically stable meaning across {L1, L2,…, Ln} 
at t iff S both appears in each of the language games L1, L2,…, Ln at t and has the 
same or similar meaning in each language game L1, L2,…, Ln at t. S has an indirectly 
synchronically stable meaning across {L1, L2,…, Ln} at t iff first, S does not appear in 
each of the language games L1, L2,…, Ln at t; and second, S has a synchronically 
stable meaning at t across the set of language games included in {L1, L2,…, Ln} in 
which S does appear; and third, for each language game included in {L1, L2,…, Ln} in 
which S does not appear, S is translatable at t to some sentence S’ that does appear in 
the language game and S’ has the same or similar meaning as S at t. Putting all of this 
together, a sentence S has a stable meaning across a set of language games {L1, 
L2,…, Ln} across a period of time t1-t2 iff S has a diachronically stable meaning within 
each language game L1, L2,…, Ln across t1-t2 and S has a synchronically stable 
meaning across {L1, L2,…, Ln} at each time between t1 and t2. 
 The second step in my defense of P2 is to argue that if something is justifiable 
then it is diachronically stable. This follows from P1, the accrual model of justification, 
and certain empirical considerations concerning inquiry. P1 tells us that if something is 
justifiable then it is an assertion, so we need only focus on assertional sentences when 
defending P2. Also, we should remember that for an assertional sentence to be the sort 
of thing that is justifiable it must be the sort of thing to which different pieces of evidence 
can accrue. It is at this point that the empirical considerations come into play. Given our 
cognitive capacities and the fact that we are embodied within the physical world, inquiry 
is not the sort of thing that happens all at once. We must engage in a temporally 
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extended process of inquiry, continuously turning up new evidence and combining it 
with old evidence. As such, given that we both gain evidence across time and apply it to 
justifiable assertional sentences across time, those sentences must maintain a 
diachronically stable meaning across that time—otherwise, we would not be justifying 
the same thing but instead justifying a series of distinct things, making the accrual of 
evidence to one thing an impossibility. Therefore, if something is justifiable, then it is 
diachronically stable. 
 The third and final step is to argue that if something is justifiable then it is 
synchronically stable. To see that this ought to be the case, notice that eliminating 
sources of justification is intellectually vicious, and that for all we know any language 
game might provide us with a source of justification. Denying either of these points—not 
to mention both—is the height of dogmatism in its pejorative sense. It is to block the 
way of inquiry, to use Peirce’s famous maxim.59 If we are to avoid this vice, a sentence 
we are looking to justify must have a synchronically stable meaning so that evidence 
from disparate language games can accrue to it.   
 This is a regulative point about how things ought to be, and the obvious 
pushback is to say that this is a merely regulative point, one that has no bearing on how 
things actually are. But the latter simply isn’t the case. We have a certain autonomy over 
our language games to construct them as we see fit. Barring a substantive argument to 
the contrary, there is no reason to think that our efforts at constructing language games 
that meet this regulative demand are doomed at the outset. True, our autonomy is not 
                                                       
59 See Peirce, “First Rule,” 48. 
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complete, but it is not illusory either, and my project throughout the coming pages is, in 
its own incomplete way, aimed at demonstrating this. 
 Since I have defined stability as the conjunction of diachronic and synchronic 
stability, and since I have now argued that justifiability entails both diachronic and 
synchronic stability, I have thereby established P2, i.e. that if something is justifiable 
then it has a stable meaning. 
 
d. iv. Argument for P3 
P3 is the final controversial premise. Luckily, we have already gone over what it means 
to be categorical-propriety-apt above, so we can jump directly to defending P3. The first 
point to note is that assertions don’t simply assert something; they assert something 
about something. For this reason, assertions have intentionality and with this comes 
intentional objects. Acknowledging this much does not unduly stack the deck against the 
expressivist and in favor of the representationalist—a point not lost on either Brandom 
or Price.60 However, acknowledging this does commit us to there being proprieties 
governing assertions, insofar as assertions can be appropriate or inappropriate to their 
intentional objects. 
 From here, the second point to note is how the stability of the sentences we use 
to make assertions affects the proprieties governing those assertions. In particular, if an 
assertional sentence has a stable meaning, then it will assert the same something about 
the same something across the set of language games over which it is stable. As such, 
                                                       
60 See Brandom, Making It Explicit, Chapter 8 and Conclusion; also Brandom, Between 
Saying, Chapter 6; also Price, Expressivism, 55. 
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the propriety relating the assertional sentence to its intentional object will be the same 
across these language games, which is just to say that this propriety will be a 
categorical propriety and the sentence will be categorical-propriety-apt. Therefore, P3—
if something is an assertion and has a stable meaning, then it is categorical-propriety-
apt—has been established. 
 
e. The Objectivity Demand 
Now that I have argued for the controversial P1-3, I am entitled to accept the conclusion 
C—that if something is justifiable then it is a-objective. What this shows is that, for j-
objectivity to be so much as possible (let alone actual), there must be a-objective 
sentences. With this I have completed the task that I set out to perform above, namely 
to demonstrate that a-objectivity is inferentially weaker than yet presupposed by both t- 
and j-objectivity.  
 Although this is, in its own right, an interesting conclusion about the relation 
between a-, t-, and j-objectivity, we are still one step removed from the final conclusion 
of this section. Remember that we are interested in these three forms of objectivity 
insofar as they are relevant to the Objectivity Demand with which we started this 
section. Now that I have shown that a-objectivity is weaker than yet presupposed by t- 
and j-objectivity, we can use the notion of a-objectivity to reformulate the Objectivity 
Demand in a manner that does not beg important questions against my interlocutors 
going forward. Doing so gives us: 
Objectivity Demand: Naturalists must be able to acknowledge the objectivity of 
science—ideally in a positive manner by explaining how a-objectivity is possible, 
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but at least in a negative manner by not saying anything that makes a-objectivity 
impossible. 
 
 
§4. The Deflationary Demand 
Now that we have finished characterizing the Objectivity Demand, we should return our 
focus to CTN. Remembering how we developed the Objectivity Demand as a way of 
understanding what premise justifies a commitment to CTN, the natural next question is: 
what conclusions follow from this commitment to CTN? In this section, I highlight one 
such conclusion, and argue that it forces the naturalist to take seriously the project of 
deflation within philosophy. 
 Starting again with a common-sensical observation, the sciences paint a detailed 
picture of us as humans. We are fallible, finite beings, who are different from but 
nevertheless continuous with every other animal, plant, and inanimate object in nature. 
Our home is within the same spatial, temporal, and causal nexus that these animals, 
plants, and objects call home, and even our distinctive form of rationality is seen as the 
latest in a chain of evolutionary developments that connects us first to primates and 
then, more distally, to various lower animals.  
 If we are to be naturalists, we must take seriously this scientific picture we are 
painting of ourselves. Although part of our project as philosophers is to interpret what 
this picture means for us, we must be sure to curb our enthusiasm to ensure that our 
philosophizing is not itself without a place in this picture. Traditional superstitions (such 
as there being a transcendent god or our having an immortal, immaterial soul) must be 
reformulated such that they have their proper place within the scientific picture of 
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ourselves, or else we must learn to live without them. Reformulating this last point gives 
us a second demand that any naturalist must be able to meet—namely, naturalists must 
ensure that their philosophical investigations are properly deflated with respect to the 
sciences. Let us call this the Deflationary Demand. 
 
a. Formulating the Deflationary Demand 
As before, I take it that this common sensical story is on the right track, but that it leaves 
the important question unanswered: what does ‘properly deflated’ mean? Traditionally, 
naturalists have assumed that for philosophy to be properly deflated is for it to be 
continuous with the sciences (in the sense discussed in §2 above); however, such a 
requirement would beg the question against more liberal versions of naturalism. 
Therefore, to develop a neutral answer to this question, I turn to Mario De Caro and 
Alberto Voltolini’s “Is Liberal Naturalism Possible.” This article makes use of many of the 
same distinctions that De Caro and Macarthur develop in the Introductions to their 
edited volumes, but whereas De Caro and Macarthur focus on establishing that ‘liberal 
naturalism’ is a meaningful expression, De Caro and Voltolini argue that liberal 
naturalism is a viable research project. 
 In particular, De Caro and Voltolini make use of two distinctions from De Caro 
and Macarthur’s Introductions that are relevant to our present purposes. First, De Caro 
and Voltolini distinguish between philosophy’s being continuous with the sciences and 
philosophy’s being different than the sciences, and they use this distinction to 
differentiate conservative from liberal naturalism. The details mirror §2 above. More 
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conservative naturalisms entail that philosophy is continuous with the sciences,61 while 
more liberal naturalisms entail only that philosophy is different from the sciences.62 
Despite this difference, what makes both sorts of naturalism of a kind is their shared 
commitment to what De Caro and Voltolini term “the ‘constitutive claim of contemporary 
naturalism’ ”: that “no entity or explanation should be accepted whose existence or truth 
contradict the laws of nature.”63 By De Caro and Voltolini’s lights, to deny this final claim 
is to adopt non-naturalism.64 
 De Caro and Voltolini are plainly on to something with their constitutive claim of 
naturalism, and this should go some ways towards vindicating my stipulation in §2 that 
the sciences pose at least a consistency standard for philosophy; however, I would 
reformulate their claim to read ‘no entity or explanation should be accepted whose 
existence or truth either contradicts or is contrary to the laws of nature’. If two 
propositions are either contradictory or contrary they cannot both be true (or 
categorically appropriate), but whereas contradictory propositions have opposite truth 
(or CPS-) values, it is possible for contrary propositions both to be false (or categorically 
inappropriate). By adding contrariness to De Caro and Voltolini’s claim, we are now able 
to acknowledge that contemporary science need not have all the answers while still 
maintaining that it provides a standard for rejecting certain philosophical excesses.65 For 
simplicity’s sake, I have previously been using and will continue to use variations on the 
                                                       
61 See De Caro and Voltolini, “Is Liberal Naturalism,” 72-73. 
62 See De Caro and Voltolini, “Is Liberal Naturalism,” 75-79. 
63 De Caro and Voltolini, “Is Liberal Naturalism,” 71. 
64 See De Caro and Voltolini, “Is Liberal Naturalism,” 73-75. 
65 I must thank Robert Talisse for helping me to appreciate the importance of the contrary-
contradictory distinction in this context. 
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phrase ‘conflicts with the sciences’ as shorthand for ‘contradicts or is contrary to the 
sciences’. 
 But for now, let us turn to De Caro and Voltolini’s second distinction. This 
distinction is that between ontological and methodological understandings of non-
naturalism, and it amounts to little more than the complement of De Caro and 
Macarthur’s distinction between these respective understandings of naturalism. In short, 
ontological non-naturalism is the view that some “entity or force … is in principle 
unaccountable by science, ineliminable from our ontology, and contradictory to scientific 
knowledge,”66 while methodological non-naturalism “appeal[s] to special [i.e. mystical] 
cognitive powers … in order to account for the human capacity to grasp” certain entities 
or forces.67 With De Caro and Macarthur’s work in mind, we can supplement De Caro 
and Voltolini’s distinction by adding to it semantic non-naturalism—the view that certain 
concepts are ineliminable, unaccountable by the sciences, yet contradictory of the 
sciences.  
 Putting these two distinctions together results in a more precise formulation of the 
Deflationary Demand: 
Deflationary Demand: Naturalists must ensure that their philosophical 
investigations are properly deflated, in the sense that their investigations cannot 
imply the existence of any entities, epistemic capacities, or concepts that conflict 
with the sciences.  
 
By my estimation, De Caro and Voltolini do an admirable job of sketching how a 
naturalist can meet the aspect of the Deflationary Demand concerning entities, 
assuming that the other aspects concerning capacities and concepts are already 
                                                       
66 De Caro and Voltolini, “Is Liberal Naturalism,” 74. 
67 De Caro and Voltolini, “Is Liberal Naturalism,” 74. 
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addressed.68 However, they do not give a convincing argument in support of this latter 
assumption.69 For this reason, in Chapter Two I do not focus on the ontological aspect 
of the Deflationary Demand, conceding for the sake of argument that a naturalist can 
take De Caro and Voltolini’s approach once she has addressed the other two 
(epistemological and semantic) aspects. I focus instead on these latter two aspects, 
doing so through the lens of Donald Davidson’s and John McDowell’s respective 
semantic theories, ultimately arguing that Davidson’s understanding of the concept of 
truth and McDowell’s understanding of our second natural capacities (particularly that of 
empirical sense perception) leads to conflicts that are antithetical to the Deflationary 
Demand.70 
 
b. An Objection to this Formulation 
With all of this said, there is a perhaps unsurprising objection to the above formulation of 
the Deflationary Demand: what happens when the results of the sciences are either 
contradictory of or contrary to one another? It would seem as though, if this were the 
case, every naturalist would fail the Deflationary Demand because whatever they said in 
their philosophical investigations would come into conflict with one or the other of the 
conflicting scientific results. Even more problematically, there is significant evidence to 
                                                       
68 See De Caro and Voltolini, “Is Liberal Naturalism,” 79-82. 
69 I say this because De Caro and Voltolini assert, but do not argue, that what they call 
“philosophical reasoning” and “imaginative speculation” (De Caro and Voltolini, “Is Liberal 
Naturalism,” 81) are distinct from revelation or mystical intuition, and therefore 
unproblematic from a naturalist perspective. However, these claims are precisely what the 
Deflationary Demand requires us to not take for granted. 
70 It is worth noting that I have left the phrase ‘the laws of the sciences’ in the Deflationary 
Demand unaccounted for. My intention is to adopt Davidson’s and McDowell’s 
understandings of this phrase in their respective divisions of Chapter Two, arguing that they 
cannot live up to the Deflation Demand even when it is formulated in their own terms. 
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suggest that such conflicts within the sciences do exist. In physics alone, certain entities 
are both particles and waves, Schrödinger’s cat is both living and dead, and quantum 
mechanics and general relativity make notoriously bad bedfellows. The picture only gets 
more conflicted when we introduce chemistry, biology, and the human sciences into the 
equation. 
 Within the confines of this dissertation project, my response to this objection is 
that any problems it raises are not my problem. The purpose of the present chapter is 
not to provide my own theory as to what the word ‘naturalism’ ought to mean, in all the 
minute detail that this would require. My purpose is the more modest one of outlining in 
the broadest details what self-avowed naturalists report themselves to mean when they 
use the word ‘naturalism’. In this manner, my purpose is descriptive and not normative, 
meaning I can succeed at achieving this purpose even in the face of an objection 
showing that ‘naturalism’ is not actually being used in the way it should. In fact, if the 
present objection is (as I suspect) a genuine one to the way ‘naturalism’ gets used, I 
would be failing to properly describe how ‘naturalism’ is used if that description were to 
adequately address this objection. 
 Additionally, my purpose in this chapter is not to describe my own view, but to 
describe someone else’s. This means that, even if we were to bracket my previous point 
and we felt the need for a response to the objection to be provided, it would not be my 
responsibility to provide that response. It would be the responsibility of those who have 
been using ‘naturalism’ in such a way as to lead to this objection. This is what I mean 
when I say the objection is not my problem. 
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 True, my objector might concede, this response works given the purpose of the 
present chapter; however, in Chapter Three I will be trying to meet the Deflationary 
Demand and so at that point I can no longer insist that any problems with the 
Deflationary Demand are not my own. My response to this new objection is 
substantively the same as for the original, with one added twist. In Chapter Three I am 
trying to establish that my position is properly describable as naturalistic in the usual 
sense of the term, not that my position specifies a new sense of the term that others 
ought to adopt. In other words, I am trying to gain entry into the naturalists’ current 
clubhouse and not trying to lure them away to my own.71 As such, naturalists serve as 
the gatekeepers to their clubhouse, and if I am to gain entry I have to play by their rules 
for the time being. Towards this end, I have been describing these rules here in Chapter 
One, and I will be applying them to my own position in Chapter Three. What I cannot do 
is change the rules come Chapter Three, as my objector is pushing me to do. 
 The added twist that I need to acknowledge is that my response to this new 
objection only works so long as I have not yet achieved my goal in Chapter Three—so 
long as I have not yet gained admission to the naturalist clubhouse. Once I have, I (like 
any other naturalist) must face up to any and all genuine objections to naturalism. My 
objector’s point about conflicts in science would seem to be one such objection, and so 
if I think of myself as successfully meeting my goal in Chapter Three I must also think of 
myself as having to face up to some version of this objection. This is all true, but it 
means that the objection only takes effect for me after I have completed my current 
                                                       
71 Using the clubhouse metaphor, my critique of Davidson, McDowell, Price, and Brandom 
across Chapter Two will be that they do not meet the criteria for admission to their own 
clubhouse. In this way, I am offering an internal (and not external) critique. 
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dissertation project, and not during it. The objection is a problem for my future projects, 
but within the confines of my dissertation project it is still not my problem.  
 The final point my objector can raise is that there simply might not be any viable 
ways to address the current objection, neither for current naturalists nor for my future 
self. If this were the case, then it would be better for me to recognize it now and for me 
to shift from a descriptive to a normative approach to the Deflationary Demand. 
However, barring the sort of detailed look into this objection that is outside the scope of 
my current project, I see no reason to think this is the case. One way of addressing the 
objection could be to insist that any apparent conflicts within the sciences are not 
genuine, but simply a mistaken artifact of our incomplete knowledge. Given my own 
Kantian and Peircean leanings, my preferred way would be to argue that the 
Deflationary Demand plays a regulative role within naturalistic thinking, in the sense that 
the Deflationary Demand sets a standard that naturalists aspire to meet and that helps 
shape future inquiry. The Deflationary Demand can play this role even if, as my objector 
insists, the Demand is not already met at present. There are surely more ways of 
addressing the objection, but I will end my list here before it gets distracting. 
 
§5. The Pincer Objection to Naturalism 
With both the Objectivity and Deflationary Demands explained, we can now construct 
the Pincer Objection to naturalism, around which the remainder of my project revolves. I 
begin by saying a few things about the general structure of the objection, before moving 
on to consider my (and others’) semantic approach to addressing it. 
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 When we think of how the Objectivity and Deflationary Demands relate to one 
another, it quickly becomes evident that they demand opposing things. Whereas the 
Objectivity Demand compels the naturalist to leave some philosophical notions inflated 
to a certain level, thus allowing her to acknowledge the objectivity of the sciences, the 
Deflationary Demand compels her to deflate all philosophical notions past a certain 
level. The hope is that the deflation levels set by these demands do not overlap, leaving 
the naturalist with the conceptual space she needs to meet both. The Pincer Objection 
is that this hope is misplaced, that the Objectivity Demand compels the naturalist to 
inflate certain notions above the level set by the Deflationary Demand. 
 At this point, I have said nothing to prove that this hope is misplaced (or that it is 
well-founded for that matter) and for this reason I take the Pincer Objection to be a 
merely prima facie objection that any naturalist must address. The proof will be in the 
naturalist’s pudding, so to speak, insofar as she gives herself the tools necessary to 
justify her hope. My argument going forward will be that the analytic pragmatists I 
consider are unable to adequately address this objection, which should make more 
plausible the claim that the Pincer Objection is a general worry for naturalists more 
generally. However, I do not think the Pincer Objection is decisive against all forms of 
naturalism, as I argue that by shifting our focus away from the semantic concept of truth 
and towards the semantic concept of validity we can begin to make headway against it. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE FAILURE OF JUDGMENT-BASED SEMANTICS 
 
Now that I have developed the Objectivity and Deflationary Demands that any naturalist 
must meet, and sketched out the Pincer Objection to naturalism that results from them, 
it is time to apply these points to the semantic projects of the analytic pragmatists. I split 
this chapter into four overarching divisions, one for each of the analytic pragmatists 
upon whom I focus—Donald Davidson, John McDowell, Huw Price, and Robert 
Brandom. I have chosen these figures in particular because, as a group, they are 
particularly representative of the various agreements and disagreements within the 
analytic pragmatist tradition. For the remainder of this section, I paint these agreements 
and disagreements with a broad brush. My hope is for this to orient my reader to the 
more detailed discussions that occur across the upcoming divisions. 
 Concerning the agreements, all of these figures have naturalist aspirations, 
although their naturalisms are of the liberal variety. All of them develop their semantics 
within the bounds of certain self-imposed restrictions concerning what proper 
philosophy—and in particular, what proper metaphysics—looks like. And finally, all of 
them emphasize the need to appreciate the bearing that our practical engagement with 
the world and its rational inhabitants has on our linguistic and rational capacities. 
 As for the disagreements, they can be at times stark. Along one fault line in the 
tradition, Davidson and Brandom approach philosophy with the sort of theory-building 
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mentality that is common to analytic philosophy, while McDowell adopts a more 
therapeutic approach of diagnosing and treating philosophical irritations. Price’s 
approach fits somewhere in between these two extremes. Along another, Davidson and 
McDowell are concerned with giving substantive accounts in semantics, ones that take 
word-world relations to be essential (although each works with what is arguably a non-
standard understanding of what constitutes the world). Against this, Price and Brandom 
are thoroughgoing minimalists who think that word-word relations are ultimately what 
matters in semantics. Along similar lines, Davidson and McDowell are realists of a sort 
(although what sort depends on their understanding of what constitutes the world) while 
Price and Brandom are expressivists. Finally, there are important disagreements within 
these two pairs: whereas Davidson takes truth to be the operative semantic notion 
McDowell takes experience to be so, and whereas Price takes i-representations (i.e. 
functional roles) to be operative Brandom takes de re ascriptions of belief to be so. 
 
But enough with the broad brushstrokes. It is now time to fill this picture out in dialectical 
detail. 
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Division One of Chapter Two 
Donald Davidson’s Tarskian Truth-Theory 
 
§1.1. Introduction 
As I mentioned above, Donald Davidson’s semantic project revolves around the notion 
of truth. Perhaps Davidson’s clearest expression of his full theory of truth comes in his 
“The Structure and Content of Truth.” Collecting his three John Dewey Lectures from 
1989, this essay begins with a consideration of Alfred Tarski’s formal work on truth, then 
moves on to Davidson’s critique of traditional correspondence and coherence theories 
of truth, and concludes with Davidson’s own Quinean alternative to correspondence and 
coherence theories. Throughout, Davidson contends that although Tarski’s work 
provides us with key insights concerning the structural features of our concept of truth, 
his work does not give us an exhaustive characterization of truth. As such, Davidson 
accepts Tarski’s general framework while supplementing it in such a way that accounts 
for the substantive or contentful side of the concept of truth, the side with which Tarski is 
unconcerned.  
 There is much to be said for each portion of Davidson’s theory, but for my 
purposes in this dissertation I focus on the first, Tarskian portion.72 Since Tarski’s work 
has been immensely influential with semanticists in general (and not just those from the 
                                                       
72 For more on the second, critical portion, see Davidson, “True to the Facts”; also Davidson, 
“A Coherence Theory,” especially Afterthoughts; also Davidson, Subjective, xv-xvi. For more 
on the third, Quinean portion, see Davidson, “A Coherence Theory”; also Davidson, “Radical 
Interpretation.” For a critique of this third portion, see Soles, “Prefers True.” Additionally, 
many of my points against Brandom in §4.4 below are equally applicable to the third portion 
of Davidson’s theory, as Brandom largely adopts Davidson’s approach to interpretation and 
objectivity. 
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analytic pragmatist tradition), doing this allows me to highlight a general problem with 
many attempts to found a naturalist semantics on a substantive conception of truth. This 
should in turn motivate my consideration of more radical semantic views in the following 
divisions of this chapter.  
 In its most general formulation, the problem that plagues the Tarskian portion of 
Davidson’s theory is the problem of developing a consistent, naturalistically sound 
conception of the structural aspects of truth. To show that this problem is genuine, I 
begin in §1.2 by outlining the Tarskian background of Davidson’s theory; then in §1.3 I 
discuss Davidson’s attempt to expand Tarski’s work in formal semantics so as to apply 
it to natural languages, but I argue that Davidson is left choosing between a rock and a 
hard place in the form of a vicious regress and the liar’s paradox. 
 
§1.2. Tarskian Semantics  
At its core, Davidson’s structure-level theory of truth73 is meant to adopt Tarski’s 
approach to the semantics of formal languages and to apply that approach to natural 
languages. As such, if we are to understand Davidson’s theory, we must first 
understand Tarski’s approach to semantics. For our purposes, there are two points 
about Tarski’s approach that are especially important. 
                                                       
73 For the remainder of this division, I adopt the general policy of dropping such phrases as 
‘structure-level’ and using simply ‘theory of truth’ and its cognates to designate the first, 
Tarskian portion of Davidson’s overall theory (and not the overall theory itself). The only 
exceptions come when the contrast between the structural component of Davidson’s theory 
and the contentful component is important, and in such cases I will explicitly mark the 
contrast using cognates of ‘structural’ and ‘contentful’. 
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 First, there is Tarski’s use of Convention T.74 Some aspects of Convention T 
should be familiar enough. There is the familiar schema at the center of Convention T: 
x is true if and only if p. 
 
And this schema is used to produce the set of T-sentences or truth conditions that plays 
a central role in Tarskian semantics (more on this shortly). A distinction between object 
language and meta-language is important for understanding how the schema produces 
this set: semantic investigations into some object language L are couched in terms of a 
meta-language M that is about L, and T-sentences are formulated in the meta-language 
M by (1) replacing the ‘x’ from the schema with an expression from M that designates a 
sentence s in the object language L and (2) replacing the ‘p’ from the schema with a 
sentence from M that has the same meaning as the sentence from L that is designated 
by the expression replacing ‘x’. Some variations on the familiar example can help 
illuminate this process: 
‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white; 
 
The sentence spelled thusly—s, n, o, w, space, i, s, space, w, h, i, t, e— is true if 
and only if snow is white; 
 
‘Schnee ist weiß’ is true if and only if snow is white; 
 
Tarski’s favorite sentence is true if and only if snow is white. 
 
 The less familiar aspect of Convention T is the exact role that it (as well as its 
related schema and T-sentences) play within Tarski’s approach to semantics. Many 
people have assumed that Convention T simply is Tarski’s theory of truth, and that 
Tarski intends for his theory to give an exhaustive account of truth. It is out of this 
                                                       
74 For more on Convention T, see Tarski, “Concept of Truth,” 154-157 and 186-188. 
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reading of Tarski that the position variously called minimalism, deflationism, and 
disquotationalism develops. However, this reading gets the historical Tarski wrong. 
Instead of functioning as a theory itself, Convention T functions, in Tarski’s hands, as a 
condition of adequacy that any theory must meet.75 Convention T functions in this 
manner because truth is, in the first instance, a familiar concept of ordinary language, 
while Tarski is in the business of providing formalized theories of a sort that are 
particularly foreign to most ordinary language speakers. This introduces a gap between 
the object of inquiry (i.e. the concept of truth) and the results of inquiry (i.e. Tarski’s 
formalized semantics), and as Davidson aptly summarizes the point: 
Convention T and T-sentences provide the sole link between intuitively obvious 
truths about [the concept of] truth and formal semantics. Without Convention T 
we should have no reason to believe that truth is what Tarski has shown us how 
to characterize.76  
 
 With the role of Convention T now clarified, we can turn to the second important 
point about Tarski’s approach to semantics—namely that Tarski provides a substantive 
account of truth. To delve into the details of Tarski’s account would take me too far 
afield from Davidson and his own theory of truth. Instead, we need only note that Tarski 
defines truth in terms of a notion of satisfaction.77 Satisfaction is like reference in that it 
is a relation between words and objects in the world; however, whereas reference 
relations hold between a noun and an object, satisfaction relations hold between a 
sentence (with or without free variables) and an infinite sequence of objects. By defining 
truth in terms of satisfaction, truth is likewise characterized by the sorts of word-world 
                                                       
75 See Tarski, “Concept of Truth,” 187-188. 
76 Davidson, “In Defense,” 66. 
77 For more on truth and satisfaction, see Tarski, “Concept of Truth,” 189-197. 
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relations that we see with satisfaction, not the sorts of word-word relations we would 
expect were Tarski the minimalist he is often taken to be.  
 
§1.3. Davidson’s Extension of Tarskian Semantics, the Regress of Metalanguages, and 
the Liar’s Paradox 
Davidson’s approach to semantics aligns with Tarski’s on both of the points from the 
previous section. However, where Tarski thinks this approach is appropriate only for 
certain formal languages, Davidson argues that it can be extended to provide a 
semantic theory for natural languages. Davidson’s Quinean theory of interpretation, 
which constitutes the portion of his overall theory that focuses on the content (as 
opposed to the structure) of the concept of truth, is the obvious place to begin 
understanding Davidson’s supplement to Tarski. However, if we limit ourselves only to 
the structural portion of Davidson’s overall theory of truth we find a less obvious though 
equally important jumping off point in the form of Davidson’s claim that there is a need 
for two notions of truth, one that is relative to some particular language and one that is 
not. 
 Davidson is led to this claim by a simple question. Given the distinction between 
object language and metalanguage at the heart of Convention T, and given that the 
schema from Convention T delivers us with T-sentences that are about the object 
language, we can see that the truth predicate about which Convention T allows us to 
theorize is the truth predicate for the object language. This is because, in satisfying 
Convention T we need say nothing at all about the metalanguage or about how the truth 
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predicate functions in the metalanguage. The question this leads to is, How does the 
truth predicate function in the metalanguage?  
 One immediate response to this question would be to say that we need only 
follow Tarski’s approach to semantics, that of using Convention T to develop a 
substantive theory of truth for the metalanguage, and we will be just fine. However, if we 
were to do as this response suggests, we would have to develop the theory of the 
metalanguage in a meta-metalanguage, then we would be forced to ask how the truth 
predicate functions in the meta-metalanguage, leading us to recognize this response for 
the regress that it is. Such a regress of metalanguages is not necessarily vicious, 
because on the assumption that we are competent speakers of the nth metalanguage, 
by following Tarski’s approach we will have developed adequate theories of truth for the 
object language and the first n-1 metalanguages.  
 However, the regress does become vicious once one adopts Davidson’s goal of 
giving a Tarskian account of natural languages. This is because natural languages are 
universal in the sense that “it would not be in harmony with the spirit of [these] 
language[s] if in some other language a word occurred which could not be translated 
into it.”78 Ultimately, all theorizing is done within a natural language, such that the object 
language and the infinite variety of metalanguages are (potential if not actual) fragments 
of that natural language; hence natural language’s universality. As a result, when we are 
theorizing about natural languages, we cannot make the assumption that prevents the 
regress from being vicious—the assumption that we are competent speakers of the nth 
                                                       
78 Tarski, “Concept of Truth,” 164. Davidson’s principle of charity expresses a similar point 
(see Davidson, “Radical Interpretation,” 136-137; Davidson, “On the Very Idea,” 196-197). 
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metalanguage. The reason is that, in theorizing about natural language, we are thereby 
theorizing about all of the metalanguages, and so we cannot bracket any concerns we 
have about any one metalanguage as we would were we to make this assumption. To 
do otherwise would be to give up on theorizing about natural language as such; at best 
we would be theorizing about some partial fragment of it. 
 In response to this issue, Davidson distinguishes between two varieties of truth in 
order to stop the regress from starting in the first place. As Davidson puts the point: 
The trick is just to add to Tarski’s definition of a truth predicate for a language L 
(say, ‘s is trueL’) the remark that Tarski’s predicate holds for all and only the true 
sentences of L. Here, of course, the word ‘true’ expresses the real-life, 
substantive, undefined concept we need for serious semantics.79  
 
Here, Davidson distinguishes between a sentence’s being trueL and its being true. Both 
notions—those of truthL and truth—belong to the metalanguage, but whereas the former 
notion is relativized to the object language, the latter is unrelativized to any language. 
With this done, Davidson is able to argue that using the metalanguage, we can begin to 
define a notion of truthL for the object language by following Tarski’s approach, then 
supplement this definition by adding that a sentence in the object language is trueL if 
and only if it is true. This takes care of accounting for the function of the truthL predicate 
within the object language. But more importantly, because the truth (as opposed to the 
truthL) predicate is unrelativized to any language and because, as Davidson insists, the 
truth predicate is to be left undefined, there is no need to develop an explicit theory 
about how the truth predicate functions in the metalanguage. The question that leads to 
the regress is an idle one that does not demand our attention (assuming Davidson’s 
                                                       
79 Davidson, “The Structure and Content,” 292. 
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insistence that the truth predicate be left undefined is appropriate). If someone asks, 
What about the metalanguage, the Davidsonian response is simply, So what about the 
metalanguage? 
 Although Davidson’s approach avoids the regress, it does so by leaving him prey 
to the familiar liar’s paradox.80 Consider the following sentence: 
c is not true 
 
where ‘c’ is the name for the very sentence in which ‘c’ occurs. From here, let us use the 
schema from Convention T to construct the T-sentence for this sentence: 
‘c is not true’ is true if and only if c is not true. 
 
And finally, substitute ‘c’ (i.e. the name for the original sentence) for ‘ ‘c is not true’ ’ (i.e. 
the original sentence itself): 
c is true if and only if c is not true, 
 
which is equivalent to the contradictory sentence: 
 
c is true and c is not true. 
 
From a seemingly uncontroversial starting point we have derived a contradiction, and 
this is the liar’s paradox. 
 The usual response to this is to insist that the object language-metalanguage 
distinction is overlooked in the proof of the paradox. To see how this dissolves the 
paradox, ask yourself which language the sentence ‘c is not true’ is in. The fact that it 
includes a truth predicate would lead us to believe that it is a metalanguage sentence, 
while the fact that it is embedded in a T-sentence would lead us to believe that it is an 
                                                       
80 I follow Tarski’s presentation of the liar’s paradox, which he derives from Łukasiewicz (see 
Tarski, “Concept of Truth,” 157-158). 
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object language sentence. As it is presented, it is something of a mongrel sentence, 
being in both the object language and metalanguage. This leaves the sentence 
grammatically ill-formed, and so it is not the sort of sentence for which we need to 
theorize. 
 However, this response works only if we accept the object language-
metalanguage distinction on which it is built, and this is precisely what Davidson tacitly 
rejects in the case of natural language by insisting that there is an unrelativized and 
undefined notion of truth (as opposed to truthL). To reiterate Davidson’s strategy, it is to 
follow Tarski’s approach to semantics and develop an account of truthL for a fragment of 
a natural language. From there, we supplement the Tarskian approach by insisting that 
the trueL sentences of this language are true, where truth is the unrelativized and 
undefined notion. This insistence puts an end to the regress of metalanguages, thereby 
allowing us to respect the universal quality of the natural language by not forcing us to 
posit the existence of a distinct metalanguage for that natural language. Unfortunately, 
the result is that, although Davidson can make the usual response to the liar’s paradox 
as it relates to truthL, he is unable to do so with truth itself. The sentence ‘c is not trueL’ 
would be an ill-formed mongrel of a sentence because truthL is a part of the 
metalanguage (i.e. the natural language as a whole) and not the object language (i.e. 
the fragment of the natural language) but if the sentence is to be the sort of sentence for 
which the Tarskian theory is relevant then it must be in the object language and not the 
metalanguage. Alternatively, the sentence ‘c is not true’ does not run into this problem 
because, since truth is undefined, there is no Tarskian theory for sentences using the 
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truth predicate and therefore no demand that such sentences be formulated in the 
language identified as the object language in the Tarskian theory. ‘c is not true’ is, on 
Davidson’s account, not a grammatically ill-formed sentence, and so the liar’s paradox 
is a genuine paradox that displays the inconsistency of Davidson’s unrelativized and 
undefined notion of truth.81 
 With this, we find ourselves in a bind. We began by considering Tarski’s 
approach to semantics, and saw how it leads to a regress of metalanguages that is 
antithetical to Davidson’s goal of providing a truth theory for natural languages. Now, we 
have seen Davidson’s supplement to Tarski, which makes use of an undefined notion of 
truth, but after following it through we see that it leads to paradox. The obvious next step 
is to give some account of Davidson’s undefined notion of truth, but this demands that 
we formulate this account within a metalanguage and with that we are back onto the 
regress. If we accept the regress, we admit that we cannot provide a semantics for 
natural languages (at best, we can do this for some fragment thereof); but if we accept 
the paradox, we run afoul of the Deflationary Demand and its call for consistency. 
Neither option is viable if we are to develop a naturalistically sound semantics, which is 
enough reason to reject Davidson’s overall strategy of taking truth to be the operative 
notion within a naturalistic semantics. 
 
 
                                                       
81 Davidson considers this sort of objection at Davidson, “The Structure and Content,” 292, 
but his response there is to assert without arguing that introducing an undefined truth 
predicate does not result in inconsistencies. Given that I have just argued to the contrary, 
this response is inadequate. A more substantive response occurs at Davidson, “In Defense,” 
71-72, but it amounts to Davidson denying the universal character of natural language by 
placing truth outside of natural language. 
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Division Two of Chapter Two 
John McDowell’s Therapeutic Empiricism 
 
§2.1. Introduction 
In this division, I argue that John McDowell’s defense of empiricism threatens to run 
afoul of the Deflationary Demand, and that his therapeutic metaphilosophy is 
inadequate for dissolving this issue. In particular, McDowell’s purportedly naturalistic 
account of empirical sense perception is indistinguishable from many non-naturalist 
accounts of rational intuition, leaving his reader to conclude that his account is either 
incomplete or inconsistent with naturalism. To establish this, I begin in §2.2 by outlining 
in broad strokes McDowell’s empiricism and what he judges to be its main competitors. 
From there, I dedicate §2.3 to the details of McDowell’s empiricism, and it is here that I 
argue that his account of perception is indistinguishable from various accounts of 
rational intuition. §2.4 functions as a detour of sorts, acknowledging that McDowell 
intends for his account of second nature to dissolve any non-naturalist worries relating 
to his account of perception but arguing that this former account too is indistinguishable 
from rationalistic forms of non-naturalism. Finally, in §2.5 I consider what I take to be 
McDowell’s real defense against my indistinguishability objection—that it represents an 
anxiety that he has already diagnosed and treated. It is in this section that McDowell’s 
therapeutic metaphilosophy comes to the fore, but I argue that there are reasons both 
general and specific for finding McDowell’s therapy inadequate. 
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§2.2. The Oscillation 
To begin our discussion of McDowell’s therapeutic empiricism, I must say some quick 
words about the dialectical lay of the land in which McDowell situates his project. 
McDowell takes it that most contemporary philosophers share an urge towards 
empiricism; however, he also takes it that this urge ought to raise a certain anxiety for 
these philosophers, an anxiety to the effect that this urge cannot be satisfied. McDowell 
contends that this combination of urge and anxiety has led many a philosopher to 
oscillate between two equally unsatisfying positions, Givenism and coherentism. 
Ultimately, McDowell’s project is to develop a philosophical treatment that satisfies our 
urge towards empiricism while dissolving its attendant anxiety, thus breaking out of the 
oscillation. The outline of this treatment should be familiar enough to anyone who has 
read Mind and World, but it is necessary background for understanding both the specific 
details of McDowell’s treatment that I focus on in §§2.3 and 2.4 below, as well as the 
broader contours of McDowell’s therapeutic metaphilosophy that I critique in §2.5. 
 At its core, empiricism for McDowell involves two commitments: first, that 
sensibility is in some sense distinct from the understanding; and second, that sensibility 
delivers us with reasons for or against our various beliefs about the world. McDowell is 
highly influenced by Kant in his insistence on distinguishing sensibility from the 
understanding. Sensibility and the understanding are two capacities that a subject has, 
with the former being a subject’s capacity for intuiting certain basic information from the 
world and the latter being a subject’s capacity for conceptualizing that basic information 
in more and more abstract manners. Importantly, whereas sensibility is passive and 
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receptive, thus allowing for genuine constraint from outside the mind, the understanding 
is active and spontaneous, thus allowing for genuine responsibility on the part of the 
subject. To collapse the distinction between sensibility and the understanding would be 
to eliminate either external constraint, or responsibility, or both. 
 Concerning the second commitment of empiricism, McDowell’s primary influence 
is Wilfrid Sellars. For experience to constrain thinking, experience must engage in 
rational relations with our thinking and not merely causal relations. The key point is that 
the constraint in question is a normative endeavor, and only rational relations have the 
sort of normativity necessary for this endeavor. I say more on this topic shortly, when I 
discuss coherentism. 
 McDowell takes empiricism as he has characterized it to be nothing more than 
sound common sense; nevertheless, McDowell acknowledges that empiricism’s stock 
has fallen in recent decades, largely as a result of naturalism’s rising stock. The move 
towards naturalism has highlighted the need to consistently distinguish between 
reasons and causes, and this has raised familiar anxieties about empiricism. 
 Traditionally, the first commitment of empiricism has been interpreted as being 
equivalent to the claim that whereas the understanding is conceptual, sensibility is pre- 
or extra- or otherwise non-conceptual—let us designate such a version of empiricism 
with the word ‘Givenism’. The naturalist critique of Givenism is then that reasons must 
be conceptual for them to be reasons at all,82 yet Givenism is committed to sensibility 
being both reason-providing and non-conceptual. As Sellars puts it, the Givenist 
conception of sensibility is “a mongrel resulting from a crossbreeding of two ideas,” that 
                                                       
82 See Sellars, “Empiricism,” §§3-7; also Davidson, “Coherence Theory,” especially 140. 
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of a reason and that of a mere (non-conceptual) cause.83 Givenism is therefore an 
inconsistent view, committed to what gets called the myth of the Given—i.e. the 
existence of data that is both merely causal yet also rational. 
 Once one is awoken to the mythical status of the Given, one must modify or 
reject some part of Givenism. One common strategy is what McDowell calls bald 
naturalism, which is characterized by rejecting the first commitment of Givenism. And 
since empiricism is traditionally identified with Givenism, bald naturalism is traditionally 
characterized by rejecting the first commitment of empiricism. McDowell finds the 
distinction between sensibility and the understanding to be a fundamental insight of 
Kant’s, and so McDowell finds bald naturalism particularly unconvincing. As such, 
McDowell dedicates little explicit discussion to bald naturalism, besides to highlight that 
it counsels eliminating the urge towards empiricism that McDowell aims to satisfy.84 
 Another strategy, one that McDowell takes more seriously, is coherentism. Such 
a view accepts the naturalist claim that reasons must be conceptual and maintains 
Givenism’s first commitment by denying the second commitment that is common to 
Givenism and empiricism. Although the deliverances of sensibility can (and most likely 
do) cause certain beliefs, these deliverances are not reasons for or against those 
beliefs. McDowell objects that such a coherentist view leaves our thinking as a 
“frictionless spinning in a void,” meaning that our thought is not rationally constrained by 
anything outside of itself.85 At best, coherentism offers us exculpations (to the effect that 
                                                       
83 Sellars, “Empiricism,” 210. 
84 See McDowell, Mind and World, xviii-xix, xx-xxiii, 72-73, and 76-77. See also McDowell, 
“Reply to Commentators,” 403-409 and 419-425. 
85 McDowell, Mind and World, 11. 
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we cannot but think the way sensibility causes us to) and not the justifications (to the 
effect that the way we are thinking is appropriate to the world) after which we are 
searching.86 
 Assuming that empiricism is identified with Givenism, it seems as if we have 
exhausted our options. We have tried the naive strategy of accepting empiricism, but 
seen that we thereby fall into the myth of the Given. We have tried the bald naturalist 
strategy of denying the first commitment of empiricism, but seen that we thereby deprive 
ourselves of a true and genuine insight (according to McDowell). And we have tried the 
coherentist strategy of denying the second commitment of empiricism, but seen that this 
offers mere exculpations. Additionally, we can see that what Givenism is missing—
namely a consistent conception of sensibility—is precisely what coherentism offers us, 
while what coherentism is missing—namely genuine justifications—is precisely what 
Givenism offers us. McDowell’s contention is that so long as we hold onto both the urge 
towards empiricism and the assumption that empiricism simply is Givenism, we will fall 
“into an interminable oscillation” between Givenism and coherentism—our 
dissatisfaction with the one will drive us towards the other, and since there is no third 
option in view, our dissatisfaction with the other will drive us back towards the one, and 
so on ad infinitum.87 
 McDowell’s therapeutic suggestion is that a third option comes into view once we 
deny the assumption that empiricism is Givenism. Instead of taking sensibility to be non-
                                                       
86 For McDowell on exculpations and justifications, see McDowell, Mind and World, 8. 
Although he does not use ‘coherentism’ or its cognates, such phrases as “extraconceptual 
impingements,” “brute impact,” and “causal impact” imply that it is coherentism (and not 
Givenism) that offers exculpations and not justifications. 
87 McDowell, Mind and World, 9. 
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conceptual, as the Givenist does, McDowell suggests that we take it to be passively 
conceptual. This idea will be my jumping off point for the next section. For now, notice 
that if sensibility is conceptual it can provide reasons for or against our beliefs, and that 
if sensibility is passively conceptual it can still be distinguished from the understanding, 
which McDowell takes to be actively conceptual. In this manner, McDowell’s suggestion 
allows us to accept the two commitments of empiricism without raising the sort of 
philosophical anxiety associated with Givenism. This is the promise of McDowell’s 
project, an anxiety-free way of satisfying our philosophical urges. 
 
§2.3. McDowell on Perception 
Whether McDowell’s position lives up to this promise depends on whether he can 
satisfactorily draw the active-passive distinction at the heart of his therapeutic 
suggestion. In Mind and World, McDowell seems less concerned with developing the 
details of how he draws this distinction or defending these details against objections, 
focusing instead on merely stating the main theses of his view. As such, I spend most of 
this section considering McDowell’s Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge, where he 
more explicitly develops and defends the details of his view. However, it is helpful to 
start by considering the main theses from Mind and World, as they provide a roadmap 
for the discussion of Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge to come. 
 In Mind and World, McDowell takes it to be relatively unproblematic that the 
understanding is actively conceptual, as this thought is readily established in the works 
of Kant, Sellars, and Davidson (among others). The problematic idea is that of 
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sensibility being conceptual in a way that the understanding is while also being passive 
in a way that the understanding is not. On the former front, McDowell insists that 
sensibility is conceptual because we, as rational agents, have “a standing obligation to 
reflect about the credentials of the putatively rational linkages that govern [empirical 
thinking],” even those linkages involving the contents delivered to us through 
sensibility.88 On the latter front, McDowell insists that through sensibility “one takes in 
how things are”89—that “there is no ontological gap between the sort of thing one can 
mean, or generally the sort of thing one can think, and the sort of thing that can be the 
case.”90 The unmediated presence of reality to the mind that these quotations suggest is 
what distinguishes the passivity of sensibility from the activity of the understanding. 
 Of course, these are all contentious claims, and the connections between them 
are not immediately obvious. This is where Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge 
enters the picture. McDowell’s begins by highlighting the distinctively internalist model 
for perception with which Sellars provides us: 
On this approach, a rational subject who has a bit of perceptual knowledge is 
self-consciously aware of the warrant provided for her knowledge by a perceptual 
state she is in.91 
 
McDowell’s project is to develop a view of this sort, where perceptual states not only 
provide warrant for certain beliefs but also are such that the warrant they provide can be 
made manifest to an ordinary believer. For this to be possible, perception must be 
conceptual in the sense of McDowell’s theses from Mind and World, because for a 
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89 McDowell, Mind and World, 9. 
90 McDowell, Mind and World, 27. 
91 McDowell, Perception, 23. 
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believer to be aware of the warrant the believer must be thinking about the warrant and 
thinking is done through concepts of the understanding. 
 From here, McDowell considers the obvious objection to any internalist view of 
perception: that it over-intellectualizes perception. McDowell focuses on Tyler Burge’s 
presentation of this objection, and in outline the objection goes as follows.92 Perceptual 
capacities are fallible, so the warrant that perceptual states provide must be defeasible. 
For a perceptual state to provide warrant for a belief, it is necessary merely that the 
warrant not actually be defeated (this being understood in externalist terms). However, 
for the perceptual state’s warrant to be manifest to the believer, the believer must be 
aware of the fact that the warrant is not defeated. Such awareness would imply that the 
believer not only has a stock of highly developed epistemological concepts (such as 
those of a warrant, a defeater, a possible world, etc.), but also a practical familiarity with 
how to deploy those concepts (such as what counts as a warrant; how defeaters infirm 
warrants; how, if at all, circumstances in nearby possible worlds infirm or confirm 
warrants; etc.).93 However, empirically speaking it is hard to imagine that most people 
have such a stock of concepts, let alone a familiarity with their use. Assuming 
internalism is correct, this means that most people are incapable of having perceptual 
knowledge, and the implausibility of this conclusion means that internalism (at least as it 
relates to perception) is an unacceptable view. 
                                                       
92 For the details, see McDowell, Perception, 23-30. 
93 If this were not the case, the believer would not only not have the authority to judge 
whether the perceptual state’s warrant is defeated; the believer would be in no position to 
formulate the question that prompts such a judgment in the first place. 
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 McDowell responds to this objection by denying that the warrant that perceptual 
states provide must be defeasible. Instead, for McDowell 
when all goes well in the operation of a perceptual capacity of a sort that belongs 
to its possessor’s rationality, a perceiver enjoys a perceptual state in which some 
feature of her environment is there for her, perceptually present to her rationally 
self-conscious awareness.94 
 
This is the unmediated presence that McDowell hints at in Mind and World, and it 
greatly simplifies the internalist requirement that a believer be aware that a perceptual 
state’s warrant is not defeated. Although it is possible for a believer to judge that 
something is perceptually present to her when some other thing (or nothing at all) is 
perceptually present to her, when something is perceptually present to the believer it is 
her state of perceiving itself that constitutes her awareness that the warrant for her 
perceptual belief (which is delivered by that very state) is not defeated. The believer has 
no need to be familiar with a set of epistemological concepts if she is to meet the 
internalist requirement and thereby have knowledge about what she perceives (although 
she undoubtedly needs this if she is to have knowledge about her perceptual knowledge 
itself). All of this boils down to the claim that the warrant provided by a perceptual state 
is not only indefeasible but also self-intimating, which in turn implies that the perceptual 
belief based on it is veridical—it cannot but be true. 
 Although denying that perceptual states always provide defeasible warrant allows 
McDowell to address the over-intellectualization objection, it immediately leads to a new 
objection.95 Our perceptual capacities are fallible in the sense that their operation 
produces both true and false beliefs. This is an obvious observation, one that is verified 
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by the familiar examples (straight sticks looking bent in water, objects of one color 
looking to be of another color under certain lighting, one object looking to be two when 
the perceiver is under the influence of certain drugs, etc.). However, if McDowell is right 
in claiming that perceptual states deliver indefeasible warrants and so perceptual beliefs 
are veridical, then it would seem that our capacities cannot be fallible. If this is really a 
consequence of McDowell’s view, then so much the worse for him. 
 McDowell has the beginnings of a response to this new objection, one that 
hinges on a distinction between defective and non-defective exercises of a capacity.96 
McDowell insists that, in non-defective exercises of our perceptual capacities, they are 
capacities for “get[ting] into states that consist in having a certain feature of the objective 
environment perceptually present to one’s self-consciously rational awareness.”97 
However, McDowell is equally insistent that, in defective cases, our perceptual 
capacities do not involve this sort of immediate presence, or the indefeasibility and 
veridicality that go along with it. With this in mind, we see that McDowell does not 
replace the claim that all perceptual warrant is defeasible with the claim that all 
perceptual warrant is indefeasible; he replaces it with the weaker claim that some 
perceptual warrant is indefeasible. And this in turn is what allows McDowell to 
acknowledge the fallibility of our perceptual capacities. Assuming that an exercise of 
these capacities is non-defective, it is true that they will be infallible. However, in 
defective cases these capacities will be fallible, and this is enough to establish that 
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these capacities are fallible when considering defective and non-defective cases 
together. 
 McDowell thinks that this is all that he needs to say about the defective-non-
defective distinction, but if he is to meet the Deflationary Demand then he is mistaken 
on this front. The reason is that, so far, McDowell’s account of perception is 
indistinguishable from common forms of rational intuitionism. Both posit a capacity that 
presents a subject with states that provide indefeasible warrant for subsequent beliefs, 
and the indefeasibility of this warrant is guaranteed because the state is self-presenting 
so that the warrant it provides is self-intimating. The result is that beliefs based on these 
states are veridical. The problem this raises is that rational intuitionism is traditionally 
seen as a non-naturalist view, but McDowell insists that his account of perception is a 
naturalist view (although liberally so). If McDowell is to be justified in holding his account 
to be naturalistic, he must identify some quality of his account of perception that 
distinguishes it from rational intuitionism, or else argue that rational intuitionism is 
actually a naturalistically sound view.  
 Unfortunately, McDowell does neither of these. McDowell’s account of the 
fallibility of our perceptual capacities does nothing to distinguish his account from 
rational intuitionism, as most any plausible form of rational intuitionism acknowledges 
the fallibility of our rational capacities, and does so using largely the same strategy as 
McDowell.98 Additionally, when considering a closely related objection, McDowell simply 
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reiterates the self-intimating quality of perceptual warrants, which again does nothing to 
distinguish his view from rational intuitionism.99 
 The closest McDowell gets to addressing the objection that his purportedly 
naturalistic view is indistinguishable from (seemingly) non-naturalist forms of rational 
intuitionism is when he considers an imagined psychological experiment; but even here 
he overlooks the decisive case. The case he focuses on is a case where the test subject 
is going to be asked to identify the colours of things she is shown in a succession 
of tests…. But she is told that in half the tests the light will be unsuitable for 
colour recognition, though cunningly arranged so as not to seem suspicious in 
any way; in the other half the light will be a good light for knowing the colours of 
things by looking at them.100 
 
Such an experiment places the test subject into two different types of situation, the first 
in which she is in good lighting but has reason to suspect that she is in bad lighting, and 
the second in which she is in bad lighting and has reason to suspect that she is in bad 
lighting. McDowell’s position is that in both cases the subject’s perceptual capacities are 
being exercised defectively, and so the subject’s perceptual state is not one in which the 
object’s color is presented veridically to the subject.101 
 However, once we recognize these two types of situation, we are in a position to 
recognize two additional, complementary types of situation: the third type is that in 
which the subject is in good lighting and has no reason to suspect that she is in bad 
lighting, and the fourth is that in which she is in bad lighting but has no reason to 
suspect that she is in bad lighting. The third type of situation is the paradigmatic non-
                                                       
99 See McDowell, Perception, 39-44. If anything, this passage strengthens the connection 
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100 McDowell, Perception, 45-46. 
101 See McDowell, Perception, 45-48. The details that lead McDowell to this position are 
beside my current purpose. 
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defective case in which the subject’s perceptual state presents the object’s color to her, 
and so is covered easily enough by McDowell’s account of perception. 
 It is this final, fourth type of situation that is decisive for McDowell’s account, but it 
is precisely this type that he does not consider in any detail.102 McDowell needs it not to 
be the case that the subject’s perceptual state presents the object’s color to her in these 
situations. If this were the case, then the subject would have indefeasible warrant for a 
veridical belief that the object’s color is as it appears in the bad lighting, when what 
makes the lighting bad is precisely that the object’s color is not as it appears. In short, if 
this were the case, then the subject would know something false, which is a patent 
absurdity. 
 If we consider the subject as a physical being, we can distinguish a situation of 
the fourth type from one of the third type. This is because the subject stands in different 
lawlike, causal relations to the object in the two cases. But to take this difference to be 
the decisive one would make McDowell a coherentist of the sort that plays into his 
oscillation from §2.2 above. Such a conclusion is obviously unacceptable to McDowell. 
 Alternatively, there is seemingly nothing about the subject qua rational agent that 
differentiates a situation of this type from one of the third type, in which the object’s color 
is presented to her. She has the same evidence set in both situations, because in both 
situations she has no reason to think the lighting is bad. Admittedly, she is in different 
perceptual states in these two situations—in one case the perceptual state is a state of 
                                                       
102 McDowell acknowledges this type of situation in the paragraph immediately before his 
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being presented with the object’s color and in the other it isn’t—but it is hard to see how 
this can make a rational difference to the subject. If it were to make such a difference, it 
seemingly must alter the subject’s evidence set such that the subject after all does have 
a reason to suspect that the lighting is bad in situations of the fourth type, which is just 
to say that these situations—which McDowell acknowledges to be possible103—are 
impossible.  
 What McDowell needs is an account of rational relations that are independent of 
individual subjects, so that these rational relations can play the role that causal relations 
play in the coherentist strategy of distinguishing situations of the fourth type from 
situations of the third type. However, this account must not entail the existence of non-
natural entities or capacities, per the Deflationary Demand. Since I have already 
conceded that Mario De Caro and Alberto Voltolini outline a way of avoiding a 
commitment to the existence of non-natural entities,104 the decisive issue for McDowell 
is not that of the subject-independent rational relations themselves, but our cognitive 
access to them. And the only way in which I find myself able to make sense of our 
cognitive access to these relations is to conceive of our perceptual capacities as 
indistinguishable from a capacity for rational intuition that I find naturalistically suspect. 
 Ultimately, my objection is not that McDowell cannot provide an account of our 
perceptual capacities as giving us access to subject-independent rational relations, only 
that he has not provided such an account and that I cannot foresee myself shaking the 
anxiety that McDowell is steering me in a non-naturalist direction until he has done so. 
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§2.4. McDowell on Second Nature 
Returning to McDowell’s project from Mind and World, we can begin to see how he 
would respond to my final objection from §2.3. My anxiety is that McDowell’s account of 
perception is non-naturalistic, and in one sense this is right. McDowell is a liberal 
naturalist, so his account is non-naturalistic if ‘nature’ is interpreted in the sense that 
conservative or bald naturalists interpret it. However, McDowell contends that 
conservative and bald naturalists overlook the existence of what he calls second nature, 
and that once second nature is taken into account my anxiety concerning his account of 
perception should dissolve. In this section, I quickly summarize McDowell’s account of 
second nature, and argue that the same anxiety I have concerning his account of 
perception arises again concerning his account of second nature.105 
 McDowell begins by disarming an immediate objection that he foresees to his 
account of second nature. As he puts it 
It would be a cheat, a merely verbal manoeuvre, to object that naturalism about 
nature cannot be open to question. If we can rethink our conception of nature so 
as to make room for spontaneity, even though we deny that spontaneity is 
capturable by the resources of bald naturalism, we shall by the same token be 
rethinking our conception of what it takes for a position to deserve to be called 
“naturalism”.106 
 
McDowell’s point is that there is conceptual space for naturalists to disagree about what 
nature is, that these disagreements are substantive instead of merely verbal, and that, 
for these reasons, it would be inappropriate for a bald naturalist to insist that his is the 
only sound conception of nature. Given that McDowell introduces his discussion of 
second nature in this manner, one would expect what follows to be a substantive 
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account of second nature, but my charge in this section is that McDowell falls into the 
same sort of merely verbal maneuvering that he disparages in the first sentence. 
 To appreciate why this is the case, we must understand the two views with which 
McDowell contrasts his account of second nature. The first is the bald naturalism we 
discussed in §2.2 above, which is a particularly conservative form of naturalism 
committed to reducing or eliminating normative and intentional phenomena to 
phenomena describable in the non-human sciences. The second is what McDowell 
terms rampant platonism, which amounts to more or less the sort of non-naturalism with 
which I ended §2.3 above, the one that led to my anxiety surrounding McDowell’s 
account of perception: 
This [sc. rejecting bald naturalism] can easily seem to commit us to a rampant 
platonism. It can seem that we must be picturing the space of reasons as an 
autonomous structure—autonomous in that it is constituted independently of 
anything specifically human…. But human minds must somehow be able to latch 
on to this inhuman structure. So it looks as if we are picturing human beings as 
partly in nature and partly outside it. What we wanted was a naturalism that 
makes room for meaning, but this is no kind of naturalism at all.107 
 
McDowell’s account of second nature is intended to give us what we want, namely a 
view that is naturalistic (unlike rampant platonism) yet that also makes room for 
meaning (unlike bald naturalism). 
 McDowell’s strategy is to use the notion of second nature to develop a 
naturalized version of platonism.108 He does so by noting that humans are born with 
certain capacities, while they must develop others through their upbringing. The former 
capacities constitute a human’s first nature and the latter capacities constitute her 
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second nature. Finally, McDowell asserts (and does not argue) that “human beings are 
intelligibly initiated into … the space of reasons by [their] … upbringing.”109 Therefore, a 
human’s perceptual capacities (shaped as they are around the space of reasons) are 
second natural, and therefore natural as opposed to non-natural. 
 The problem with this strategy is that, just as McDowell leaves his account of 
perception indistinguishable from rational intuitionism, here he leaves his naturalized 
platonism indistinguishable from rampant platonism. To recognize this, notice that by 
replacing ‘second natural’ and its cognates with ‘non-natural’ and its cognates in the 
previous paragraph, the view that is described simply is that of rampant platonism. This 
should raise our suspicions that McDowell is engaging in merely verbal maneuvering, 
but these suspicions would rightly dissolve if he were to supplement his naturalized 
platonism with a method for distinguishing that which is second natural from that which 
is non-natural. Towards this end, McDowell time and again asserts without arguing that 
upbringing actually does inculcate just the second natural capacities he needs without 
being able to inculcate the non-natural capacities that would call his view into 
question.110 At the root of these assertions is an externalist way of thinking 
encapsulated by something McDowell says in another essay, where he discusses 
virtuous upbringing and our ethical capacities: “what is distinctive about virtue … is that 
the reasons a virtuous person takes himself to discern really are reasons; a virtuous 
person gets this kind of thing right.”111 Translated to be about second nature, 
McDowell’s claim is that what is distinctive about a human’s second natural capacities is 
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that she not only takes herself to have such a capacity; she really does have such a 
capacity. Whereas a person cannot have the non-natural capacity for having Platonic 
forms present to her regardless of how she takes things to be or how she is brought up, 
McDowell’s response is that it is a simple fact that she can (and does) have the second-
natural capacity for having physical objects present to her. Given that my challenge to 
McDowell has been to justify this latter commitment given the stark analogy between the 
former and latter capacities, the vacuity of McDowell’s externalist response should be 
obvious. At best it begs the very question at issue, at worst it ignores the issue outright, 
and barring some substantive way of distinguishing the second-natural from the non-
natural McDowell’s account of second nature and the naturalized platonism he develops 
around it is indistinguishable from the non-naturalism of rampant platonism.  
 
§2.5. McDowell as Therapist 
My charges against McDowell in the previous two sections should not come as news. At 
root, they highlight one and the same problem with McDowell’s first-order philosophy: 
that he does not address what seem to be the highly rationalist, non-naturalist 
implications of his view. Many commentators have levied similar charges against 
McDowell,112 and it is not my primary intention to rehash these debates. Instead, I hope 
for these previous sections to show the general shape of McDowell’s empiricism, so that 
now we can focus more directly on his therapeutic metaphilosophy. The reason I shift 
my focus from McDowell’s first-order philosophy to his metaphilosophy is that this is a 
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move McDowell himself makes time and again when he is faced with objections of any 
stripe. His strategy is to highlight what he takes to be a misunderstanding on the part of 
his objector—either at the level of McDowell’s first-order philosophy or his 
metaphilosophy—and conclude that, given this misunderstanding, the burden of proof 
for the issue at hand does not fall on McDowell after all. In this section, I develop two 
objections to McDowell’s metaphilosophy, the first highlighting a general problem 
concerning the consistency of McDowell’s metaphilosophical principles and his actual 
practice, and the second highlighting the faulty diagnosis at the heart of McDowell’s 
response to my objections from the previous sections more specifically. To differentiate 
these new objections from my objections in previous sections, I designate these former 
as meta-objections. Together, these meta-objections establish that McDowell cannot 
avoid the burden of proof in his usual ways, so that my first-order objections go through. 
 
a. The First Meta-Objection 
Let me begin by developing my first meta-objection against McDowell. I have already 
provided a general outline of McDowell’s metaphilosophical strategy: he highlights a 
misunderstanding and concludes that given this misunderstanding he has no obligation 
to respond directly to the objection at hand. To establish that this is his strategy, we 
need only consider a few examples. First, consider how Simon Blackburn criticizes 
McDowell’s metaphor of distinct “spaces”—one being the space of reasons and the 
other the realm of law—arguing that this metaphor makes it difficult (if not impossible) 
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for McDowell to acknowledge obvious facts concerning the causal dimension of 
perception.113 To address Blackburn’s worries, McDowell simply notes that 
I work with a contrast between the space of reasons … and the realm of law…. 
Blackburn assumes that this is merely my preferred way of describing a contrast 
between the space of reasons and the space of causes. But I do not set off the 
space of reasons by distinguishing it from something describable as the space of 
causes…. This means that the main thrust of Blackburn’s reflections … [are] 
unthreatening to me.114 
 
Here, we see McDowell highlighting that Blackburn (purportedly) confuses the realm of 
law with the space of causes. From this, McDowell concludes that Blackburn’s 
objections raise no problems with his view. 
 Alternatively, Graham Macdonald argues that McDowell’s insistence that there 
cannot be a science of our rational second nature is misguided, and that the project of 
teleosemantics allows us to understand how we might go about developing such a 
science of rationality.115 As McDowell summarizes the charge against him: 
Now Macdonald thinks this stance [sc. McDowell’s account of second nature] 
lands me with a burden of proof, to show that a sufficiently sophisticated 
exploitation of the concept of function, as it figures in framing biological 
understanding, cannot accommodate the explanatory potential of appeals to 
rationality.116 
 
However, by McDowell’s lights, “for there to be a burden of proof where Macdonald 
places it, a naturalism of natural science would need to be the default position.”117 Since 
the motivation for McDowell’s account of second nature is that such a prioritizing of this 
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sort of naturalism “is nothing but a scientistic prejudice,” McDowell concludes by saying 
simply, “I reject [Macdonald’s] view of the dialectical situation.”118 
 There are many more cases where McDowell pursues this metaphilosophical 
strategy, some where the strategy is obviously convincing119 and others where it is less 
so.120 For now, the conclusions I want to highlight are that, assuming this strategy is 
appropriate, McDowell places much of the dialectical burden on his interlocutor, thereby 
making his position highly immune to criticism. My first meta-objection is intended to call 
into doubt the general soundness of McDowell’s burden-shifting, while my second meta-
objection is intended to prove that even if this burden-shifting is appropriate in general, it 
is not appropriate in the specific case of my charges of rationalistic non-naturalism and 
so McDowell’s view is not as immune to criticism as he would lead one to believe. 
 We are already halfway towards appreciating the first meta-objection, now that 
we have seen how McDowell goes about attempting to disarm his interlocutors’ 
criticisms. We gain a full understanding of the first meta-objections once we recognize 
one of McDowell’s general metaphilosophical principles. In his Introduction to Mind and 
World, McDowell gets to the heart of this principle when, after setting his goal of 
diagnosing the oscillation between Givenism and coherentism as illusory, he says: 
I want to be able to acknowledge the power of the illusion’s sources, so that we 
find ourselves able to respect the conviction that the obligations [that lead to the 
                                                       
118 McDowell, “Response to Graham Macdonald,” 237. 
119 To my mind, McDowell’s use of this strategy in his debate with Hubert Dreyfus is one 
such case. See Dreyfus, “The Myth”; also McDowell, “The Myth.” 
120 McDowell’s treatment of Robert Brandom and Richard Rorty’s objections are one such 
case. McDowell acknowledges that Brandom and Rorty offer an alternative that he does not 
explicitly treat in Mind and World, but nonetheless he judges them on Mind and World’s 
terms, not their own terms. See Brandom, “Perception and Rational Constraint”; also Rorty, 
“McDowell, Davidson, and Spontaneity”; also McDowell, “Reply to Commentators,” 403-409 
and 419-425. 
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oscillation] are genuine, even while we see how we can, for our own part, reject 
the appearance that we face a pressing intellectual task.121 
 
Against his actual practice of handling objections, in this passage McDowell is explicitly 
accepting the burden of proof—he is “respect[ing] the conviction that the obligations are 
genuine”—while insisting that he has a way to show that the burden can be met more 
easily than people often imagine. The obvious conclusion this should lead one to is that 
McDowell’s metaphilosophical practice is inconsistent with his principles. 
 The equally obvious way for someone sympathetic with McDowell to block this 
conclusion is to insist that he accepts the burden of proof only when it comes to 
addressing the oscillation between Givenism and coherentism; but such a contention is 
simply false. In two separate exchanges with Richard Rorty, one where McDowell 
defends the vocabulary of objectivity against Rorty’s arguments in favor of the 
vocabulary of solidarity and another where McDowell defends his therapeutic 
empiricism against Rorty’s arguments in favor of bald naturalism, McDowell reiterates 
that his goal is to accept a burden of proof that Rorty rejects.122 Together, these 
establish that McDowell’s principled acceptance of the burden of proof extends beyond 
the scope of only the oscillation from Mind and World. 
 But, might it still be the case that McDowell’s principle of accepting the burden of 
proof ranges only over a small number of issues, a number that includes those issues at 
stake in his exchanges with Rorty, without it ranging over any substantive number? 
                                                       
121 McDowell, Mind and World, xi. 
122 For McDowell on objectivity and solidarity, see McDowell, “Towards Rehabilitating 
Objectivity,” especially 221-224. For McDowell on therapeutic empiricism and bald 
naturalism, see McDowell, “Reply to Commentators,” 419-425 (especially 422 and 423-
424). 
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Again, McDowell himself tells us why this cannot be the case. When comparing his 
burden-accepting principle to Rorty’s burden-shirking one, McDowell asserts that 
“Rorty’s medicine … is harder to take than mind.”123 It is not so much out of respect for 
argumentative norms that McDowell accepts the burden, but instead out of a desire for 
therapeutic efficacy that he does so. As McDowell puts it, when an interlocutor’s 
anxieties are ignored, as they are by Rorty’s burden-shirking principle, “it would be only 
natural [for the interlocutor] to recoil into just the kind of … philosophical activity that 
Rorty deplores.”124 This is because the interlocutor needs to have his anxieties both 
diagnosed and treated—i.e. he needs a philosopher both to lay out in an orderly manner 
the conceptual space within which his anxieties operate and to conspicuously display 
why his anxieties are inappropriate once he adopts some position within that conceptual 
space. To stop at the diagnosis phase would leave the interlocutor’s anxieties 
untouched, because although the interlocutor could identify his anxieties he has no way 
of seeing them as anything but appropriate. As such, he will try to address his anxieties 
in a philosophically robust manner that, assuming Rorty and McDowell are right in their 
therapeutic approach to philosophy, only serves to deepen his anxieties’ hold on him. 
McDowell’s charge is that this is precisely where Rorty’s burden-shirking principle 
leaves the therapeutic philosopher—providing the interlocutor with diagnosis but no 
treatment, and therefore leaving the interlocutor to address his anxieties in his own 
pathological manner. Instead, by doing as McDowell advises and adopting the burden of 
                                                       
123 McDowell, “Reply to Commentators,” 422. 
124 McDowell, “Towards Rehabilitating Objectivity,” 222. 
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proof, the therapeutic philosopher can provide the treatment which would otherwise be 
lacking. 
 Because the McDowellian argument from the previous paragraph is a perfectly 
general one, the conclusion is not hard to draw: McDowell is committed to a wide-
ranging principle of accepting the burden of proof, one that his actual philosophical 
practice flies in the face of. This charge of inconsistency is my first meta-objection to 
McDowell, and this meta-objection is double-edged in the sense that it cuts against 
McDowell regardless of which approach he takes in trying to address it. On the one 
hand, if McDowell tries to avoid my objection from the previous sections by sticking to 
his burden-shirking practice, then I can respond that he is not providing me with an 
adequate treatment to my anxieties and so McDowell fails in his therapeutic endeavor. 
On the other hand, if McDowell accepts the burden of treating the anxieties at the heart 
of my objection from the previous sections, then he has a steep hill to climb, one that he 
has not even begun to climb and one that will almost inevitably involve him in the sort of 
constructive philosophizing in which he is loathe to engage.125 
 
b. The Second Meta-Objection 
Now that I have gone over my first meta-objection, let’s move on to consider my second. 
As I mentioned above, my second meta-objection is more specifically focused on the 
issues surrounding my objection from the previous sections, and the charge at the heart 
of this meta-objection is that McDowell provides a false diagnosis of my anxieties from 
these previous sections. To rebut an immediate objection, notice that philosophical 
                                                       
125 For McDowell and constructive philosophy, see McDowell, Mind and World, xxiii-xxiv. 
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therapy is, for McDowell, a particularistic endeavor that is shaped by contingent and 
historical forces.126 As such, he cannot object that my reaction to his work, and my 
resulting anxieties, are pejoratively idiosyncratic. That would require McDowell to 
engage in theorizing as opposed to therapy, and he is adamant that the former is not his 
method of philosophizing.127 
 Getting to my second meta-objection, I admit that when I first read Mind and 
World I had the sorts of anxiety that McDowell associates with the oscillation between 
Givenism and coherentism. For the longest time, I assumed there was no problem with 
a naive sort of empiricism, but then I read the work of Wilfrid Sellars (among others) and 
learned to appreciate the force of his attack on the myth of the Given. This called into 
doubt my faith in empiricism, but I recognized that the coherentist alternative that many 
read Sellars as providing has problems of its own, and with that I was sucked into 
McDowell’s oscillation and struck with its attendant anxieties. 
 As such, I read Mind and World eagerly awaiting McDowell’s impending insights, 
which would doubtlessly show the error in my way of thinking and dissolve my anxieties. 
And there were the beginnings of such insights, as I acknowledge in the previous 
sections. However, at the end of the day I find myself unable to distinguish McDowell’s 
empiricism and naturalized platonism from rational intuitionism and rampant platonism. 
This much is just a rehash of §§2.3 and 2.4. 
                                                       
126 See in particular McDowell’s contrast of theory and therapy at McDowell, “Reply to 
Commentators,” 403-404; also McDowell, “Towards Rehabilitating Objectivity,” 207-208. 
127 See again McDowell, Mind and World, xxiii-xxiv; also McDowell, “Reply to 
Commentators,” 403-404. 
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 At this point, I can hear McDowell beginning to push back, saying that his 
empiricism and naturalized platonism only appear this way to me because I am still in 
the grips of his oscillation, or because of a scientistic prejudice on my part, or because 
of some other infirmity that he has already diagnosed and provided a treatment for. 
Therefore, my objections from the previous sections are simply a result of me not 
appreciating his diagnosis, or not following through with his treatment. Either way, the 
failing is mine and not his. 
 But this is simply not the case. I am a naturalist of a particularly liberal 
persuasion, agreeing with most of what De Caro and Macarthur identify as being liberal 
naturalist theses. Furthermore, I am not stuck in McDowell’s oscillation; I concede that 
McDowell’s position is an adequate escape to this. I could easily continue going through 
the list of McDowellianisms and defend myself against the McDowellian charge that I fail 
to appreciate their significance. Finally, it is not the case that I have anxieties that are 
simply unrelated to McDowell’s project, as I came into reading Mind and World with 
precisely the anxieties McDowell is.128 In short, I am a prime candidate for McDowell’s 
diagnosis and treatment, yet even after following this therapy I am still left with anxieties. 
 McDowell’s therapy is unsuccessful because it has had side effects on me, and 
these side effects are as serious as the problem that McDowell’s therapy is supposed to 
resolve. I find myself in the grips of an oscillation, but it is not the one McDowell 
diagnoses and treats. I am oscillating between a bald naturalism of the sort McDowell 
                                                       
128 At points in his reply to Brandom and Rorty, McDowell seems to suggest that this is the 
case with them—they are simply unbothered by the problems surrounding McDowell’s 
oscillation and so do not feel the attendant anxieties. See McDowell, “Reply to 
Commentators,” 403-409 and 419-425. 
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acknowledges in Mind and World, and a substantive rationalism of a sort that McDowell 
rarely considers explicitly. McDowell’s combined account of perception and second 
nature appears to be the only plausible alternative to Givenism and coherentism that 
respects the points that get us into the oscillation in the first place, and as I concede in 
the previous paragraph, it dissolves the sorts of issues that McDowell and I both see as 
plaguing Givenism and coherentism. However, McDowell’s account reminds me too 
much of rational intuitionism and rampant platonism, and McDowell’s silence on this sort 
of concern (not only in Mind and World but also in his similarly focused Woodbridge 
Lectures and Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge) raises anxieties that the 
therapeutic side of McDowell’s therapeutic empiricism is there simply to pass over (and 
not address) some of the more pressing issues for a view as committed to the 
conceptuality of perception as his is.129 These anxieties lead me to conclude that there 
is no satisfactory alternative that respects the points that get us into the oscillation, and 
so I am driven into the sort of bald naturalism that “opt[s] out of this area of philosophy” 
altogether.130 From here, I am convinced by the sorts of charges McDowell and other 
liberal naturalists levy against bald naturalism, and so I am driven back to McDowell’s 
therapeutic empiricism. The result is that I am stuck oscillating between two views that I 
never seriously considered before reading Mind and World: on the one hand, a sort of 
naturalism for which I do not have much sympathy, and on the other, a sort of 
rationalism I never imagined would be relevant to understanding empirical sense 
perception. The novelty of this new oscillation means that this oscillation is a side effect 
                                                       
129 For McDowell’s Woodbridge Lectures, see McDowell, Having the World, Chapters 1-3. 
130 McDowell, “Reply to Commentators,” 421. 
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of McDowell’s treatment, and not a relapse on my part to some antecedent pathology. 
And if this is the case, then McDowell is stuck in much the same situation as he was at 
the end of my first meta-objection: if he refuses the burden I am placing on him then his 
therapy fails on its own terms, and if he accepts the burden I am placing on him then his 
therapeutic empiricism is radically incomplete, maybe even incompletable. 
 
Division Three of Chapter Two 
Huw Price’s Global Expressivism 
 
§3.1. Introduction 
In this division, I argue that naturalism and global expressivism are inconsistent with 
one another. Naturalism is the view characterized by CTN from Chapter One above, 
while global expressivism is a view that Huw Price has developed and defended across 
a number of recent publications (more on this shortly). Whereas Davidson’s semantic 
project focuses on developing a substantive theory of truth and McDowell’s focuses on 
embedding a substantive theory of perception within his broader therapeutic 
metaphilosophy, Price’s global expressivism is distinctive for eschewing any substantive 
theorizing at all. Instead, Price adopts a minimalist and quietist approach to semantics. 
Minimalism is the view that the content of various semantic predicates is exhausted by 
their (merely) syntactical role—to take the most familiar example, one version of 
minimalism about truth is the view that there is nothing more to the truth predicate than 
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the disquotational feature captured by Tarski’s schema: ‘ ‘p’ is true iff p’.131 Alternatively, 
quietism is the view that certain topics are beside the point. For this reason, we can 
justifiedly remain silent on these topics, thus rejecting both affirmative and negative 
judgments related to these topics. Price’s minimalism and quietism will come into 
clearer view as we continue through this division. 
 Price’s minimalism and his quietism lead him to collapse a number of traditional 
distinctions—particularly that between expression and representation—and to prioritize 
the notion that is traditionally seen as being the weaker or more deflated of the two 
(again, more on this shortly). Although this sets Price up nicely to meet the Deflationary 
Demand, it would also seem to leave Price’s global expressivism ripe for criticism to the 
effect that it is too deflated a position to accomodate the Objectivity Demand. This is my 
ultimate charge against Price, but he has time and again stressed that such critiques 
tend to backfire since they presuppose precisely the distinctions that he collapses and 
the robust notions that he eliminates.132 As such, I begin in §3.2 by quickly reiterating 
how my account of CPS-aptness avoids such backfiring presuppositions. From there, I 
turn to Price’s global expressivism in §3.3, outlining it in its specific details. Finally, in 
§3.4 I look at how Price’s global expressivism leads him to develop a minimalist account 
of intentionality in an attempt to meet the Objectivity Demand, then I argue that the 
indexical nature of Price’s use of disquotational schemata prevents him from meeting 
the Objectivity Demand—this is what I call my Indexicality Objection. The conclusion is 
                                                       
131 Robert Brandom provides a helpful survey of minimalist views of truth at Brandom, 
Making It Explicit, 299-305. 
132 See, for example, Price, “Truth,” 180-183; also Price, “Semantic Minimalism,” 68-69; 
also Macarthur and Price, “Pragmatism,” 240-241. 
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then that Price cannot be entitled to his naturalism, because his global expressivism is 
inconsistent with it. §3.5 provides a summary overview of this division, preparing the 
way for Division Four where I apply the Indexicality Objection to Robert Brandom’s 
transcendental expressivism. 
 
§3.2. The Objectivity Demand and CPS-Aptness 
Let us begin by reminding ourselves of two things from Chapter One above. First, the 
Objectivity Demand states that naturalists must be able to acknowledge the objectivity 
of science—ideally in a positive manner by explaining how a-objectivity is possible, but 
at least in a negative manner by not saying anything that makes a-objectivity 
impossible. Second, ‘a-objectivity’ is to be understood in terms of categorical-propriety-
status-aptness (CPS-aptness), and a sentence is CPS-apt when it is governed by a 
propriety that is shared across all (inquiry-relevant) language games. 
 Going forward, the Objectivity Demand will be a crucial point in my criticism of 
Price’s global expressivism. As such, I should address at the outset the charge that 
Price will level at it—that it is blatantly question-begging. Often, the shared norm 
governing the various modes of inquiry is understood in terms of truth, such that the aim 
of inquiry is to begin with truth-apt sentences and uncover which of them are in fact true 
and which are in fact false. Objective modes of inquiry—paradigmatically the sciences—
are on this approach those that successfully satisfy this truth-norm of inquiry. However, 
as we are about to see, Price is a minimalist about truth, meaning that for him the only 
role that truth plays is the purely syntactical one encoded by Tarski’s disquotational 
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schema. Price’s objection is then that if we are to use truth to make sense of objectivity, 
we must understand truth in a robust, non-minimal, and therefore question-begging 
sense. 
 But this objection is too hastily put. As I make a point to highlight in Chapter One, 
truth-aptness is a species of CPS-aptness, and nothing about my account of CPS-
aptness necessitates that the concept of CPS-aptness be understood in terms of the 
more specific concept of truth-aptness. It could be understood just as easily in terms of 
Peircean ideal justification,133 or Brandomian scorekeeping attitudes,134 or a Rortian 
urge to keep the conversation going,135 so long as there is nothing about these 
successor-concepts for truth that prevents them from factoring into a categorical 
propriety. What is important is not the content of the shared norm, nor how that content 
is specified, but instead the functional role of the norm as shared—i.e. as governing not 
just one mode of inquiry but as governing all modes.  
 Furthermore, even if the shared norm is understood in terms of truth, Price 
himself gives us a model for not begging questions against the minimalist. In his “Truth 
as Convenient Friction,” Price argues in favor of a truth-norm governing conversation, 
one that is stronger than even an idealized, Peircean justification-norm.136 By couching 
his discussion in specifically linguistic terms (as opposed to metaphysical terms), Price 
is able to identify positive reasons that both support this truth-norm yet do not commit 
                                                       
133 See Peirce, “How to Make,” 273; also Peirce, “Some Consequences,” 239. 
134 See Brandom, Making It Explicit, Chapter 3. 
135 See Rorty, Philosophy, Chapters 7 and 8. 
136 See Price, “Truth,” 177-180. 
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him to anything inconsistent with his minimalism.137 Going forward, I adopt both the 
functional and linguistic approaches that these responses to the question-begging 
objection suggest.  
 
§3.3. Global Expressivism 
With these points about the Objectivity Demand and CPS-aptness noted, we can now 
turn to the details of Price’s global expressivism. The purpose of this section is to outline 
these details, starting with global expressivism’s genesis out of Simon Blackburn’s 
quasi-realism and ending by noting its thoroughgoing anti-representationalism. 
 At the broadest level, Price considers his view to be “a generalised or ‘global’ 
version of quasi-realism.”138 For Price, quasi-realism is developed as a solution to what 
he calls the placement problem.139 We recognize this problem when we realize that 
common sense tells us that there are many true statements but science tells us that 
                                                       
137 See Price, “Truth,” 180-183. Hopefully at this point the charge of begging the question 
has been adequately rebutted, although there is one final source of Pricean pushback. Price 
distinguishes between object naturalism—the view either that “all there is is the world 
studied by science” or that “all genuine knowledge is scientific knowledge” (Price, 
Expressivism, 4-5)—and subject naturalism—the view that “philosophy needs to begin with 
what science tells us about ourselves” (Price, Expressivism, 5). Price argues that subject 
naturalism validates, and is therefore theoretically prior to, object naturalism. The question 
begging charge would then be that the Objectivity Demand reverses this order of 
explanation. My first response is to fall back on the linguistic-functional nature of my use of 
the Objectivity Demand, which I discuss in the following body paragraph. But if this is not 
satisfying to Price, I would ask how it is that he is entitled to his subject naturalism. If Price 
answers that the sciences are better at what they do than any other mode of inquiry, then 
he accepts the common sensical point which leads to the Objectivity Demand (see Chapter 
One, §3 above). And if Price does not answer in this way, he is left with no good reason for 
prioritizing the scientific story of ourselves that is at the heart of his subject naturalism, as 
opposed to prioritizing the story that religion tells us about ourselves, or that art tells us, or 
metaphysics or any of a number of other disciplines. In this manner, either Price 
presupposes the Objectivity Demand when he commits himself to subject naturalism, or he 
must concede that his commitment to subject naturalism is unjustified-because-
unjustifiable. 
138 Price, Expressivism, 29. 
139 See Price, “Moving,” 3-6; also Macarthur and Price, “Pragmatism,” 230-232. 
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there are not enough truth-makers in the world to account for all of the true statements. 
This would seem to entail the existence of truths without truth-makers, of which the most 
common examples are moral truths like ‘murder is wrong’ or modal truths like ‘massive 
bodies necessarily attract one another’. The quasi-realist’s strategy is to argue that 
common sense overestimates the number of truths that are in need of truth-makers, and 
he pursues this strategy in two stages. First, he argues that the function of certain 
sentences—such as moral and modal sentences—is not to represent the world but 
instead to express something about the speaker. Second, the quasi-realist argues that, 
despite their expressive function, these sentences are entitled to the syntactical 
trappings of representational sentences—paradigmatically the indicative mood and 
Tarski’s disquotational schema. The first stage shows why the truth-maker model is 
inappropriate for certain statements, while the second stage ensures that the first stage 
does not become too revisionary or ad hoc.140 
 Price’s challenge to quasi-realism concerns the status of “the bifurcation thesis—
the doctrine that there is a line to be drawn in language, between descriptive [sc. 
representational] and non-descriptive [sc. non-representational] uses.”141 Although 
quasi-realists are committed to the bifurcation thesis, in an essay coauthored with David 
Macarthur, Price argues that they ought not be. Macarthur and Price begin their attack 
by posing the following question to the quasi-realists: are you minimalists about truth? If 
the quasi-realists answer affirmatively, then they are saying that Tarski’s schema is the 
only criterion for using the truth predicate, and since statements like ‘ ‘snow is white’ is 
                                                       
140 For more on quasi-realism, see Blackburn, Essays; Price, Expressivism, 23-31; Macarthur 
and Price, “Pragmatism,” 237-239 and 244. 
141 Price, Expressivism, 30. 
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true’ and ‘ ‘murder is wrong’ is true’ equally follow Tarski’s schema, there is no longer a 
principled way of drawing the distinction at the heart of the bifurcation thesis. Therefore, 
quasi-realists must answer negatively and identify an additional criterion for the truth 
predicate that allows it to apply when the embedded sentence is representational but 
not when it is expressive.  
 Regardless of what this criterion is, Macarthur and Price now ask the quasi-
realists whether the new criterion is what entitles expressive uses of language to the 
syntactical trappings of representational uses. If the quasi-realists answer affirmatively, 
then they admit defeat because expressive uses of language do not meet this criterion 
by hypothesis, and so expressive uses of language are not entitled to the syntactical 
trappings of representational uses—thus contradicting the second stage of the quasi-
realist’s strategy for addressing the placement problem. Therefore, the quasi-realists 
need to answer negatively, but once they do so the new criterion becomes an ad hoc 
addition to quasi-realism, “an idle cog, unnecessary in accounting for the use of 
semantic vocabulary.”142 The result of Macarthur and Price’s two questions is that no 
matter how the quasi-realists answer, they run into a compelling objection.143 
 At this point, Macarthur and Price’s recommendation is for quasi-realists to 
accept minimalism about truth. By doing this, the quasi-realists must also reject the 
bifurcation thesis and the representational-expressive distinction it supports, leaving 
them unable to account for the quasi aspect of their quasi-realism. Therefore, quasi-
                                                       
142 Macarthur and Price, “Pragmatism,” 245. 
143 For this argument, see Macarthur and Price, “Pragmatism,” 239-246. 
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realists must adopt a new position, and the only issue left to settle is whether this 
position is a global realism or a global expressivism.  
 On the face of it, it would seem like global realism follows from accepting 
minimalism. As Macarthur and Price put it: 
If there is nothing more to truth than the equivalence schema, then any 
meaningful sentence “P” whose syntax permits it to be embedded in the form “P 
is true” immediately possesses truth-conditions, in the only sense available: 
namely, “P” is true if and only if P.144 
 
Because minimalism entails that all syntactically indicative sentences are able to be 
given an analysis based on truth-conditions, the assumption is that all syntactically 
indicative sentences must be representational in nature, and therefore a global realism 
follows. 
 Macarthur and Price object to this inference from a truth-conditional analysis to 
representationalism. They begin by noting that expressivism is characterized by two 
claims: 
The negative claim says that these terms or statements [being given an 
expressivist analysis] lack some semantic feature: they are non-referential, non-
truth-apt, non-descriptive, non-factual, or something of the kind. The positive 
claim offers an alternative, non-semantic, account of the functions of the 
language in question—for example, that it expresses, or projects, evaluative 
attitudes of the speaker in question. Thus the negative claim is anti-
representational, the positive claim expressivist.145 
 
The global realist is right that minimalism entails a rejection of the anti-representational 
claim, but the global realist also makes two mistakes. First, the global realist assumes 
that to reject the anti-representational claim is to accept its negation. But this need not 
be the case. To understand why, consider the theistic claim that god exists. It is true that 
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one way of rejecting this claim is to accept its negation—the atheistic claim that god 
does not exist. But there is another, agnostic way of rejecting the theistic claim, namely 
by rejecting the intelligibility of the word ‘god’ and thereby rejecting both the theistic and 
the atheistic claims together. Outside of a religious context, ‘quietism’ is the name for 
this agnostic strategy, and Macarthur and Price’s contention is that minimalism leads to 
quietism. As they put it, the thought behind deflating truth to the Tarski schema is that 
“semantic notions [such as truth] have no substantial theoretical role to play,” meaning 
that the proper response to the anti-representational claim is to reject both it and its 
substantial, representationalist negation.146 For this reason, representationalism does 
not follow from minimalism, and so the route to a global realism is cut off. 
 The second mistake that the global realist makes is to ignore the positive 
expressivist claim outright. Macarthur and Price do not elaborate as to how they would 
develop this claim, so going forward I understand ‘expressivism’ in the general sense 
that they leave it in the quotation above—as an “alternative, non-semantic, account of 
the functions of … language,” whatever the details of that account might be.  
 Given these two mistakes, the lesson to learn is that minimalism causes us “to 
deflate the expressivist’s (usual) negative claim, while leaving intact the positive 
claim.”147 The result, Macarthur and Price argue, is global expressivism. Given the 
rejection of the bifurcation thesis, we must be either global realists or global 
expressivists, and given that there is no good argument in favor of realism (per the first 
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mistake) and no good one against expressivism (per the second), we ought to be global 
expressivists. 
 
§3.4. The Indexicality of Disquotational Schemata 
Let us now apply the Objectivity Demand to Price’s global expressivism. Because he 
characterizes his project as that of developing a specifically “pragmatic naturalism,” 
Price must be able to meet the Objectivity Demand;148 but as I argue in this section, this 
proves impossible for him. The reason is that, in rejecting the bifurcation thesis, Price 
deprives himself of the conceptual tools needed to acknowledge the CPS-aptness of 
any sentence, scientific or otherwise. Although Price attempts to do just this on 
minimalist grounds, I argue in this section that this attempt fails. 
 
a. Price’s Attempt to Meet the Objectivity Demand 
The first step in Price’s attempt is to substitute a distinction between i- and e-
representations for the distinction at the heart of the bifurcation thesis—that between 
representational and non-representational uses of language. Both sorts of 
representation are similar in that they must be representations in a minimalist sense in 
order to be consistent with Price’s global expressivism. However, i-representations are 
individuated according to their “internal functional role[s],” while e-representations are 
individuated according to their covariation with “external environmental condition[s].”149 
The difference that makes the difference is that i-representations are representations 
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insofar as they hold certain relations to other i-representations, while e-representations 
are representations insofar as they hold certain relations to the external world. 
 Price’s second step is to develop a correlative distinction between i- and e-
worlds. The i-world is “what our i-representations are about, in the proper deflationary 
sense of ‘about’.”150 Price does not elaborate as to what this deflationary sense is, but 
given his approach to other semantic predicates one is left to assume that his account 
of ‘about’ would be similarly minimalist, involving some such disquotational schema as ‘ 
‘S is P’ is about S’s being P’.151 Alternatively, the e-world “is simply the natural 
environment—what we have in view in the scientific project.”152 I will say more about 
both the i- and e-worlds shortly. 
 From here, Price’s final step is to claim that “the e-world simply is the i-world of 
the scientific vocabulary.”153 This tactic of explaining the e-world in terms of the i-world 
is the only option available to Price given his global expressivism. To reverse the order 
of explanation would be to adopt global representationalism, while to explain both 
independently would reinstantiate the quasi-realist’s bifurcation thesis. The result is that 
Price explains both the bearers of intentionality (i.e. i- and e-representations) and their 
intentional objects (i.e. the i- and e-worlds) solely in terms of the disquotational ‘about’ 
schema, making his account of intentionality a thoroughly minimalist one. 
 
 
                                                       
150 Price, Expressivism, 55. 
151 This is consistent with the last paragraph of Macarthur and Price, “Pragmatism,” 252, 
where they support a minimalism about reference. 
152 Price, Expressivism, 55. 
153 Price, Expressivism, 55. 
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b. The Indexicality Objection to Price’s Attempt 
Unfortunately, it is precisely this minimalism about intentionality that prevents Price from 
meeting the Objectivity Demand. To see why, we must understand how ‘i-world’ gains 
its intentional object. Looking back to Price’s definition, we see that the intentional object 
of ‘i-world’ is precisely the set of intentional objects of all (other) i-representations, and 
that we use the disquotational ‘about’ schema to determine the intentional object of any 
particular i-representation. This may appear to put Price on safe ground, because 
seemingly all we need to do to determine the intentional object of ‘i-world’ is to use the 
disquotational schema to read off the intentional objects of i-representations, and the 
resulting set will be the singular intentional object of ‘i-world’. 
 However, such an approach ignores the fact that there is no in principle reason 
for why the functional roles of i-representations cannot change over time. Because i-
representations are individuated by their functional roles, were these roles to change so 
too would the i-representations themselves. A perspicuous language would introduce a 
syntactical device—say subscripts—to mark such changes. Once such a device is 
introduced, we see that were we to apply the disquotational ‘about’ schema both before 
and after the change in roles occurs, the intentional objects picked out would not be the 
same—a fact marked by the different subscripts attached to the names for the different 
objects. Therefore, the intentional object of ‘i-world’ before the change in roles would not 
be the same as its intentional object after the change, even though ‘i-world’ maintains a 
singular intentional object throughout the change. 
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 The lesson is that ‘i-world’ functions as an indexical.154 Just as we can evaluate 
the propriety of a sentence that uses words such as ‘now’ or ‘here’ only after we index 
the sentence to the time or position of its utterance, so too can we evaluate the propriety 
of a sentence that uses ‘i-world’ only after we index the sentence to the linguistic context 
surrounding its utterance. Moreover, the propriety of ‘i-world’ sentences must be 
indexed to a linguistic context by means of the same token reflexive function that we 
associate with ‘now’ or ‘here’. Without such an indexing function, there is simply no way 
of identifying which is the appropriate linguistic context to associate with the sentence. 
Therefore, whereas ‘now’ means roughly ‘the time at which the sound ‘now’ is uttered’ 
and ‘here’ roughly ‘the place at which the sound ‘here’ is uttered’, ‘i-world’ means 
roughly ‘the set of intentional objects entailed by the linguistic context in which the 
sound ‘i-world’ is uttered’. Because the e-world is explained in terms of the i-world, 
similar considerations apply mutatis mutandis to ‘e-world’. 
 Once we recognize that ‘i-world’ and ‘e-world’ function as indexical terms, we 
recognize that statements about both the i- and e-worlds are not CPS-apt (as the 
Objectivity Demand would require). This is because the function of an indexical term is 
to alter the content being expressed by different utterances of the same sentence using 
that term, depending on the context in which that sentence is uttered. When we attempt 
to appraise such an indexical sentence according to any arbitrarily chosen norm, we see 
that particular utterances of that sentence may be appropriate or inappropriate to the 
norm, but the sentence itself is neither appropriate nor inappropriate because it does not 
                                                       
154 Price seems to overlook this implication of his view, as it seems to be precisely the 
“soapbox … for the village idealist” that he claims is nowhere to be seen given his account of 
the i-world (Price, Expressivism, 55). See Price, Expressivism, 53-55. 
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have a determinate content. Therefore, sentences using indexical terms cannot have a 
determinate propriety status—categorical or otherwise—and so they cannot be CPS-
apt. 
 To better understand this point, let us consider the following two sentences: 
 ‘It is raining here and now’ 
 
and 
 
 ‘Phlogiston is included in the e-world’. 
 
The content of an utterance of ‘It is raining here and now’ at place p1 and time t1 is that 
it is raining at place p1 and time t1. Alternatively, the content of such an utterance at a 
different place p2 and different time t2 is that it is raining at place p2 and time t2. From 
here, showing that ‘It is raining here and now’ does not itself have a determinate 
propriety status is a simple matter of specifying the conditions under which, given some 
norm, the different utterances of this sentence would have different propriety statuses. 
Assuming that the relevant norm is a truth-norm, the relevant conditions concern the 
arrangement of things in the external world—namely, when there are rain-producing 
storm clouds located above p1 at t1, and when there are no such things located around 
p2 at t2. Alternatively, if the relevant norm is a justification-norm, the conditions concern 
what evidence the utterer does and does not have to support his utterance. One 
obvious example is when the utterer has heard the weatherman say that it will rain at p1 
and t1 but not at p2 and t2; another is when the utterer is located around p1 at t1 and is 
being appeared to raining-ly, but later is located around p2 at t2 and is not being 
appeared to in this manner. Finally, given a Brandomian scorekeeping-norm, the 
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relevant conditions would concern the scorekeeping attitudes of the utterer’s linguistic 
peers, such that these peers judge his utterance to be appropriate for p1 and t1 and 
inappropriate for p2 and t2. Since ‘e-world’ functions indexically, parallel thoughts apply 
to ‘Phlogiston is included in the e-world’, leaving both sentences unable to be CPS-apt. 
 Nevertheless, each utterance of ‘It is raining here and now’ seemingly expresses 
something objective, and so this sentence ought to be CPS-apt in some extended or 
indirect sense. To develop this thought, we need only notice what I did in the previous 
paragraph to disambiguate between the different utterances of ‘It is raining here and 
now’: I translated the original indexical sentence into multiple, non-indexical sentences 
like ‘It is raining at place p1 and time t1’. What makes these latter, non-indexical 
sentences explanatorily useful is that the propriety status of their utterances remains the 
same across their different utterances. In other words, whereas the original indexical 
sentence is not CPS-apt, these latter non-indexical sentences are (assuming that there 
is a categorical norm with which to appraise these sentences). For the original, indexical 
sentence to be CPS-apt in this indirect sense, it must be possible for us to translate any 
arbitrary utterance of it into a similarly CPS-apt non-indexical sentence. In the case of ‘It 
is raining here and now’, the following translation scheme suffices: 
‘It is raining at place p and time t’ 
 
where ‘p’ and ‘t’ are variables that take as their substitutions names of the particular 
place and time (respectively) at which ‘It is raining here and now’ is uttered.  
 103 
 For Price’s global expressivism to meet the Objectivity Demand, a similar 
translation scheme must be available for sentences such as ‘Phlogiston is included in 
the e-world’. And at first it appears as if there is one, namely: 
‘Phlogiston is included in the set of intentional objects entailed by the linguistic 
 context c’ 
 
where ‘c’ is a variable that takes as its substitutions names of the particular linguistic 
context in which ‘Phlogiston is included in the e-world’ is uttered. But remember that the 
reason we recognized that sentences using ‘e-world’ are indexed to a linguistic context 
is because the functional role—and with it the intentional object—of the representations 
in those sentences change across different linguistic contexts. To take the present 
example, the functional role of ‘phlogiston’ is drastically different when it is uttered by a 
17th century scientist as compared to a 21st century scientist. As such, the above 
translation scheme is inappropriate for translating both scientists’ utterances, because it 
implies that they use ‘phlogiston’ univocally across both utterances, when in fact they 
use it equivocally.  
 The obvious way of modifying the scheme so as to account for this equivocation 
is to index ‘phlogiston’ to its relevant functional role. Using a subscript to do this, we get: 
‘Phlogistonx is included in the set of intentional objects entailed by the linguistic 
context c’ 
 
where substituting numerals for ‘x’ in ‘Phlogistonx’ produces names for the different 
intentional objects associated with the different functional roles of ‘phlogiston’. However, 
we should now be able to see that such indexing serves merely to mark the problem of 
equivocation, and not to solve it. The reason is simple: there is no in principle reason for 
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making any one substitution for ‘x’ as opposed to another. For any particular utterance 
of ‘Phlogiston is included in the e-world’, should we translate ‘phlogiston’ as phlogiston1, 
which is the intentional object of ‘phlogiston’ as used in 17th century science? Or as 
phlogiston2, which is the intentional object of ‘phlogiston’ as used in 21st century 
science? Or as phlogiston3, which is the intentional object of ‘phlogiston’ as used by 
philosophers who are comparing 17th to 21st century science? More generally, should 
we choose a translation of utterances of ’Phlogiston is included in the e-world’ that tends 
to make the utterances inappropriate, since we know that phlogiston is not included in 
the e-world (given our linguistic context)? Or should we choose a translation that tends 
to make the utterances appropriate, since we are charitable Davidsonian translators?155 
Or is there no such uniform approach to translation? The scheme by itself does not 
provide an answer to these questions, and neither can any further modification to the 
scheme. The conclusion is that ‘Phlogiston is included in the e-world’ is not itself CPS-
apt, nor can its utterances be translated into sentences that are.  
 
c. Two Generalizations of the Indexicality Objection 
More problematically, we can make two generalizations to this conclusion. For the first 
generalization, notice that my argument above depends only on the fact that the 
functional role of ‘phlogiston’ changes across different linguistic contexts, and not on 
any determinate quality that that functional role might have in any one context. A survey 
of the history of the sciences shows us that there is hardly a theoretical term that has 
not undergone noticeable changes in its functional role, and so this conclusion 
                                                       
155 See Davidson, “Radical Interpretation” and Davidson, “On the Very Idea.” 
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generalizes to the claim that most any sentence using ‘e-world’ is not CPS-apt, nor can 
its utterances be translated into sentences that are.  
 For the second generalization, notice that because Price explains the e-world in 
terms of the i-world, the only difference between the two is their scope—whereas the e-
world includes only the intentional objects of our scientific language games, the i-world 
includes the intentional objects of all of our language games. As such, my argument can 
just as easily be used to show that any sentence using ‘i-world’ is not CPS-apt, nor can 
its utterances be translated into sentences that are. If anything, the greater scope of the 
i-world leads to a greater diversity in functional roles for any individual term, making the 
argument against the CPS-aptness of i-world sentences stronger still than that against 
the CPS-aptness of e-world sentences. 
 The fully generalized conclusion is then: neither i-world nor e-world sentences 
are CPS-apt, nor can their utterances be translated into sentences that are. For this 
reason, Price is unable to acknowledge the existence of CPS-apt sentences or the sort 
of objectivity that I developed around the notion of CPS-aptness above. In short, Price 
cannot meet the Objectivity Demand, and so he cannot be entitled to his naturalist 
commitments. 
 
§3.5. Summary of the Indexicality Objection 
At this point, it is worth pausing to summarize what has led us to the conclusion that 
global expressivism is inconsistent with naturalism. In Chapter One above, we see how 
anyone committed to naturalism must also be committed to the objectivity of the 
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sciences, understood in terms of CPS-aptness. This is the Objectivity Demand that any 
naturalist must meet. Alternatively, in §3.3 we see how Price’s acceptance of 
minimalism about truth leads him to reject the bifurcation thesis, which in turn leads him 
to develop his global expressivism. §3.4 is where naturalism and global expressivism 
meet. This section begins by showing how Price’s global expressivism leads him to 
develop a minimalist account of intentionality, then the remainder of the section is 
dedicated to my argument showing that this minimalism about intentionality leaves Price 
unable to acknowledge the existence of CPS-apt sentences. The latter is my Indexicality 
Objection, and together with the Objectivity Demand it shows that Price cannot be 
entitled to his naturalist commitments. Finally, all of this was done using the linguistic-
functional approach to philosophy that Price prefers, meaning that my critique is internal 
to Price’s global expressivism, not question-beggingly external to it. 
 
Division Four of Chapter Two 
Robert Brandom’s Transcendental Expressivism 
 
§4.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this division is to extend my Indexicality Objection against Price’s global 
expressivism to apply to Robert Brandom’s semantic project from Making It Explicit. Like 
Price, Brandom’s project is thoroughly minimalist, although unlike Price, Brandom takes 
the syntactical roles that exhaustively determine the content of semantic predicates to 
be more complex than that of mere disquotation. In particular, Brandom sees the 
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syntactical roles characteristic of anaphoric and de re modal locutions as being 
essential to a full account of the semantic or representational dimension of language. 
Brandom adopts this syntactically richer approach to minimalism because he 
acknowledges the challenge posed by my Indexicality Objection, and he attempts to use 
his syntactical notions of anaphora and de re modality in order to develop an account of 
objectivity that does not fall prey to this objection. My argument throughout this division 
is that this attempt fails. 
 I begin in §4.2 by outlining the key structural difference between Price’s global 
expressivism and what I call Brandom’s transcendental expressivism. My intention is to 
show that, although Brandom and Price disagree about the systematic relations 
between those representational locutions that make explicit the semantic dimension of 
any first-order language game and those first-order language games themselves, they 
are equally minimalist in their accounts of the representational locutions and so my 
Indexicality Objection is an at least prima facie objection to Brandom’s transcendental 
expressivism. From there, I spend §4.3 surveying Brandom’s accounts of anaphora and 
de re modality, before arguing in §4.4 that, despite appearances to the contrary, 
Brandom’s account of objectivity is inadequate for addressing the Indexicality Objection. 
Finally, I spend §4.5 considering the significance of my conclusion that Brandom’s 
transcendental expressivism is inconsistent with naturalism given Brandom’s at times 
tenuous relation to naturalism. 
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§4.2. Transcendental Expressivism 
The immediate worry with applying my Indexicality Objection to Brandom is that, by 
developing this objection as I did around Price’s global expressivism, I have 
inadvertently designed it such that it is inapplicable to any other view. Given that 
Brandom explicitly asserts that his is a local version of expressivism—and not a global 
one—this is a pressing worry that I must address at the outset.156 The first point to note 
is that it is not Price’s global expressivism as such that leaves him open to the 
Indexicality Objection; instead, it is his minimalism about intentionality (which is 
admittedly a consequence of his global expressivism) that does this. The second point, 
which I dedicate this section to establishing, is that despite his local expressivism 
Brandom too is a minimalist about intentionality. 
 Brandom’s most concise statement of his versions of expressivism and 
minimalism can be found in his response to Price’s Expressivism, Pragmatism and 
Representationalism. There, he begins by outlining his thesis that the distinctive 
expressive role that he is interested in theorizing is the role of a vocabulary’s being both 
elaborated from and explicitating of a (set of) practice(s) that one must engage in to be 
playing any language game at all.157 A vocabulary is elaborated from a practice when it 
is possible for someone to speak that vocabulary by performing actions that occur within 
that practice, and a vocabulary is explicitating of a practice when that vocabulary allows 
someone to say in words what one is doing when one performs actions from that 
                                                       
156 See Brandom, “Global Anti-Representationalism,” 102 and 105. 
157 For Brandom’s overview of this thesis, see Brandom, “Global Anti-Representationalism,” 
99-102. For Brandom’s detailed account of this thesis and its place within his project of 
meaning-use analysis, see Brandom, Between Saying, Chapters 1 and 2 (especially 44-48). 
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practice. The concept of a vocabulary that is elaborated-explicitating (LX) in this manner 
is important for Brandom because it is the genus concept of which logical, normative, 
modal, and (as we will shortly see) intentional vocabularies are all species. 
 Because as an expressivist Brandom is interested in this LX relation, his “is 
essentially, and not just accidentally, a local expressivism.”158 Brandom’s reasoning 
here seems to be that while a vocabulary may hold this LX relation to some practice(s), 
those practice(s) are a proper subset of a larger set of practices that make possible 
some second vocabulary, one that does not itself hold the LX relation to any of these 
practice(s).159 In this manner, the vocabulary that is LX is, in an indirect sense, a 
metalanguage for the vocabulary that is not LX (which is in turn an object language), 
and for this reason the former but not the latter can be given an expressivist analysis. 
But whatever the reasoning, Brandom is adamant that  
not all vocabularies can play this particular expressive role [sc. the role of being 
LX]. Autonomous discursive practices must contain vocabularies playing other 
expressive roles—for instance, observational vocabulary that reports features of 
the non-linguistic bits of the world…. So this [sc. Brandom’s] sort of expressivism 
is not a candidate for extension to a global expressivism.160 
 
 However, whereas most expressivists (local or global) introduce their expressivist 
vocabularies as a competitor to the representational vocabulary of truth, reference, and 
intentionality more generally, Brandom introduces his expressivist vocabulary to better 
explain such representational vocabulary. As Brandom puts it, “one of the vocabularies I 
                                                       
158 Brandom, “Global Anti-Representationalism,” 102. 
159 I am here drawing from Brandom’s Figure 5.2 at Brandom, “Global Anti-
Representationalism,” 102. 
160 Brandom, “Global Anti-Representationalism,” 102. 
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am a local expressivist about is representational vocabulary itself.”161 I have much to 
say about Brandom’s expressivist story about representational vocabulary in the 
following section. For now the point to note is simply that Brandom’s strategy is not to 
explain language use in expressivist as opposed to representational terms; instead, his 
strategy is to admit that language use can be explained in representational terms, but 
also to argue that these representational terms are not what they seem—that they are 
not to be understood on their own terms but instead in expressivist terms. Given 
Brandom’s penchant for the German idealists, we can put this point by saying that, for 
Brandom, language use is empirically representational but transcendentally expressive, 
and for this reason I designate his view with the phrase ‘transcendental expressivism’. 
 Finally, it is Brandom’s transcendental expressivism that leads him to accept 
minimalism about intentionality. This is because what Brandom takes representational 
vocabulary to be expressive of are certain syntactical features of the deontic 
scorekeeping practices of our various language games. Looking forward to the next 
section, this leads Brandom to accept “deflationism [sc. minimalism] about traditional 
technical semantic vocabulary,” such as “ ‘true’, ‘refers’, ‘denotes’ and like cognates.”162 
On this front, Brandom’s minimalism takes the form of his prosentential theory of truth 
and his broader account of anaphora. However, this is just the tip of Brandom’s 
minimalist iceberg, as his transcendental expressivism also leads him to accept 
minimalism about “something possibly more fundamental,” namely “the representational 
                                                       
161 Brandom, “Global Anti-Representationalism,” 102. 
162 Brandom, “Global Anti-Representationalism,” 102. 
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dimension of intentionality itself.”163 The details concerning this level of Brandom’s 
minimalism will come when we consider his account of de re modality in the next 
section. What is important now is simply that Brandom shares Price’s minimalist 
approach not only to truth and reference, but also to intentionality as such. Therefore, 
Brandom’s is the sort of view that is at risk of falling prey to my Indexicality Objection, 
and so this is an objection that he must be able to address. 
 
§4.3. Truth, Anaphora, and De Re Modality 
Now that we appreciate why my Indexicality Objection is applicable to Brandom’s 
transcendental expressivism, we should survey his attempt to address it. Unlike Price, 
Brandom is acutely aware of the danger I highlight under the banner of the Indexicality 
Objection, and he spends the greater portion of Part Two of Making It Explicit 
developing the tools he takes to be necessary for rebutting this objection. As readers, 
the obvious places to begin might seem to be Brandom’s accounts of truth or anaphora, 
given the close conceptual ties between truth and objectivity and between anaphora and 
indexicals. However, truth and anaphora are for Brandom only indirectly relevant to his 
response to the Indexicality Objection. Instead, it is his account of de re modality that 
allows him to develop a notion of objectivity that he takes to be robust enough to 
address my Indexicality Objection. I will argue in the following section that Brandom is 
mistaken on this latter point, but before I get there I must first outline his accounts of 
truth, anaphora, and de re modality. 
 
                                                       
163 Brandom, “Global Anti-Representationalism,” 102. 
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a. Brandom on Truth 
To appreciate why Brandom decides to develop an account of anaphora in the first 
place, we must consider his approach to truth. Although he has much to say on this 
topic,164 Brandom ultimately defends a prosentential theory of truth of the sort 
developed by Dorothy L. Grover, Joseph L. Camp, Jr., and Nuel D. Belnap, Jr.165 The 
key thesis in Brandom’s development of this theory is that the truth predicate is not used 
to ascribe a substantive property (one usually seen to involve correspondence) to a 
sentence; instead, the truth predicate is what Brandom calls a prosentence-forming 
operator. Prosentences are understood by analogy to pronouns: just as a pronoun is a 
noun whose content is determined not by its relation to some non-linguistic entity but by 
its relation to another noun, a prosentence is a sentence whose content is determined 
not by its relation to some non-linguistic state of affairs but by its relation to another 
sentence. Brandom provides a detailed explanation of how exactly prosentences relate 
to regular sentences,166 ultimately characterizing the relation in anaphoric terms. 
 
b. Brandom on Anaphora 
With his prosentential theory of truth developed, Brandom quickly notes that “the 
treatment of ‘true’ has an exact parallel in the treatment of ‘refers’.”167 In particular, 
“‘refers’ can be understood as a pronoun-forming operator,”168 leading to “a single 
                                                       
164 See Brandom, Making It Explicit, 285-305. 
165 See Grover, Camp, and Belnap, “Prosentential Theory.” 
166 See in particular Brandom’s discussion of lazy and quantificational uses of pronouns and 
prosentences at Brandom, Making It Explicit, 301-302. 
167 Brandom, Making It Explicit, 305. 
168 Brandom, Making It Explicit, 305. To investigate Brandom’s pronominal theory of 
reference in detail would take me too far from the topic of Brandom’s response to the 
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theory form to explain the use of all legitimate semantic talk about truth and reference in 
purely anaphoric terms.”169 In this manner, much of Brandom’s semantic project is built 
around the notion of anaphora, to which we should now turn our attention. 
 Brandom defines anaphora in terms of its “asymmetric structure of 
recurrence.”170 To understand this, let us consider the notion of an anaphoric chain, 
which designates a set of linguistic items that hold the sort of asymmetric recurrence 
relations to one another that are characteristic of anaphora. To understand these 
relations, consider Brandom’s example sentences: 
A man in a brown suit approached me on the street yesterday and offered to buy 
my briefcase. When I declined to sell it, the man doubled his offer. Since he 
wanted the case so badly, I sold it to him. 
 
There are two anaphoric chains across these sentences, one that consists of the set of 
linguistic items {‘a man in a brown suit’, ‘the man’, ‘he’, ‘him’}, and another consisting of 
the set {‘my briefcase’, ‘it’, ‘the case’, ‘it’}. The relation between the various words and 
phrases within each chain can be understood “presystematically by saying that the 
reference of later elements in such chains … is secured only by the relations these 
elements stand in to the singular terms that initiate the chains in which they appear.”171 
In this manner, ‘a man in a brown suit’ serves as the initiator for the first chain. ‘The 
man’, ‘he’, and ‘him’ are then recurrences of ‘a man in a brown suit’ because all four 
have the same reference. However, the relation between the initiating ‘a man in a brown 
suit’ and the other words in the chain is asymmetric because ‘a man in a brown suit’ has 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Objectivity Demand. Curious readers should see Brandom, Making It Explicit, 305-307. Two 
additional, relevant passages can be found at Brandom, Making It Explicit, 432-449 and 
459-473. 
169 Brandom, Making It Explicit, 306. 
170 Brandom, Making It Explicit, 455. 
171 Brandom, Making It Explicit, 307. 
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the reference it does independently of its grammatical relations to the other words, while 
these other words would have no determinate reference were they not preceded by ‘a 
man in a brown suit’. In this manner, these other words depend for their reference upon 
the initiator of the anaphoric chain. 
 Although Brandom has much more to say on the topic of anaphora,172 for our 
purposes the important point is that Brandom does not intend for his account of 
anaphora to address the Indexicality Objection. As Brandom puts the point: 
It should be emphasized that this is an account of what anaphoric relations 
consist in—or better, given the methodological phenomenalism about normative 
statuses that governs the theoretical idiom employed here, about the practical 
attitudes that constitute taking or treating two expressions as anaphorically 
linked.173 
 
Brandom’s phenomenalism entails that—mentions of reference and coreference 
aside—his account of anaphora is ultimately an account of the subjective, word-word 
relations between the linguistic items in an anaphoric chain, not an account of any 
purported objective, word-world relations between those items and some non-linguistic 
reality. Brandom’s concern is with what our collateral commitments lead us to take to be 
the case, not with what actually is the case.174 Although the notion of an anaphoric chain 
plays a role in Brandom’s account of objectivity, it is not until we get to Brandom’s 
theory of de re modality that anything like the word-world relations characteristic of 
objectivity come into view.  
 
                                                       
172 For Brandom’s full elaboration of his theory of anaphora, see Brandom, Making It Explicit, 
Chapter 7 (especially 449-459); also Brandom, Making It Explicit, 307-313. For a summary 
of how Brandom develops his theory, see Brandom, Making It Explicit, 431-432. 
173 Brandom, Making It Explicit, 457. 
174 For more instances where Brandom highlights this point as it relates to his theory of 
anaphora, see Brandom, Making It Explicit, 433 and 461. 
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c. The de re-de dicto Distinction 
Brandom comes to focus on de re modality by first noting that it is through using words 
such as ‘of’ or ‘about’ that we make explicit the intentional dimension of language 
(consider such sentences as ‘I am thinking of a number’ or ‘You are talking about the 
weather’). However, both ‘of’ and ‘about’ play additional grammatical roles besides this 
one of marking intentionality. For example, ‘of’ is often used to indicate possession (as 
in the phrase ‘the book of mine’) and ‘about’ is used to indicate approximations (as in 
the sentence ‘My house is about five miles from downtown’). Brandom’s claim is that 
what distinguishes the former intentionality-marking uses of ‘of’ and ‘about’ from these 
other uses is “the way [‘of’ and ‘about’] figure in de re ascriptions of propositional 
attitudes” in these former uses.175 
 To understand what de re ascriptions of propositional attitudes are, it helps to 
contrast them with their traditional counterpart, de dicto ascriptions. There are two 
common criteria for distinguishing between de dicto and de re ascriptions. On the one 
hand, de re ascriptions are understood as being those ascriptions that remain 
appropriate even when the words characterizing them are replaced with corefering 
words; de dicto ascriptions are then those for which this is not the case. As an example, 
assume that John believes the sentence ‘The German national team did not win the 
2014 World Cup’ but does not believe ‘The 2014 World Cup champion did not win the 
2014 World Cup’. It is appropriate to ascribe to John both de re and de dicto the belief 
that the German national team did not win the 2014 World Cup. However, substituting 
‘the 2014 World Cup champion’ for the coreferring phrase ‘the German national team’ 
                                                       
175 Brandom, Making It Explicit, 500. 
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and thus ascribing to John a belief that the 2014 World Cup champion did not win the 
2014 World Cup is appropriate when the ascription is understood as de re but not when 
understood as de dicto. 
 On the other hand, de re ascriptions are understood as being those for which at 
least one of its (explicit or implicit) quantifiers is of wide scope, where a quantifier is of 
wide scope iff there is a propositional attitude operator such that the quantifier is not 
within the context of this operator and a variable bound by the quantifier is within the 
scope of this operator. De dicto ascriptions are those for which all of its (explicit or 
implicit) quantifiers are of narrow scope, where a quantifier is of narrow scope iff it is not 
of wide scope. ‘John believes the German national team did not win the 2014 World 
Cup’ is an example with an implicit quantifier, and as such is ambiguous between a 
number of meanings, among them: 
(∃x) (x is the German national team & John believes that (x did not win the 2014 
World Cup)) 
 
and 
 
John believes that ((∃x) (x is the German national team & x did not win the 2014 
World Cup)). 
 
The former is a de re reading, meaning that it quantifies over things about which John 
has beliefs, and the latter is a de dicto reading, meaning that it attributes a quantified 
belief to John. Together, they help us visualize why substituting ‘the 2014 World Cup 
champions’ for ‘the German national team’ is inappropriate in the one case but not the 
other—in the de dicto case such a substitution changes the content of the ascribed 
belief while in the de re case it leaves the content of the ascribed belief unaltered. 
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 Brandom introduces a helpful convention for keeping track of what portion of an 
ascription is de dicto and what portion (if any) is de re.176 Formally, the convention 
schema is: 
Subject S Φs of x1, x2, …, xn that P(itx1, itx2, …, itxn) 
 
By filling in the variables ’S’ and ‘Φ’, the convention has us specify to whom we are 
ascribing a propositional attitude and what that propositional attitude is, respectively. 
From there, we nominalize the portions of the attitude that we are ascribing de re, and 
replace ‘x1, x2, …, xn’ with those nominalizations. In this manner the ‘of’ marks off the 
de re portion of the ascription. Alternatively, the ‘that’ marks off the de dicto portion, 
which includes two important parts: first, a predicate term that replaces the variable ‘P’ 
and specifies the de dicto portion of the ascribed attitude; and second, pronouns 
referring to each of the terms ‘x1, x2, …, xn’ that take the place of ‘itx1, itx2, …, itxn’ and 
that make explicit how the de re and de dicto portions relate to one another. Finally, 
when there is no de re portion to the ascription, the ‘of x1, x2, …, xn’ from the schema is 
dropped and ‘x1, x2, …, xn’ takes the place of ‘itx1, itx2, …, itxn’ in the de dicto ‘that’ 
clause. Continuing with our example about John, the ascriptions we have been working 
with in previous paragraphs can be formulated as 
John believes that the German national team did not win the 2014 World Cup 
 
and 
 
John believes of the German national team that they did not win the 2014 World 
Cup. 
 
For clarity’s sake, I make use of this convention going forward. 
                                                       
176 See Brandom, Making It Explicit, 501-502 and 504. 
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d. Brandom’s Social-Practical Twist on the de re-de dicto Distinction 
Now that we understand the de dicto-de re distinction and a convention for marking it, 
we can consider how this distinction factors into Brandom’s transcendental 
expressivism. Perhaps the most obvious way would be for Brandom to have de dicto 
ascriptions be such as to ascribe a belief concerning mere word-word relations, while 
having de re ascriptions ascribe beliefs concerning the sort of robust word-world 
relations that are missing in his account of anaphora. Etymology would seem to push in 
this direction—after all, ‘dictum’ means saying and ‘res’ means thing—but this is not the 
approach that Brandom pursues.177  
 Instead of distinguishing de dicto and de re ascriptions in terms of a difference 
concerning the ascribed beliefs’ objects of acquaintance (i.e. words and the world, 
respectively), Brandom distinguishes them in terms of a difference in how they ascribe 
one and the same type of belief. In Brandom’s words, “the distinction between de dicto 
and de re should not be understood to distinguish two kinds of belief or even belief-
contents, but two kinds of ascription—in particular two different styles in which the 
content of the commitment ascribed can be specified.”178  
 To understand Brandom’s point, we must first go over some basics of his deontic 
scorekeeping account of language games.179 Each speaker in a language game has his 
own set of commitments. The contents of these commitments are determined by their 
inferential relations to one another, and the contents of any words used to express 
                                                       
177 For more on this non-Brandomian approach, and Brandom’s reasons for rejecting it, see 
Brandom, Making It Explicit, 547-552. 
178 Brandom, Making It Explicit, 503. 
179 For more on deontic scorekeeping, see Brandom, Making It Explicit, Chapter 3. For 
simplicity’s sake I ignore the role that entitlements play in deontic scorekeeping because 
they do not factor into Brandom’s account of the de dicto-de re distinction. 
 119 
these commitments are determined by those words’ contribution to the inferential 
relations between the commitments. Additionally, for a commitment to be included in a 
speaker’s set of commitments, it must be ascribed to the speaker by a scorekeeper 
(either implicitly or explicitly). Propositional attitude ascriptions (both de dicto and de re) 
play the expressive role of making explicit what a scorekeeper is doing in keeping score. 
However, the scorekeeper has her own set of commitments, and she need not share 
the commitments of the speaker on whom she is keeping score. Since the contents of 
any one commitment is determined by its relation to every other commitment in a 
person’s set of commitments, a difference in one commitment between speaker and 
scorekeeper entails a difference in every commitment.  
 With this in mind, we can now understand Brandom’s point that the de dicto-de re 
distinction identifies two styles of specifying belief contents, and not two distinct types of 
belief or belief content. In explicitly ascribing a propositional attitude to a speaker, the 
scorekeeper is obviously ascribing some content to the speaker; however, to do this the 
scorekeeper must be using words whose contents are determined by their contribution 
to the inferential relations between her own commitments—she has no other option 
given Brandom’s inferentialism. Therefore, the scorekeeper is responsible for the 
contents of the words used in the ascription, but the speaker is responsible for the 
overall content being ascribed, and barring some grammatical device the sentence 
expressing the ascription is systematically ambiguous as to who is responsible for which 
contents. Brandom’s claim is that the de dicto-de re distinction, and the of-that 
convention he develops around it, serves precisely this grammatical role, with the 
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speaker being responsible for the de dicto portion of the ascription (conventionally 
marked by ‘that’) and the scorekeeper being responsible for the de re portion (marked 
by ‘of’).180 Using Brandom’s terminology, in uttering an ascription, the scorekeeper 
attributes responsibility for the de dicto portion to the speaker while undertaking 
responsibility for the de re portion herself. 
 
§4.4. Objectivity and the Indexicality Objection 
a. Brandom’s Account of Objectivity 
We are finally in a position to appreciate Brandom’s account of objectivity. Starting with 
the basics, for Brandom a necessary condition “on any account of concepts [is] that it 
make sense of a distinction between how [concepts] are applied in fact, by anyone or 
everyone, and how they ought to be applied,” regardless of how anyone or everyone in 
fact does apply them.181 Determining how concepts are actually applied is no doubt a 
serious empirical endeavor, but it need not produce significant philosophical 
problems.182 Instead, it is the normative side of the distinction—how concepts ought to 
be applied—that makes headaches for philosophers and that Brandom’s account of 
objectivity is intended to address. 
 The reason that Brandom takes objectivity to be relevant to drawing this 
distinction is that this distinction can be reformulated in terms of a distinction between 
someone’s taking something to be true and something’s being true, this latter distinction 
                                                       
180 See Brandom, Making It Explicit, 504-508. 
181 Brandom, Making It Explicit, 593. 
182 See Brandom’s discussion of regularism at Brandom, Making It Explicit, 26-30 and 37-42. 
Some form of regularism is no doubt appropriate for understanding how concepts actually 
are applied, and Brandom’s objections against regularism only have force once it is used to 
understand how concepts ought to be applied. 
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being at the heart of t-objectivity. In short, when a person is applying concepts he is 
taking his application to be true, while when those concepts are applied the way they 
ought to be the application is true. 
 It is here that Brandom’s account of de re modality comes to the fore. This is 
because 
the distinction between claims or applications of concepts that are objectively 
correct and those that are merely taken to be correct is a structural feature of 
each scorekeeping perspective. Indeed, the required notion of objective 
correctness is just what is expressed by de re specifications of the conceptual 
contents of ascribed commitments.183 
 
This quotation introduces the two core ideas in Brandom’s account of objectivity: first, 
that objectivity is a structural feature of scorekeeping; and second, that the structural 
feature is precisely that expressed by the de dicto-de re distinction.  
 I will consider the first idea shortly, but for now I let me turn to the second. We 
have already seen Brandom characterize objectivity in terms of an is-ought distinction 
and a taking true-being true distinction, so how does the de dicto-de re distinction fit in? 
Brandom’s answer is that, from a scorekeeper’s perspective, in ascribing a propositional 
attitude to a speaker, the de dicto part of the ascription commits the scorekeeper merely 
to the claims that the speaker does apply certain concepts in certain ways and that the 
speaker takes something to be true, whereas the de re part commits the scorekeeper to 
the stronger claims that certain concepts ought to be applied in certain ways and that 
something is true. This is merely reiterating Brandom’s point that the de dicto part 
attributes some content to the speaker while the scorekeeper undertakes the de re part 
                                                       
183 Brandom, Making It Explicit, 595. 
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herself. In this manner, Brandom insists that from the scorekeeper’s perspective there is 
a way to draw the distinction he takes to be characteristic of objectivity.184 
 The obvious objection to Brandom’s second idea is that this distinction is being 
drawn from the scorekeeper’s perspective. It is true that the scorekeeper is committed 
to the de re portion of an ascription being true and not to its merely being taken to be 
true, but this is just to say that the scorekeeper takes the de re portion to be true. What 
Brandom has said is simply that in ascribing a propositional attitude to a speaker, the 
scorekeeper takes one content to be true while also taking it to be true that the speaker 
takes some other content to be true. Nowhere does something’s actually being true 
factor in, and so Brandom has not actually characterized the taking true-being true 
distinction (or the related is-ought distinction) in terms of the de dicto-de re distinction.  
 However, this objection misses the point of the first core idea in Brandom’s 
account of objectivity. Brandom expands on this idea by saying that his strategy is  
to reconstrue objectivity as consisting in a kind of perspectival form, rather than in 
a nonperspectival or cross-perspectival content. What is shared by all discursive 
perspectives is that there is a difference between what is objectively correct in 
the way of concept application and what is merely taken to be so, not what it is—
the structure, not the content.185 
 
Brandom concedes that all scorekeeping activity occurs from the perspective of some 
subject doing the scorekeeping, and so any contents being ascribed (either de dicto or 
de re) are merely taken to be true, either by the scorekeeper or the speaker. However, 
for us to make this appraisal of how the scorekeeper keeps score upon the speaker 
requires that we adopt a perspective from which we can keep score on both the 
                                                       
184 For more, see Brandom, Making It Explicit, 595-596. 
185 Brandom, Making It Explicit, 600. 
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scorekeeper and the speaker, a perspective which is therefore distinct from both the 
scorekeeper’s and the speaker’s perspectives. Brandom’s point is that what we are 
implicitly doing in adopting this third perspective is distinguishing what is true from what 
the scorekeeper and speaker merely take to be true. However, this is precisely what the 
scorekeeper is implicitly doing with regards to the speaker, and assuming the speaker is 
keeping score on someone, this is what the speaker is implicitly doing with regards to 
this someone. More to the point, this is precisely what we would be doing were we to 
adopt some fourth perspective from which to keep score on our past selves who 
adopted the third perspective, and so on ad infinitum. When comparing these various 
perspectives, the contents under question drop out of consideration, because what the 
perspectives share is not any set of contents but simply the structural feature that within 
each perspective there is a distinction to draw between being true and taking true.186 
 Where the objection goes wrong is to suppose that there is any privileged 
perspective from which to judge the others. The thought behind the objection is that a 
scorekeeper’s de re ascriptions are, although not perspectival in the sense that her de 
dicto ascriptions are, still problematically perspectival, but this thought is problematic 
only against the background assumption that there is some non-perspectival alternative. 
Because Brandom’s position is expressivist about representational locutions, the role 
that both the de dicto ‘that’ and the de re ‘of’ play is to make explicit what we as players 
of the game of giving and asking for reasons have always already been implicitly doing, 
and what they show us is that there is no such alternative. The philosopher studying the 
                                                       
186 In this paragraph, I have combined considerations from Brandom, Making It Explicit, 
592-601 and 639-650. 
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de dicto-de re distinction does so just as perspectivally as anyone else playing the 
game of giving and asking for reasons, and the philosopher’s perspective is no different 
in form than anyone else’s. Instead of being antithetical to objectivity, the inevitability of 
one’s having a perspective is, for Brandom, the essence of objectivity.187 
 
b. Applying the Indexicality Objection to Brandom’s Account of Objectivity 
Now that I have finished outlining Brandom’s account of objectivity, we need to consider 
whether it gives him the conceptual tools needed to meet the Objectivity Demand. My 
argument for the remainder of this section is that it does not, because Brandom’s 
transcendental expressivism falls prey to the same Indexicality Objection that plagues 
Price’s global expressivism.188  
                                                       
187 See Brandom, Making It Explicit, 598-601. 
188 This should not be a surprising conclusion, given certain formal similarities between 
Brandom’s account of the de dicto-de re distinction and Price’s global expressivism. First, 
notice the formal parallels between Brandom’s account and Price’s denial of the bifurcation 
thesis. Using the language of that thesis, Brandom’s claim is that it is not the case that de 
re ascriptions ascribe genuinely representational beliefs or belief contents whereas de dicto 
ascriptions ascribe non-representational or otherwise second-rate beliefs or contents. And 
second, notice how after denying that the de dicto-de re distinction corresponds to any 
distinction between types of belief or belief content, Brandom goes on to explain both de 
dicto and de re ascriptions in terms of their “expressive functions” within the scorekeeping 
practices of a language game (Brandom, Making It Explicit, 505). This expressivist 
explanation of both sides of the de dicto-de re distinction mirrors Price’s expressivist 
explanation of both sides of the bifurcation thesis’s representational-non-representational 
distinction. Finally, notice how Brandom’s expressivist explanation concerns the grammatical 
role that de dicto and de re locutions play in marking who is responsible for which contents. 
Brandom eventually develops this explanation in disquotational and anaphoric terms (see 
Brandom, Making It Explicit, 530-547), but what is important is that this explanation 
concerns the merely grammatical role of de dicto and de re locutions, meaning that his is a 
minimalist explanation. Since Brandom is interested in de dicto and de re locutions only 
insofar as they “express the intentional directedness of thought and talk” (Brandom, Making 
It Explicit, 500), we are now in a position to understand Brandom when he says, “I am also 
a certain kind of deflationist [sc. minimalist] about the representational dimension of 
intentionality itself”  (Brandom, “Global Anti-Representationalism,” 102)—his minimalism 
about de dicto and de re locutions simply is his minimalism about intentionality. 
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 To appreciate my argument against Brandom, it is helpful to understand what it is 
not. We have already discussed one common objection to Brandom’s account of 
objectivity—that it does not characterize a distinction between taking true and being true 
because it is couched only in terms of taking true. For the sake of argument, I concede 
that Brandom’s response to this objection, to the effect that it misses the point of his 
formal construal of objectivity, is satisfactory. Another common objection is simply that 
objectivity concerns contents and not perspectival forms. The problem with this 
objection should be obvious enough, as it simply begs the question against Brandom.  
 Ultimately, my argument does not hinge on either of these objections. Instead of 
arguing that Brandom does not draw a distinction between taking true and being true, I 
argue that he draws too many such distinctions. And instead of arguing that objectivity 
cannot be formal, I argue that the form Brandom associates with objectivity is not the 
form appropriate to objectivity. On both fronts, the problem is that of a scope ambiguity: 
for Brandom’s account to succeed, he must have proven that the de re ‘of’ has one and 
only one functional role for every person; but what he in fact proves is that the de re ‘of’ 
has one and only one functional role for each person. 
 To see why this is the case, we need only consider the third perspective that we 
adopt to keep score on both the speaker and scorekeeper. Given Brandom’s 
expressivism, the use of de dicto and de re locutions from such a perspective makes 
explicit what the speaker and scorekeeper are implicitly doing. So, consider the case 
where the scorekeeper asserts to the speaker: 
You believe of the 2014 World Cup champions that they won the 2014 World 
 Cup, 
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and the speaker asserts to the scorekeeper: 
I do believe of the 2014 World Cup champions that they won the 2014 World 
 Cup. 
 
Assuming that both only assert what they believe, the question now is, how should we 
go about ascribing the scorekeeper’s and speaker’s beliefs about each other’s beliefs, 
given that we have our own third perspective? 
 The most obvious option would be for us to say: 
The scorekeeper believes of the speaker that he believes of the 2014 World Cup 
champions that they won the 2014 World Cup; and the speaker believes of 
himself that he believes of the 2014 World Cup champions that they won the 
2014 World Cup. 
 
However, this way of speaking is misleading. By framing our two belief ascriptions third-
personally using the terms ‘the scorekeeper’ and ‘the speaker’, it might seem as though 
the perspective we are taking in ascribing those beliefs is privileged over and above the 
perspectives of the scorekeeper and the speaker. But (right or wrong) Brandom’s 
contention is that such privileging of a perspective is antithetical to objectivity. 
 The Brandomian way of putting things is to say: 
Youscorekeeper believe of the speaker that he believes of the 2014 World Cup 
champions that they won the 2014 World Cup; and youspeaker believe of yourself 
that you believe of the 2014 World Cup champions that they won the 2014 World 
Cup, 
 
where the subscripts on ‘Youscorekeeper’ and ‘youspeaker’ serve to mark the fact that each 
belongs to a different anaphoric chain, one with an initiating word referring to the 
scorekeeper and the speaker, respectively.189  
                                                       
189 For more on the dangers of the third person and the importance of the second person, 
see Brandom, Making It Explicit, 598-607 and 623-650. 
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 Now that we have identified the sentence with which to ascribe the relevant 
beliefs to the scorekeeper and speaker from our own perspective, we need only ask 
what the expressive roles of the de re uses of ‘of’ are to begin to appreciate how the 
Indexicality Objection applies to Brandom. The first and third uses of ‘of’ follow 
Brandom’s account unproblematically—each expresses our own undertaking of a 
commitment, namely one to the effect that it is the speaker whom each of the two 
beliefs being ascribed are about. However, the second and fourth uses of ‘of’ are 
embedded within a de dicto use of ‘that’, and so their expressive role is less obvious. 
Brandom briefly discusses the case of iterated ascriptions in an Appendix, but this 
discussion is too brief to be of much help.190 What is clear is that the de dicto ‘that’s 
within which the second and fourth uses of ‘of’ are embedded express our attributing a 
commitment to the scorekeeper and speaker, respectively.191 From here, the most 
plausible line to take is the following.192 Since the second use of ‘of’ is within the scope 
of a ‘that’ attributing a commitment to the scorekeeper, the role of this second use of ‘of’ 
is to express our attributing to the scorekeeper a commitment to undertake a further 
                                                       
190 See Brandom, Making It Explicit, 608-613. The point Brandom needs to expand on is the 
transition from (i’) to (i’’) at Brandom, Making It Explicit, 611-612. Everything would seem 
to hinge on the expressive role played by the ‘:’s in (i’) and (i’’), as Brandom’s strategy for 
eliminating a de dicto ‘that’ that has further de dicto or de re locutions within its scope is to 
substitute (i’’)—which includes a ‘:’ and only one ‘that’—for the first clause in (i’)—which 
includes no ‘:’ but two ‘that’s. It would seem as though a ‘:’ is an operator that takes a 
scorekeeper as the argument to its left and an ascription as its argument to the right, but it 
is not clear what operation a ‘:’ performs on these arguments and even less clear how a ‘:’ 
is supposed to function when it is embedded within the scope of the right argument of 
another ‘:’ (as would happen if (i’) were substituted for (i’’)). Both problems leave 
Brandom’s account of iterated ascriptions incomplete at best. 
191 See Brandom, Making It Explicit, 612. 
192 This is the only plausible line assuming that attributing and undertaking are the only 
pragmatic forces at play in iterated ascriptions and we, the speaker, and the scorekeeper 
are the only subjects at play in an example such as ours. There is conceptual space for 
denying these assumptions, but Brandom gives his reader no reason to think that this is the 
line he takes (see Brandom, Making It Explicit, 608-613). 
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commitment. Similarly, the fourth use of ‘of’ expresses our attributing to the speaker a 
commitment to undertake a commitment.  
 Notice that, on this line, the second and fourth uses of ‘of’ do not have the same 
expressive role—in using the second ‘of’ we are attributing an undertaking to the 
scorekeeper while in using the fourth ‘of’ we are attributing an undertaking to the 
speaker. Notice also that this difference in expressive role is not accounted for by a 
difference in contents being ascribed to the scorekeeper and speaker. Explicitly, we are 
ascribing one and the same content (that the 2014 World Cup champions won the 2014 
World Cup) to both, and for the sake of argument we can assume that the speaker’s 
and scorekeeper’s implicit background commitments are the same (there is nothing in 
principle preventing this after all). What makes the difference is the formal feature that 
the second and fourth uses of ‘of’ are associated with different, non-coreferential 
anaphoric chains. Specifically, the second use is indexed to a chain whose members 
refer to the scorekeeper and the fourth use is indexed to one whose members refer to 
the speaker. With this in mind, it is not hard to see that the first and third uses of ‘of’ are 
likewise indexed to an anaphoric chain whose members refer to us, although this is only 
implicit in our speaking from our own perspective. We could make this point explicit by 
adopting some fourth perspective on our past selves, and go through this very process 
again (and we could make the analogous point for this fourth perspective explicit by 
adopting a fifth perspective, and so on).  
 In this manner, each use of the de re ‘of’ is indexed to an anaphoric chain 
referring to a person (just as each use of ‘i-world’ and ‘e-world’ is indexed to an 
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individual linguistic context). So long as two uses of the de re ‘of’ are indexed to 
coreferring anaphoric chains, the two uses will have the same role of expressing (the 
attributing of the attributing of…) the undertaking of a commitment by the referent of the 
anaphoric chains. For this reason, Brandom has established that there is one and only 
one functional role of the de re ‘of’ associated with each person. However, there is 
nothing about Brandom’s account of objectivity that guarantees the anaphoric chains 
associated with any two uses of the de re ‘of’ will be coreferential—in fact, such a 
guarantee would we antithetical to the decidedly social articulation that Brandom gives 
to objectivity. Therefore, Brandom has not established that there is one and only one 
functional role of the de re ‘of’ associated with every person. In short, he has not 
established that there is one functional role of the de re ‘of’; instead, he has established 
that there are as many roles as there are persons. 
 At this point, we have seen how the indexical aspect of the Indexicality Objection 
applies to Brandom; what about the objection aspect? How does this conclusion that the 
de re ‘of’ has many functional roles prevent de re ascriptions from being CPS-apt and 
thereby prevent Brandom from meeting the Objectivity Demand? The answer is perhaps 
unsurprising. Returning to the case of ‘phlogiston’, the sentence 
‘You believe of phlogiston that it is involved in combustion’ 
 
is not CPS-apt for the simple reason that ‘of’ is indexed to an anaphoric chain (and 
indirectly, to the perspective of the person referred to by the members of that chain).193 
                                                       
193 For simplicity’s sake, in this sentence and the forthcoming translation schemes, I am 
ignoring the fact that ‘you’ is an indexical and the issues concerning CPS-aptness that this 
raises. 
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The point exactly mirrors the case of ‘Phlogiston is included in the e-world’ from §3.4 
above. 
 Now, let us try using the following as a translation scheme for ‘You believe of 
phlogiston that it is involved in combustion’: 
‘You believe ofx phlogiston that it is involved in combustion’ 
 
where substituting different numerals for ‘x’ in ‘ofx’ disambiguates between the various 
meanings of the de re ‘of’. For instance, ‘of1’ might have the functional role of the de re 
‘of’ associated with a particular 17th century scientist’s perspective, and ‘of2’ might have 
the functional role associated with a particular 21st century historian of science. Again, 
the problem with this as a translation scheme is the same problem as ‘Phlogiston is 
included in the set of intentional objects entailed by the linguistic context c’ has from 
§3.4. This scheme implies that ‘phlogiston’ is being used univocally by different utterers 
of ‘You believe of phlogiston that it is involved in combustion’. However, the purpose of 
distinguishing between different meanings of the de re ‘of’ in the first place is to 
acknowledge that different utterers of ‘You believe of phlogiston that it is involved in 
combustion’ have different commitments, and given Brandom’s inferentialism this 
difference in commitments entails a difference in the contents of the utterers’ words. 
Therefore, the purpose of distinguishing between meanings of the de re ‘of’ is to 
acknowledge that people’s use of ‘phlogiston’ is not univocal, contrary to what the 
scheme implies. 
 Therefore, the following might seem to be a better translation scheme: 
‘You believe ofx phlogistony that it is involved in combustion’ 
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where substituting different numerals for ‘y’ in ‘phlogistony’ produces names for the 
different intentional objects associated with the different functional roles of ‘phlogiston’ 
(note that the numeral substituted for the ‘x’ in ‘ofx’ need not be the same as the numeral 
substituted for the ‘y’ in ‘phlogistony’). Again the problem is the same as before: this 
translation scheme merely marks the problem of equivocation without solving it. And 
again, the conclusions this ultimately leads us to are that sentences ascribing attitudes 
de re are not CPS-apt, nor can their utterances be translated into sentences that are; 
that Brandom is unable to acknowledge the existence of CPS-apt sentences; that 
Brandom is unable to acknowledge the sort of objectivity associated with CPS-aptness 
above; that Brandom cannot meet the Objectivity Demand; and finally, that Brandom’s 
transcendental expressivism is inconsistent with naturalism. 
 
§4.5. Brandom and Naturalism 
Now that we have seen how the Indexicality Objection applies to Brandom’s 
transcendental expressivism, there is the lingering issue of its significance. In 
Articulating Reasons, Brandom quickly summarizes Chapters 4, 5, and 6 of Making It 
Explicit only to admit that “none of these is a naturalistic account.”194 Similarly, in his 
“Reply to Sebastian Rödl’s ‘Brandom’s Theory of the Mind,’” Brandom claims that “to 
attribute [to him] the allegiance to naturalism and empiricism … requires Rödl to read 
between the lines—indeed, I think, to misread between the lines.”195 Given the clearly 
non-naturalist sentiments displayed in these quotations, why should we be surprised 
                                                       
194 Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 27. 
195 Brandom, “Reply,” 309. The rest of Brandom’s reply to Rödl is illuminating for the sense 
in which Brandom is and is not a naturalist. 
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that Brandom’s account of objectivity is inconsistent with naturalism? Why think that my 
argument from the previous section is an objection to Brandom’s view and not simply a 
feature of it? 
 To answer these questions, we must understand another quotation from 
Articulating Reasons: “the rationalist pragmatism and expressivism presented here is 
opposed to naturalism, at least as that term is usually understood.”196 There are two 
components to this quotation, the forcefully non-naturalist claim before the comma and 
the hedging move after the comma. For our purposes, it is the post-comma hedging 
move that is most important. Although Brandom is adamantly a sort of non-naturalist, he 
is just as adamant that he is not an “anti- (or super-)naturalist.”197 The picture this 
leaves us with is one in which Brandom is not a scientistic naturalist, but is still a 
naturalist of a more liberal variety. This picture is supported by some of Brandom’s more 
detailed discussions of his relation to naturalism.198 Given that all naturalists, and not 
just scientistic naturalists, must meet the Objectivity Demand, Brandom’s failure on this 
front points out a genuine inconsistency between his account of objectivity and his 
liberal naturalism. 
  
                                                       
196 Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 26. 
197 Brandom, Reason, 2. 
198 See in particular Brandom, From Empiricism, 90-96 (ultimately, Brandom accepts the 
second species of subject naturalism that he attributes to Sellars); also Brandom, Between 
Saying, 207-211. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE PROMISE OF INFERENCE-BASED SEMANTICS 
 
§1. Introduction 
At this point, I have argued in Chapter One that the Objectivity and Deflationary 
Demands specify two necessary conditions for being a naturalist, and I noted that there 
is a prima facie tension between these two demands that is constitutive of my Pincer 
Objection to naturalism. In Chapter Two, I have looked at how a number of philosophers 
operating within the analytic pragmatist tradition in semantics are unable to address the 
Pincer Objection, with Donald Davidson and John McDowell unable to meet the 
Deflationary Demand and Huw Price and Robert Brandom unable to meet the 
Objectivity Demand. The question now is, what significance does these philosophers’ 
failure to address the Pincer Objection have for our appraisal of the analytic pragmatist 
tradition in semantics? 
 
a. Some Unsatisfying Responses 
There are a number of possible responses to this question. The most obvious 
responses are that these failures show either that the analytic pragmatist tradition is not 
adequately naturalist or that the Objectivity or Deflationary Demand is too strong (thus 
leaving my account of naturalism too narrow). Other possible responses include that this 
shows nothing of importance because the philosophers I have chosen to focus on are 
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unrepresentative of the broader analytic pragmatist tradition. Or that this shows that 
there is a tension in the conjunction of naturalism and pragmatist semantics, although 
an acceptable one that falls short of being a contradiction. Or that this shows that there 
is a genuine contradiction in such a conjunction, but this is beside the point because the 
pragmatist’s adherence to naturalism is edifying and therefore merely rhetorical. 
 Each of these responses is plausible, but for various reasons I find them 
unsatisfactory. The charge of non-naturalism amounts to an almost wholesale rejection 
of analytic pragmatism (not only in semantics but in general) insofar as the twin pillars of 
pragmatists’ metaphilosophy are a critique of the pejoratively naive metaphysics of non-
naturalism and a defense of the adequacy of naturalism in accounting for the 
distinctively human aspects of our existence. As someone sympathetic to analytic 
pragmatism, I take this response to be an option of last resort.  
 Alternatively, I simply do not see how either my Objectivity or Deflationary 
Demands can be too strong. The Deflationary Demand is nothing more than a demand 
for consistency, while I have taken pains to develop my Objectivity Demand in terms of 
CPS-aptness to mitigate precisely this sort of worry. If the worry surrounding the 
Objectivity Demand persists, it must be because the Objectivity Demand requires there 
to be a framework for comparing disparate language games (and not because of this or 
that way of developing this framework), but notice that without such a framework there 
is no defensible way to prioritize any one language game (say that of the sciences) over 
any other. Different language games would be simply different, not better or worse, 
resulting in a pluralism and not a naturalism. 
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 Concerning the charge that Davidson, McDowell, Price, and Brandom are 
unrepresentative, I likewise do not see how this can be the case. They are four of the 
most prominent members of the analytic pragmatist tradition in semantics, and so they 
obviously represent significant aspects of that tradition. True, to keep Chapter 2 to a 
manageable length I have avoided detailed discussions of figures such as the later 
Wittgenstein, W. V. O. Quine, Wilfrid Sellars, and Richard Rorty, but it should not be 
hard to predict the outlines of my critique of each. Wittgenstein and Rorty are both 
therapeutic philosophers along the lines of McDowell, and my charge against each 
would be that their therapy is either ineffective because incomplete or complete but 
problematically non-naturalistic. Alternatively, Quine and Rorty both fall into the same 
sort of problems as Price and Brandom, with all four accepting a deflationary approach 
to semantics that leaves them unable to develop the sort of framework needed to meet 
the Objectivity Demand. The complexity and systematicity of Sellars’s thinking makes 
him (admittedly) harder to place in this dialectical context; but as a first attempt I note 
the common reaction to his infamous notion of picturing. If this notion is taken 
substantively then it is hard to see how Sellars’s position does not fall prey to similar 
objections as Davidson’s and McDowell’s, but if this notion is not taken substantively 
then it is hard to see how it does not fall prey to similar objections as Price’s and 
Brandom’s. Finally, there are those who think that the linguistic turn and its attendant 
focus on semantics has been one of worst developments within the pragmatist tradition, 
and that the truly representative figures are the classical pragmatists of Peirce, James, 
and Dewey. On the one hand, as the father of semiotics Peirce presages the linguistic 
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turn and so fits nicely within the story I have been telling. On the other, although James 
and Dewey are less interested in philosophy of language their rich conceptions of 
experience fit right into the Sellarsian dialectic that McDowell traces and its attendant 
oscillations between givenism and coherentism, and between bald naturalism and non-
naturalism. In short, pragmatists both pre- and post-turn fit within the dialectical contours 
of Chapter 2. 
 Moving on to the next charge, it is not the case that what I have highlighted in 
Chapters 1 and 2 is merely a tension (as opposed to a contradiction) between 
naturalism and analytic pragmatist semantics. The case is clearest with Davidson, 
whose undefined notion of truth leads to the contradictory liar’s paradox. But although 
the route to contradiction for McDowell, Price, and Brandom is less direct, it is 
nonetheless present. Whereas the liar’s paradox is a consequence of Davidson’s truth-
theoretic semantics in isolation, for all I have said in Chapter 2 McDowell’s, Price’s, and 
Brandom’s respective semantic theories are internally consistent. However, each of 
their theories have non-naturalist implications insofar as they cannot meet the 
Objectivity or Deflationary Demand, implications which contradict each philosopher’s 
independent commitment to naturalism. Unlike in Davidson’s case, were McDowell, 
Price, and Brandom not committed to naturalism then their semantic theories need not 
be contradictory; but they are so committed, so their theories are contradictory. 
 Finally, there is the response of having the analytic pragmatist accept the 
contradiction and recontextualize their project in such a way that the contradiction is not 
a decisive objection. I find this response highly problematic, and I suspect that, at the 
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very least, Davidson, Price, and Brandom do as well. For more therapeutically minded 
pragmatists, this response is not patently inappropriate, but even still, the points 
McDowell raises while critiquing Rorty for being an ineffective therapist would seem to 
eliminate this response from the realm of possibilities for McDowell and any other more 
moderate therapeutic philosopher. Of course, this is just to say that such a response is 
possible for more radical therapeutic philosophers. According to a common caricature of 
Rorty, this is the approach he takes. On such a reading, so long as a person’s peers let 
her get away with holding a set of beliefs, it is not inappropriate for her to hold those 
beliefs. Admittedly, it might be the case that these beliefs must facilitate the person’s 
practical coping with her environment or that they must serve to ennoble her life as a 
moral being before they count as being truly appropriate for her to hold (as opposed to 
being neither appropriate nor inappropriate). But none of this has any necessary 
connection to avoiding contradiction, especially on issues as far removed from ordinary 
life as one’s metaphilosophical bearings on semantics and naturalism. The purported 
lesson of Rorty’s edifying philosophy is to recognize the philosopher’s concern with 
avoiding contradiction on such issues for the pathologically misguided relic of traditional 
epistemology that it is. To my mind, if this really is a lesson of Rorty’s philosophy (and I 
am not convinced that it is), then it motivates a modus tollens for rejecting the Rortian 
philosophy that leads to it, not a modus ponens for accepting it based on that 
philosophy.  
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b. One Satisfying Type of Response 
Having surveyed these unsatisfying responses to the question, what significance does 
the failure of the philosophers from Chapter Two to address the Pincer Objection have 
for our appraisal of the analytic pragmatist tradition in semantics, we are now faced with 
the task of identifying a response that is satisfying. If we cannot find such a response 
we will be left with our option of last resort—admitting that analytic pragmatist semantics 
is non-naturalistic—but luckily for us there is a response we have yet to consider. 
According to this response, what these philosophers’ failure highlights is the need to 
modify some shared commitment of theirs, other than their commitment to naturalism, 
with an eye towards resolving the admitted contradictions that result from their 
unmodified views. This is the response I pursue, and the primary purpose of this chapter 
is to develop my version of this response. 
 But before I begin developing my version, I should note that this response is a 
particularly open-ended one. Analytic pragmatists share many commitments and there 
are many ways of modifying each of these commitments, meaning that there are as 
many versions of this response as there are modifications to members of this set of 
shared commitments. As such, it is infeasible for me to consider all of the competing 
versions of this response and give anything that approaches a deductive argument in 
favor of my particular version. Instead, my argumentative strategy in this chapter is 
decidedly abductive, focusing solely on my own version and arguing that it provides a 
good response to our original question.  
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 Before arguing that my version provides a good response, I must first outline 
what the criteria are by which to judge this argument—i.e. what makes a response 
better or worse than another. My survey of the various unsatisfying responses should 
establish that, all things being equal, one response is better than another if that 
response is a token of the type on which I am now focusing—the type involving a 
modification of the analytic pragmatist’s commitments—and the other is a token of one 
of the unsatisfying types of response. The issue we need to address now is what makes 
one token of the response type on which I am now focusing better than another of that 
same type. 
 Towards this end, I take there to be two criteria for goodness of response tokens. 
The first criterion is that one response token is better than another if the modification the 
one recommends is more continuous with the analytic pragmatist tradition than the 
modification the other recommends. On my usage, there are two components to a 
modification’s continuity with the pragmatist tradition. First, all things being equal the 
closer the content of the modified commitment is to its unmodified counterpart the more 
continuous the modification is with the tradition. And second, all things being equal the 
more the modified commitment fits into the analytic pragmatists’ shared intellectual 
genealogy the more continuous the modification is. To understand why continuity with 
the analytic pragmatist tradition is a criterion for the goodness of response tokens at all, 
remember my objection to the response type of concluding that analytic pragmatist 
semantics has non-naturalist implications. This is an option of last resort because, as 
someone who is sympathetic to the analytic pragmatist tradition, I would have to reject 
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much of what I find admirable about the analytic pragmatist approach to semantics were 
I to pursue this response type. These same considerations explain why continuity with 
the analytic pragmatist tradition is important—the more radical the modification, the less 
the resulting view can have in common with the mostly admirable analytic pragmatist 
approach to semantics. 
 The second criterion is that one response token is better than another if it 
addresses the Pincer Objection while the other does not. The purpose of pursing the 
response type of modifying an analytic pragmatist commitment is to acknowledge the 
problem the Pincer Objection poses and to address it; so, to the extent that a token of 
this response type fails to do this, to that extent it fails as a response. 
 
c. My (Hopefully) Satisfying Response-Token 
With these criteria in mind, I now turn to the content of my version of a modification-
focused response to our original question. The commitment I recommend for 
modification is the analytic pragmatists’ commitment to what is usually called the priority 
of the propositional. In short, this is a commitment to the effect that, first, the objective 
contents of propositions (or judgments, or sentences, etc.) are the primary explanans of 
semantic theorizing and, second, that the objective contents of propositions are to be 
explained in terms of the semantic properties of those propositions. My proposed 
modification to this commitment is to keep the first conjunct unchanged but to change 
the second so that it reads: and, second, that the objective contents of propositions are 
to be explained in terms of the semantic properties of those inferences within which the 
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propositions occur. Since I leave the first conjunct unchanged, we can already see a 
significant overlap in the contents of the unmodified and modified theses.  
 Going forward, I organize the chapter around my two criteria from above. I argue 
across §§2 and 3 that my modification to the shared commitment to the priority of the 
propositional is continuous with the broader analytic pragmatist tradition. To do this, I 
begin in §2 by highlighting the degree to which the content of my modified commitment 
overlaps with that of the unmodified commitment, and then I outline the intellectual 
genealogy that analytic pragmatists commonly give for their unmodified commitment. 
Since Kant functions as the progenitor of this genealogy, I argue in §3 that my modified 
commitment is what Kant’s analogous commitment becomes once it is transposed into 
contemporary vocabulary.  
 After arguing that my modification fares well under the first criteria, I move on in 
§4 to argue that my modification also fares well under the second criteria. The result of 
my discussion in §3 is that, once we transpose Kant’s position out of the vocabulary of 
categorical logic and into that of modern predicate logic, we see that his question, How 
are synthetic judgments a priori possible?, becomes the question, How are materially 
valid inferences possible? Once we take this latter question seriously, we are forced to 
develop a theory of material validity. My argument across §4 is not intended to establish 
any one theory of material validity as the correct theory, but instead to show that of the 
many ways of developing such a theory, there is a justified hope that some of them can 
be developed in such a way as to meet both the Deflation and the Objectivity Demand, 
thus that some can address the Pincer Objection. 
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§2. The Traditional Genealogical Story 
To begin, it will be helpful for us to survey how each of the figures from Chapter 2 is 
committed to the two conjuncts of the unmodified priority of the propositional thesis. Let 
us designate the first conjunct as the Teleological Priority of the Propositional Thesis, 
because it specifies what the explanatory goal of semantics is: 
TP-Prop. The objective contents of propositions (or judgments, or sentences, 
etc.) are the primary explanans of semantic theorizing. 
 
And let us designate the second conjunct as the Explanatory Priority of the Propositional 
Thesis, because it specifies how to achieve the explanatory goal of semantics: 
EP-Prop. The objective contents of propositions are to be explained in terms of 
the semantic properties of those propositions. 
 
 Starting with Davidson, he comes down forcefully in favor of TP-Prop when, in his 
“Reality without Reference,” he says 
There are two approaches to the theory of meaning, the building-block method, 
which starts with the simple and builds up, and the holistic method, which starts 
with the complex (sentences, at any rate) and abstracts out the parts…. The 
second begins at the point (sentences) where we can hope to connect language 
with behavior described in non-linguistic terms…. I propose to defend a version 
of the holistic approach.199 
 
Davidson’s point is that sentences have an internal complexity (one that has often been 
understood in terms of subjects and predicates), and that the goal of semantic 
theorizing is not to give an independent account of the contents of the simple 
constituents of sentences and then explain the contents of sentences in terms of the 
contents of those constituents. Instead, Davidson recommends that we invert the order 
of explanation, beginning with an independent account of the contents of sentences and 
                                                       
199 Davidson, “Reality,” 221. 
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ending with an explanation of the constituents’ contents in terms of the sentences’ 
contents. By saying that we should adopt the sentence-first, holistic approach Davidson 
is simply voicing his acceptance of TP-Prop.200 From here, Davidson’s acceptance of 
EP-Prop is not hard to appreciate: to determine the contents of sentences we must 
develop a truth theory for those sentences. 
 Moving to McDowell, he insists that thinking involves the sort of “co-operation 
between receptivity and spontaneity”201 that Kant highlights with his familiar dictum, 
“Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”202 As with 
Kant, this leads McDowell to conclude that thinking (at least in the first instance) takes 
the form of judging. The clearest route McDowell provides to this conclusion begins with 
his insistence that the space of reasons be identified with “the realm of the freedom [sc. 
spontaneity] of judging.”203 From here, McDowell goes on to argue against Sellars that 
there is no philosophical need for a “below-the-line conception of sensibility [sc. 
                                                       
200 There are two related themes in Davidson’s work that might cast doubt on his acceptance 
of PPT1. First, Davidson insists that language is compositional (see Davidson, “Theories of 
Meaning”); and second, Davidson accepts in general outline Tarski’s theory of truth, which 
accounts for truth in terms of a satisfaction relation that is in certain respects analogous to 
reference (see Tarski, “Concept of Truth,” 189-197). Both would seem to support the 
building-block approach, but Davidson insists that this is not the case. Concerning the first 
theme, Davidson responds by conceding that the compositionality of language supports the 
building-block approach at one level of thinking about language, though it does not support 
the building-block approach at the level appropriate to philosophical semantics (see 
Davidson, “Epistemology,” 180). Concerning the second theme, Davidson insists that 
according to Tarski’s theory, “which semantic concept [truth or satisfaction] we take as 
basic is open to choice” (Davidson, “Epistemology,” 180). 
201 McDowell, Mind and World, 4. Although McDowell rejects the view (commonly commonly 
attributed to Kant) that the deliverances of receptivity provide an independent contribution 
to thinking, one that is unstained by spontaneity, he still insists that receptivity and 
spontaneity are at work together in thinking (see McDowell, Mind and World, 9-10). 
202 Kant, Critique, A51/B75. 
203 McDowell, Having the World, 6; italics mind. 
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receptivity]”—i.e. a conception characterizable independently of the space of reasons.204 
Since both receptivity and spontaneity are understood in terms of the space of reasons, 
and since the space of reasons is in turn understood in terms of judging, thinking itself 
(which is the result of the joint activity of receptivity and spontaneity) is understood in 
terms of judging. This is just another way of putting TP-Prop. To get to EP-Prop, we 
need only remember that on McDowell’s account our perceptual judgments have the 
contents they have because those very contents are presented to us. It is because the 
contents have this property of being-presented-to-us that explains why they have the 
content they do. 
 Price gives a few clues as to the role that TP-Prop and EP-Prop play in his 
semantic theorizing, but by and large he defers on this (and other) issues to Brandom 
and the latter’s inferential semantics. Most explicitly, Price commits himself to TP-Prop 
by accepting “that language is a medium for encoding and passing around sentence-
sized packets of factual information.”205 However, when it comes to the details of how 
TP-Prop factors into his semantic theory and where EP-Prop comes into the picture, 
Price is happy to “coast in Brandom’s wake…, helping ourselves to his account of 
assertion.”206 As such, the points I make in the following paragraph about Brandom 
apply equally to Price. 
 Finally, Brandom comes down forcefully in favor of TP-Prop, but less so in favor 
of EP-Prop. Unlike “the pre-Kantian tradition[, which] took it for granted that the proper 
                                                       
204 McDowell, Having the World, 29. For McDowell’s full argument, see McDowell, Having the 
World, Chapter 2. 
205 Price, Expressivism, 40. 
206 Price, Expressivism, 49. 
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order of semantic explanation begins with a doctrine of concepts or terms,” Brandom 
concurs with Kant “that the fundamental unit of awareness or cognition, the minimum 
graspable, is the judgment.”207 A clearer acceptance of TP-Prop is hard to imagine. 
However, Brandom’s relation to EP-Prop is a tale of two parts. In Part One of Making It 
Explicit, Brandom accounts for the contents of propositions in terms of their role within 
inferences (this is why he designates his view with the term ‘inferentialism’). This 
sounds remarkably like the modified version of the priority of the propositional thesis 
that I recommend above; but then, in Part Two of Making It Explicit, Brandom shows his 
true colors. Instead of arguing that propositions have content of a specifically objective 
sort because the propriety of certain inferences is ascribed to a speaker de re, 
Brandom’s argument is that this sort of content arises because commitments to 
propositions are ascribed de re. At the end of the day, it is certain properties of 
propositions (i.e. their being ascribed de re) that is decisive for Brandom’s account of 
the content of propositions, and not certain properties of inferences—hence his 
commitment to EP-Prop. 
 After this survey, two things should be apparent: first, that the unmodified priority 
of the propositional thesis is generally contrasted with an analogous priority of the 
conceptual thesis; and second, that there is an at least implicitly held genealogical story 
undergirding these figures’ commitment to the priority of the propositional thesis. 
Concerning the contrasting thesis, it is characterized by a focus on the contents and 
semantic properties of what Davidson considers the simple constituents of sentences 
and what Brandom calls concepts or terms, as opposed to a focus on the contents and 
                                                       
207 Brandom, Making It Explicit, 79. 
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semantic properties of propositions (as is the case in TP-Prop and EP-Prop). This 
contrast is important because it shows that the unmodified version of the priority of the 
propositional thesis is, in part, a rejection of the contrasting priority of the conceptual 
thesis. Since my modified version of the former thesis not only includes a commitment 
to TP-Prop but also includes a rejection of the priority of the conceptual thesis, there is a 
noticeable overlap between the contents of the modified and unmodified versions, and 
to that extent my modified version is continuous with the original unmodified version. 
 Concerning the genealogical story behind the analytic pragmatists’ commitment 
to TP-Prop and EP-Prop, we see both McDowell and Brandom tracing it back to Kant. 
Of the two, Brandom tells this story most clearly, and I follow its outline over the 
following paragraphs.208 Unlike his predecessors, who give monistic accounts of 
cognition, Kant gives a dualistic account, one where sensibility, receptivity, and 
intuitions are placed on one side and the understanding, spontaneity, and concepts are 
placed on the other. This leads to various of Kant’s dicta—such as “thoughts without 
content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind,”209 “the understanding can 
make no other use of these concepts than that of judging by means of them,”210 and 
“the understanding in general can be represented as a faculty for judging”211—all of 
which hint at what becomes TP-Prop and EP-Prop.  
 After Kant, we do not see the importance of the priority of the propositional being 
recognized again until the work of Frege. In particular, his context principle (“the 
                                                       
208 See Brandom, Making It Explicit, 79-83. For a parallel genealogical story, one that 
supplements (as opposed to contrasts with) Brandom’s story, see Hacking, Why Does 
Language Matter, especially Chapter 13. 
209 Kant, Critique, A51/B75. 
210 Kant, Critique, A68/B93. 
211 Kant, Critique, A69/B94.
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meaning of a word must be asked for in the context of a proposition, not in isolation”212) 
and his priority principle (“I do not believe that concept formation can precede 
judgement, because this would presuppose the independent existence of concepts, but 
I think of a concept as having arisen by decomposition from a judgeable content”)213 
have obvious affinities with TP-Prop and EP-Prop.214 Frege adopts these principles for 
reasons relating to the role truth plays in his semantics,215 and they have gone on to 
influence much of the subsequent semantic theorizing from within the analytic tradition. 
 If Frege represents the analytic source of the analytic pragmatists’ acceptance of 
TP-Prop and EP-Prop, then the later Wittgenstein represents the pragmatist source. 
According to Brandom, it is the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations who first 
makes us appreciate that “it is to sentences that pragmatic force attaches,” and that for 
this reason “the contents expressed by sentences must play a privileged explanatory 
role” in semantics.216 This emphasis on pragmatic force, as opposed to the semantic 
concept of truth, offers the analytic pragmatist another entry point into the priority of the 
propositional thesis. 
 Most every subsequent analytic pragmatist semanticist can be seen as fitting 
within this genealogical line from Kant to Frege to Wittgenstein. Wilfrid Sellars is 
                                                       
212 Frege, Foundations, 90. 
213 Frege, “Letter to Marty,” 81. 
214 For more on Frege’s principles and their relation to Kant, see Heis, “The Priority 
Principle.” 
215 See Brandom, Making It Explicit, 80-82. 
216 Brandom, Making It Explicit, 82. In claiming this, Brandom is most likely thinking of 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §49. 
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perhaps the first of this stripe, and the figures from Chapter 2 are simply the next 
generation of such thinkers.217  
 
§3. The Modified Genealogical Story 
Having sketched in rough outline the sort of genealogical story that many analytic 
pragmatists tell about their commitment to the priority of the propositional thesis, I am 
now in a position to show where my modified version fits into the overall story. My hope 
is that, in doing so, I will prove my position to be a branch on one and the same 
genealogical tree as the analytic pragmatist positions from Chapter 2, thus 
demonstrating the continuity between my modified commitment and their unmodified 
one. 
 Before I begin, I should remind my reader of what my modified version of the 
priority of the propositional thesis is. Like with the unmodified version, it is a conjunction 
of two commitments, with the first conjunct being the Teleological Priority of the 
Propositional Thesis: 
TP-Prop. The objective contents of propositions (or judgments, or sentences, 
etc.) are the primary explanans of semantic theorizing and,  
 
However, unlike the unmodified version, the second conjunct of my modified version 
replaces the Explanatory Priority of the Propositional Thesis with an analogous 
Explanatory Priority of the Inferential Thesis: 
                                                       
217 We have already seen McDowell and Brandom’s debt to Kant. In addition to this, all four 
figures explicitly comment on their debt to Sellars (see Davidson, Subjective, xvi; McDowell, 
Perception; McDowell, Having the World, Chapters 1-3; Price, Expressivism, 148 and 160-
170; Brandom, From Empiricism). Finally, Frege is a common interlocutor for Davidson 
(see, for instance, Davidson, “Truth and Meaning”), while the later Wittgenstein is one for 
McDowell and Price (see, for instance, McDowell, Engaged Intellect, Chapters 5 and 6; Price, 
“Immodesty”). 
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EP-Inf. The objective contents of propositions are to be explained in terms of the 
semantic properties of those inferences within which the propositions occur. 
 
For the remainder of this section, I argue that once we transpose certain traditional 
Kantian claims out of the vocabulary of categorical logic that Kant (at least nominally) 
accepts and into the vocabulary of quantified predicate logic that has dominated since 
the time of Frege, we come to see that Kant’s use of ‘judgment’ is equivocal between a 
propositional sense of the word and an inferential sense.218 This is important because if 
one does not recognize this equivocation, then it is natural to interpret him as accepting 
the analytic pragmatists’ unmodified conjunction of TP-Prop and EP-Prop. But once one 
does recognize this, one sees that the Kantian position is better encapsulated by my 
modified conjunction of TP-Prop and EP-Inf. 
 
a. Kant on Judgment 
To begin, let us go over three familiar points about Kant’s conception of judgment. First, 
for Kant a judgment is the bringing together of either two concepts or two judgments into 
the relation of having the objective unity of apperception.219 Just what this relation of 
having the objective unity of apperception amounts to is an important issue to settle in 
                                                       
218 It is important to emphasize that I am not appraising Kant’s project on its own terms, 
but instead on the terms set by post-Fregean logicians. This introduces a certain 
anachronistic quality into my discussion of Kant insofar as I am working with logical 
concepts he may or may not recognize as valid. I have little interest in resolving this issue, 
and as such my argument across this section is not meant to tell one way or another 
against the historical Kant or his views. What it does tell against is the analytic pragmatist 
uptake of Kant and his views. Readers who are interested in the historical Kant’s relation to 
pre-Fregean categorical logic and post-Fregean predicate logic should consult Heis, “The 
Priority Principle” (Heis uses cognates of ‘Aristotelian logic’ and ‘Boolean logic’ to refer to 
categorical logic, and cognates of ‘modern logic’ to refer to predicate logic). 
219 See Kant, Critique, A67/B92-A69/B94 and B140-B142. For a helpful analysis of these 
passages, see Allison, Kant’s, 82-89. I say ‘in the first instance’ because at B141 Kant 
acknowledges that judgments can also consist in a bringing together of two judgments. 
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Kant interpretation, but for my present purposes it is beside the point. Instead, what is 
important right now is that an atomic judgment involves two concepts. A concept is 
something that either is immediately about (in the intentional sense of ‘about’) an 
intuition or else is mediately about some other concept, where this second concept is in 
turn either immediately about an intuition or mediately about a third concept, and so on 
until the final nth concept is immediately about an intuition. Given that an intuition is a 
representation of an object, concepts are then representations of a representation of an 
object. Putting this all together results in the familiar understanding of categorical 
judgments as involving an (implicit or explicit) quantifier, a subject term, a copula, and a 
predicate term. The subject and predicate terms correspond to the two concepts in a 
Kantian judgment, and the copula corresponds to the relation between them. Finally, the 
quantifier corresponds to the fact that the concepts are about an intuition (either 
immediately or mediately through other concepts), which is in turn immediately about an 
object. 
 Second, for Kant a judgment is either a priori or a posteriori.220 An a priori 
judgment can be justified independently of any particular experience, whereas an a 
posteriori judgment, if it is to be justified at all, must be justified by some particular 
experience.  
 Third, for Kant genuine a priori judgments are both necessary and strictly 
universal.221 In the relevant passage at B3-B6 of the first Critique, Kant says little about 
what he means by necessity, but he attempts to clarify what he means by strict 
                                                       
220 See Kant, Critique, B1-B3. 
221 See Kant, Critique, B3-B6. 
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universality by distinguishing it from empirical universality. In short, an empirically 
universal judgment is one for which there are no actual counterexamples, while a strictly 
universal judgment is one for which there cannot possibly be any counterexamples. I 
say more about this distinction below. 
 
b. Transposing Kant on A Posteriori Judgments (i.e. Kant’s Propositional Sense of 
‘Judgment’) 
With these points noted, we may now transpose Kant’s points into the vocabulary of 
modern, quantified predicate logic. When we do so with a posteriori judgments, we can 
understand the propositional sense of Kant’s usage of ‘judgment’. For example, the 
judgment ‘Some houses have exactly four walls’ will be transposed into a judgment 
formalized as 
(∃x) (Hx • Fx). 
 
Since this formula represents a judgment, it will have a propositional content (as 
opposed to a conceptual or inferential content) for the simple fact that propositional 
contents are the sort of contents that judgments have—any other sort of content would 
not have the right ‘shape’ to ‘fit’ a judgment. And if we accept Kant’s account of 
judgment from above, the natural way of interpreting this formula is as follows. ‘H’ 
represents the concept of being a house and ‘F’ represents the concept of having 
exactly four walls. The quantifier and variables represent the fact that each of these 
concepts is about the members of a single (indeterminately specified) subset of one’s 
set of intuitions, in the sense that each concept is able to be applied to each member of 
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the subset (though it is not necessarily the case that each concept is to be applied to 
each member of the subset). Finally, the ‘•’ represents that both concepts are not 
merely able to be applied to each member of the subset, but that both concepts are to 
be applied to each member of the subset.222 By going through all of this, we are now in 
a position to understand that the propositional content of this judgment is that certain 
concepts relate to one another and to intuitions in a specific way, one that on Kant’s 
account is characteristic of a proposition. In short, this judgment has a propositional 
content which asserts that the very propositional relation characteristic of its content is 
in effect. Let us call this phenomenon—where a judgment asserts that the propositional 
relation characteristic of its own content is in effect—the phenomenon of propositional 
transparency.223 
 From here, it would not be difficult to demonstrate that this phenomenon of 
propositional transparency is, on a transposed Kantian account, characteristic of any a 
posteriori judgment, although it would be time-consuming. As such, I will only discuss 
                                                       
222 To understand why I distinguish between a concept’s being able to be applied to an 
intuition and a concept’s being applied to an intuition, it helps to consider the subcontrary of 
my example, ‘Some houses do not have exactly four walls’. Formalizing this, we get: 
 (∃x) (Hx • ~Fx). 
We should now realize that the quantifier and variables do not represent the fact each 
concept does apply to the members of the subset of intuitions, because this judgment as a 
whole is saying the opposite of that, that one of the concepts does not apply to the 
members (that is precisely what the ‘~’ signifies). Instead, the quantifier and variables 
represent the fact that the concepts are able to be applied to the members of the subset 
and prime us to expect some further claim about how those concepts actually are to be 
applied. It is then the role of the truth-functional operators (‘•’ and ’~’) to specify what 
claim is actually being made—i.e. to specify how these concepts are to be applied. In our 
new example, the ‘•’ and ’~’ represent the fact that while one concept is to be applied to 
each member, the other is not to be applied to any member. 
223 This phenomenon of transparency has many affinities to McDowell’s thought that things 
are presented to us in perceptual judgments. However, the conclusions I come to 
throughout this section conflict with McDowell’s own conclusions concerning perceptual 
presence. 
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singular and universal a posteriori judgments here, in the hopes that this will provide 
enough of a beginning to make a fuller account intelligible. Beginning with singular 
judgments, let us consider as our example the judgment ‘This house has exactly four 
walls’, which we can formalize as 
Ha • Fa. 
 
On the Kantian account, ‘a’ will represent the single intuition picked out by the indexical 
use of ‘this’ in the original judgment. From there, the account should be unsurprising. ‘H’ 
and ‘F’ represent the same concepts as before. The major change from the previous 
existentially quantified judgment is that there is no longer an explicit quantifier because 
we have substituted the constant ‘a’ for the variable ‘x’ from that previous judgment.224 
This alters the story from the previous paragraph, so that now the various uses of ‘a’ 
represent the fact that each of these concepts is about the single intuition associated 
with ‘a’ in the sense that each concept is able to be applied to that intuition. Finally, the 
‘•’ represents that both concepts are not merely able to be applied to the intuition, but 
that both concepts are to be applied to it. Just as before, when we put this together we 
see that this new judgment has a propositional content to the effect that the 
                                                       
224 This change might seem like it would entail drastic changes in the logical grammar of our 
new judgment, but this is not the case. With the previous judgment, the ‘(∃x)’ is there to 
explicitly mark two facts: first, that if we are to understand the judgment as a whole then 
we must keep track of the formal relations between the various uses of the variable ‘x’ and 
the other symbols in the formula; and second, that these formal relations have to 
significance of existential quantification (as opposed to that of universal quantification, or 
that of definite description, or any other significance). However, in our new judgment we 
still must keep track of the formal relations between the various uses of the constant ‘a’ and 
the other symbols in the formula if we are to understand the judgment as a whole, and the 
use of constants instead of variables tells us that these formal relations have the 
significance of indexical or singular quantification. For this reason, the logical grammar is 
largely the same between these judgments. At the level of logical grammar, the difference 
in these judgments is simply the difference in significance of the formal relations. The 
absence of any analogue to ‘(∃x)’ in our new means only that this significance is left implicit, 
whereas it is explicitly marked by the ‘(∃x)’ in the previous judgment. 
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propositional relation characteristic of its own content is in effect, thus this new judgment 
displays the phenomenon of propositional transparency. 
 Finally, let us consider universal a posteriori judgments, taking as our example 
‘All houses have exactly four walls’. Such a judgment must be merely empirically 
universal (as opposed to strictly universal), otherwise it would be an a priori and not an 
a posteriori judgment. The question now is what Kant’s empirical universality amounts to 
in predicate logic, and here the details of Kant’s discussion of empirical and strict 
universality are helpful: “Empirical universality is therefore only an arbitrary increase in 
validity from that which holds in most cases to that which holds in all, … whereas strict 
universality belongs to a judgment essentially.”225 Kant’s point is that there is no 
essential difference between existential judgments (those about “most cases”) and 
empirically universal judgments (those about “all” cases), only an arbitrary one. Given 
this, the logical form of both existential and empirically universal judgments will be the 
same, namely 
(∃x) (Hx • Fx), 
 
and so empirically universal judgments are (surface grammar aside) a species of 
existential judgment. This means that my account of the judgment ‘Some houses have 
exactly four walls’ applies equally well to the judgment ‘All houses have exactly four 
walls’, which in turn establishes that both judgments (as well as their associated types) 
display the phenomenon of transparency. The arbitrary difference between these two 
judgments concerns the scope of the subset of intuitions that the concepts are about—
with the existential judgment, the claim is that the subset of intuitions may or may not 
                                                       
225 Kant, Critique, B4. 
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include at least one intuition of each empirically existing house, whereas with the 
empirically universal judgment the claim is that the subset decidedly does include at 
least one intuition of each empirically existing house. Thus, if this were the complete 
story of universal judgments then one would need to perform a complete enumeration of 
the objects in the world if one were to be fully justified in believing the content expressed 
by a universal judgment. This in turn would lead to the familiar problem of induction 
(which I will not be discussing in this chapter, but mention only to give my reader a 
better feel for the logic behind empirically universal judgments).226 
 
c. Transposing Kant on A Priori Judgments (i.e. Kant’s Inferential Sense of ‘Judgment’) 
The important takeaway from these previous paragraphs is that Kantian a posteriori 
judgments—singular, existential, and universal—all share a similar logical grammar 
when they are transposed into the vocabulary of predicate logic. Additionally, this 
shared logical grammar entails that a posteriori judgments are propositionally 
transparent in the sense that they have propositional contents which assert that the very 
propositional relations characteristic of their contents are in effect. This transparency is 
characteristic of what I term Kant’s propositional sense of ‘judgment’. In the upcoming 
paragraphs, I will turn to Kant’s account of a priori judgments, transposing it into the 
vocabulary of predicate logic and arguing that, once this is done, such judgments are 
not propositionally transparent because the contents of these judgments assert that 
certain inferential relations hold between propositional contents (and not that certain 
propositional relations hold between concepts and intuitions). This difference of a priori 
                                                       
226 See Hume, Treatise, 61-65 (Book 1, Part 3, Section 6). 
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judgments from a posteriori judgments is characteristic of what I term Kant’s inferential 
sense of ‘judgment’. 
 To see why a priori judgments are not propositionally transparent, let us consider 
as an example the a priori judgment ‘All bachelors are unmarried’. Remembering back, 
a priori judgments are, for Kant, both necessary and strictly universal. Since my 
argument against the transparency of a priori judgments does not depend on the 
necessity of a priori judgments, let us instead focus on their strict universality. We 
should again remember that, whereas empirically universal judgments are merely 
arbitrarily different from existential judgments (and therefore a species of existential 
judgment), strictly universal judgments are essentially different from existential 
judgments and therefore of their own genus. When we consider the expressive 
resources of modern predicate logic, this means that the existential quantifier ‘(∃x)’ is 
inappropriate to this account of strict universality, and instead the universal quantifier 
‘(x)’ is appropriate. With this in mind, and bracketing any issues concerning modality, 
the appropriate formalization of our example judgment is 
(x) (Bx ⊃ Ux), 
 
where ‘B’ represents the concept of being a bachelor and ‘U’ represents the concept of 
being unmarried.  
 Notice that, in addition to the new quantifier, this formula also includes a new 
first-order logical operator (a ‘⊃’ instead of a ‘•’); it is this difference in logical operator 
that prevents a priori judgments from being propositionally transparent. This is because 
‘⊃’ represents the conditional, and there is an important difference between the 
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conditional and the conjunction: whereas you can conjoin both concept-expressions and 
judgment-expressions to produce a meaningful expression, you can only use the 
conditional with judgment-expressions to produce a meaningful expression. For 
instance, ‘being a house and having exactly four walls’ is a meaningful expression, and 
the gist of the Kantian account of a posteriori judgments from above is that if the 
following judgments: 
1. ‘Some houses have exactly four walls’ 
2. ‘This house has exactly four walls’ 
3. ‘All houses have exactly four walls’ 
 
were more conspicuously worded in ordinary language, then they would read as follows:  
1’. ‘Being a house and having exactly four walls are concepts that apply to a set 
of intuitions’ 
2’. ‘Being a house and having exactly four walls are concepts that apply to this 
intuition’ 
3’. ‘Being a house and having exactly four walls are concepts that apply to a set 
of intuitions (and this set just happens to include intuitions of all existing houses)’. 
 
However, ‘if being a bachelor then being unmarried’ is not a meaningful expression; only 
expressions such as ‘if Thomas is a bachelor then Thomas is unmarried’ are 
meaningful, i.e. expressions where ‘judgment-shaped’ expressions are embedded within 
the conditional. For this reason, whereas the conjunction can be used to say how 
concepts ‘add up’ to become a proposition, the conditional cannot be so used. The 
conditional can only be used to show how propositions ‘add up’ to an inference. This is 
the reason why Brandom claims that the expressive function of the conditional is to  
say, as part of the content of a claim (something that can serve as a premise and 
conclusion in inference), that a certain inference is acceptable. The conditional is 
the paradigm of a locution that permits one to make inferential commitments 
explicit as the contents of judgments.227 
                                                       
227 Brandom, Articulating Reasons, 60. 
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Or, in the terms I have been working with, conditional judgments are not propositionally 
transparent because although each conditional judgment has a propositional content, 
this content asserts that certain inferential relations hold between propositions (and not 
that the very propositional relation characteristic of each’s own content holds between 
certain concepts and intuitions). Since a priori judgments just are a variety of conditional 
judgment (once the Kantian account is transposed into the vocabulary of modern 
predicate logic), a priori judgments are not transparent but instead make assertions 
concerning inferential relations. This lack of transparency due to a concern with 
inferential relations is characteristic of what I term Kant’s inferential sense of ‘judgment’. 
 
d. Material Inference and EP-Inf (i.e. Transposing Kant on Synthetic A Priori Judgments) 
With the propositional and inferential senses of Kant’s usage of ‘judgment’ adequately 
disambiguated, we are now in a position to see how Kant’s project in the first Critique 
relates to the analytic pragmatists’ and my own semantic projects. As I hope to have 
shown in the previous section, the analytic pragmatists themselves trace their 
intellectual lineage back to Kant, and they see their acceptance of TP-Prop and EP-
Prop as the latest development within this lineage. However, as I will currently argue, 
Kant can just as easily be seen as providing those of us engaging in contemporary 
debates with an example of how one can pursue a semantic project developed around 
TP-Prop and EP-Inf—not TP-Prop and EP-Prop. 
 The reason that this is the case is simple enough. The analytic pragmatists’ 
considerations that I discuss in the previous section establish that a Kantian approach 
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to semantics involves accepting TP-Prop. However, if we recognize the difference 
between Kant’s propositional and inferential senses of ‘judgment’, we can appreciate 
that his strategy of accounting for the contents of empirical (i.e. a posteriori) judgments 
in terms of the appropriateness of certain synthetic a priori judgments amounts to an 
acceptance of EP-Inf and not EP-Prop. In making a synthetic a priori judgment, one 
asserts that certain inferential relations obtain between certain propositions; and so in 
following Kant’s explanatory strategy, one asserts that it is because of the fact that 
these inferential relations obtain that empirical judgments have the propositional 
contents that they do. 
 It is important to note that Kant accounts for the contents of empirical judgments 
in terms of those a priori judgments that are also synthetic. Kant gives various accounts 
of the analytic-synthetic distinction.228 On one account, a judgment is analytic iff its truth 
is guaranteed because its predicate is contained in its subject; otherwise, the judgment 
is synthetic.229 On another, a judgment is analytic iff its truth is guaranteed because “the 
connection of the predicate [to the subject] is thought through identity”; otherwise, the 
judgment is synthetic.230 On still another, a judgment is analytic iff its truth is guaranteed 
                                                       
228 I am assuming that the viability of such a distinction is not under question, but of course 
within the analytic pragmatist tradition precisely this has been called into question by Quine, 
“Two Dogmas.” To my mind, Quine’s critique does not establish that all ways of drawing the 
analytic-synthetic distinction are untenable; only that certain well-known ways are. Quine’s 
own metaphor of statements being “of varying distances from a sensory periphery” allows 
for a plausible version of the analytic-synthetic distinction, whereby those statements that 
are closer to the periphery are more synthetic and those that are further from the periphery 
are more analytic (Quine, “Two Dogmas,” 43). Such an account eliminates the binary 
quality that is usually associated with the distinction, but nonetheless leaves the distinction 
in tact. For a discussion of these and related issues, see Lance and O’Leary-Hawthorne, 
Grammar of Meaning, Chapter 2. 
229 See Kant, Critique, A6-7/B10-11. 
230 Kant, Critique, A7/B10. 
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solely by the principle of non-contradiction; otherwise, it is synthetic.231 For my 
purposes, what is important is that, on all of these accounts, a judgment is analytic 
when its truth is guaranteed on the basis of logic alone (whether it be the logic of 
containment, identity, or contradiction), whereas it is synthetic when its truth or falsity is 
founded on an extra-logical basis. This final point leaves synthetic a priori judgments in 
a precarious position. Being a priori, such judgments can be justified independently of 
any particular experience, but being synthetic, their truth (and for that reason their 
justification as well) cannot be established through logic alone. Therefore, for synthetic a 
priori judgments to be so much as justifiable, there must be some source of justification 
other than logic and particular experience; but there seemingly isn’t a third source over 
and above these two. It is for this reason that Kant takes the question, “How are 
synthetic judgments a priori possible?,” as the guiding question of his entire project.232 
 An analogous problem remains for us analytic pragmatists pursuing a semantic 
project centering on TP-Prop and EP-Inf. My discussion of transposing Kantian a priori 
judgments into universally quantified conditionals should establish the connection 
between inference and the a priori. However, we can distinguish two types of inference 
from one another, along similar lines as Kant distinguishes analytic and synthetic 
judgments from one another. Some inferences are appropriate because of the purely 
logical relations between their premises and conclusions, such as: 
Soccer balls are round and soccer balls are hollow. 
 
∴ Soccer balls are round. 
 
                                                       
231 See Kant, Critique, A150/B189-A153/B193. Also Kant, Prolegomena, 4:266-4:269. 
232 Kant, Critique, B19. 
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In this example, it is the formal feature characteristic of conjunction that accounts for the 
validity of the inference, and in other such inferences it is one or another formal feature 
of the logical operators in the inference. For this reason, let us call inferences of this 
type formal inferences.  
 However, there is another type of inference in addition to that of formal inference, 
a type where no logical vocabulary at all is used. Consider the inference: 
Nashville is to the west of Knoxville. 
 
∴ Knoxville is to the east of Nashville. 
 
Here there are no explicit logical operators being used, leaving us with two options for 
how to interpret this inference. On the first interpretation, what I have given above is not 
a full inference, but only a portion of the more complete: 
Nashville is to the west of Knoxville. 
 
If Nashville is to the west of Knoxville, then Knoxville is to the east of Nashville. 
 
∴ Knoxville is to the east of Nashville. 
 
This more complete version is a formal inference in the sense from above, and the less 
complete version is simply an enthymeme for the more complete version (assuming that 
the less complete version is an inference at all). On the second interpretation, what 
defenders of the first interpretation treat as the less complete version of the inference is 
actually complete in and of itself, and what accounts for the validity of this original 
inference is the conceptual contents of the words ‘east’ and ‘west’. This means that the 
inference is not a formal inference after all, and its validity is determined by certain 
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extra-logical features of its premise and conclusion. Let us designate such non-formal, 
extra-logical inferences with the phrase ‘material inferences’.233 
 The question now is which of these interpretations is the appropriate one. There 
is something to be said in favor of both responses, but ultimately I follow the likes of 
Sellars and Brandom in pursuing the second, material interpretation over the first, 
formal-enthemematic interpretation. My defense of this second interpretation in the next 
few paragraphs is a summary version of Brandom’s more detailed defense in Making It 
Explicit, so I direct more curious readers to the relevant passages there.234 Also, Sellars 
offers another sort of defense, and although I find it less accessible it is, to my mind, no 
less convincing.235 
 To begin, notice that if we accept the first interpretation, then we are providing a 
reductive account of what defenders of the second interpretation consider material 
inferences, explaining them in terms of formal inference. For such a strategy to be 
successful, the notion of a formal inference must be intelligible independently of that of a 
material inference. But notice that the ‘∴’ marks but does not state the fact that the 
conclusion of an inference (purportedly) follows from the premise(s) of that inference, 
while conditional expressions explicitly state this fact. The reason the inference 
concerning Nashville and Knoxville is taken to be enthemematic is because it uses a ‘∴’ 
without explicitly stating the conditional encoding its own inferential propriety, and 
therefore stating this conditional is necessary before the inference can be fully explicit. 
                                                       
233 For more on the distinction between formal and material inferences, see Sellars, 
“Inference”; also Sellars, “Is There?” 
234 See in particular Brandom, Making It Explicit, 94-116. Brandom’s discussion of regulism 
and regularism is also informative (see Brandom, Making It Explicit, 18-30). 
235 See Sellars, “Inference”; also Sellars, “Is There?” 
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However, the inference about soccer balls uses a ‘∴’ without stating the associated 
conditional. As such, its more explicit form should be:  
Soccer balls are round and soccer balls are hollow. 
 
If soccer balls are round and soccer balls are hollow, then soccer balls are round. 
 
∴ Soccer balls are round. 
 
But notice that, by adding the conditional as a premise, we are no longer working with 
the same inference as before. We realize this once we notice that this new inference 
also uses a ‘∴’ without explicitly stating its own inferential propriety in the form of a 
conditional, and as such could be formulated in a more explicit manner as: 
Soccer balls are round and soccer balls are hollow. 
 
If soccer balls are round and soccer balls are hollow, then soccer balls are round. 
 
If soccer balls are round and soccer balls are hollow and if soccer balls are round 
and soccer balls are hollow then soccer balls are round, then soccer balls are 
round. 
 
∴ Soccer balls are round. 
 
And again, this is a new inference that needs to be made more explicit. At this point, the 
regress this way of thinking leads to should be clear.236 The source of this regress is the 
urge to ground the propriety of a less explicit inference on the propriety its more explicit 
counterpart, which is precisely the problem that defenders of the first interpretation from 
above fall into. To end the regress, we need to reverse the order of explanation by 
                                                       
236 At its root, this is the same regress as Wittgenstein’s regress of rules and Lewis Carroll’s 
Achilles and the tortoise regress. See Carroll, “What the Tortoise Said”; also Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations, §§84, 86-87; also Kripke, Wittgenstein; also Brandom, Making 
It Explicit, 18-30. 
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accounting for formal inferences in terms of material inferences.237 Once we do so, 
material inferences will no longer appear to be enthymemes for longer formal 
inferences; instead, formal inferences will be the members of that subset of material 
inferences whose validity depends on the contents of logical words such as ‘and’ and ‘if’ 
and ‘then’ (as opposed to the contents of extra-logical words such as ‘east’, ‘west’, ‘red’, 
etc.).  
 At this point, we have reached the same impasse that Kant faces, only 
concerning material inferences and not synthetic a priori judgments. Such inferences 
must be valid, otherwise they would be nothing more than a random collection of 
statements with no inferential structure. However, their validity cannot be established 
through mere logic alone, otherwise they would be formal inferences and the regress 
would arise again anew. Finally, as we will see in the next section, validity has a modal 
component. Just as genuine a priori judgments are necessarily true, valid inferences 
with true premises necessarily deliver a true conclusion. With this in mind, we can see 
that, for the same reason why a priori judgments cannot be established solely through 
particular experiences, the validity of inferences cannot be established solely through 
particular experiences.238 Putting these points together, the validity of material 
inferences cannot be established on the basis of logic alone or on the basis of particular 
experiences. Thus, the guiding question for a semanticist who accepts TP-Prop and EP-
Inf should be an analogue to Kant’s: How are materially valid inferences possible? 
                                                       
237 For more on this reversed order of explanation, see Brandom, Making It Explicit, 97-105. 
Additionally, Sellars offers independent arguments to the same conclusion that material 
inference (and not formal inference) should be taken as the privileged concept. See Sellars, 
“Inference”; also Sellars, “Is There?” 
238 For more on a similar point, see Brandom’s discussion of the difference between rules 
and regularities at Brandom, Making It Explicit, 26-30. 
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e. Concluding Note on Brandom 
The previous section on material inference and substituting EP-Inf for EP-Prop might 
sound particularly Brandomian, and in one sense it is. Brandom accepts the material-
inference-first order of explanation that I defend here,239 and his approach to 
understanding the semantic contents of propositions is called inferentialism after all. 
However, Brandom tips his hand when he says, “In [the chapter where he discusses 
material inferences explicitly] material proprieties of inference have been treated as 
primitives, playing the role of unexplained explainers.”240 Brandom’s intention is for 
subsequent chapters to provide a story concerning the pragmatics of language to 
undergird his notion of material inference, but although these chapters tell a compelling 
story about the pragmatics of language his refusal to return to the topic of material 
inference for any extended period leaves the connection between pragmatics and 
material inference murky at best, and nonexistent at worst.241 Instead of focusing on this 
issue, Brandom spends the bulk of his efforts showing how “if [the inferentialist] 
approach [to semantics] is granted its preferred starting point, it can develop it into an 
account of the sort of objective representational content other approaches begin 
with.”242 For these reasons, if there is a single guiding question to Brandom’s project 
from Making It Explicit, it is not the question that I recommend: How are materially valid 
inferences possible? Instead, Brandom’s guiding question is: Given that materially valid 
                                                       
239 See Brandom, Making It Explicit, 97-105. 
240 Brandom, Making It Explicit, 133. 
241 I am not the only person to level this complaint against Brandom. Without naming 
names, Rebecca Kukla and Mark Lance disappointingly observe, “Not that philosophers have 
offered much in the way of theories of material inference in any case” (Kukla and Lance, 
Yo!, 69). 
242 Brandom, Making It Explicit, 136. 
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inferences are possible, how is objective representation possible? And, as I pointed out 
in the previous section, Brandom’s answer to this question in terms of de re ascriptions 
is founded on a commitment to EP-Prop, not EP-Inf. 
 
§4. Material Validity and the Pincer Objection 
At this point, I hope to have established that the content of my modified commitment to 
TP-Prop and EP-Inf has significant similarities to the content of the analytic pragmatists’ 
unmodified commitment to TP-Prop and EP-Prop, and that by way of Kant my modified 
commitment fits well into the analytic pragmatists’ intellectual genealogy. Therefore, my 
modified commitment is to a significant degree continuous with its unmodified 
counterpart. However, this continuity would be all for naught if my modified commitment 
were to fare no better against the Pincer Objection than its unmodified counterpart.  
 In this section, I will lay the groundwork for an argument that this is not the case. 
To do so, I first analyze the concept of material validity into its Modal and 
Representational Components. To develop a full account of the Modal Component of 
material validity would be a dissertation-length project in itself, so instead of doing this in 
all its attendant detail, I briefly provide my reasons for thinking that it is possible to 
develop such an account, and to develop it in a manner consistent with the Deflationary 
Demand. However, I find it unlikely that an account of the Modal Component of material 
validity would, by itself, address the Objectivity Demand. As such, I spend the bulk of 
my efforts in this section focused on the Representational Component of material 
validity and its relation to the Objectivity Demand.  
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 When I began this dissertation project, I predicted that my account of the 
Representational Component would be independent of whatever account of the Modal 
Component I end up developing in future projects; unfortunately, this prediction has 
proven to be inaccurate. In particular, I follow Peirce in believing that an idealized notion 
of justification is necessary for understanding representation, and as I have come to 
understand the idealization at work here it presupposes an antecedently developed 
account of modality. As such, the force of my discussion of the Representational 
Component is weaker than I originally planned. Before writing this section, I expected to 
be able to develop an account of the Representational Component in all of its detail, and 
prove that this account allows me to meet the Objectivity Demand. While revising this 
section, I have realized that, given the dependence of the Representational Component 
on the Modal Component, my discussion of ideal justification is incomplete, meaning 
that by extension my discussion of the Representational Component is incomplete. 
Instead of proving that I can meet the Objectivity Demand, this latter discussion merely 
provides me with three points concerning ideal justification that, if justified, allow me to 
meet the Objectivity Demand. The justification for these stipulations can come only in 
the form of a more developed account of the Modal Component, and for this reason 
these three points jointly function as a criterion for success of my future work concerning 
the Modal Component. I say more about this as the section progresses. 
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a. The Representational and Modal Components of Material Validity 
To begin, let us consider the textbook definition of a valid inference:  
An inference is valid iff the truth of its premise(s) guarantees the truth of its 
 conclusion.  
 
This definition is a good starting point, but is in need of two modifications. First, as I 
mentioned in Chapter One, truth is a controversial concept within the analytic pragmatist 
tradition and so I substitute the philosophically neutral genus-term, ‘categorical 
propriety’, for its more controversial species-term, ‘truth’, in the original definition: 
An inference is valid iff the categorical propriety of its premise(s) guarantees the 
categorical propriety of its conclusion.  
 
As a terminological point, going forward I use ‘categorical propriety’, ‘categorical 
impropriety’, and ‘CPS-aptness’ in a manner analogous to how ‘truth’, ‘falsity’, and ‘truth-
aptness’ (respectively) are normally used.  
 Second, if we explain formal inference in terms of material inference (as I have 
argued we should) then all valid inferences will be materially valid and vice versa. 
Therefore, we can modify the above definition to be in terms of the concept of material 
inference, which is our primary concern in this section:  
An inference is materially valid iff the categorical propriety of its premise(s) 
guarantees the categorical propriety of its conclusion.  
 
 Once we make these modifications, we can define material validity as 
guaranteed categorical-propriety-preservation. In doing so, we see that material validity 
can be analyzed into two components. The first, which I term the Representational 
Component, concerns the fact that materially valid inferences are categorical-propriety-
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preserving; and the second, which I term to Modal Component, concerns the fact that 
this categorical-propriety-preservation is guaranteed. 
 
b. The Modal Component and the Deflationary Demand 
Since I have more to say about the Representational Component in this section, let’s 
first look at the Modal Component and its relation to the Deflationary Demand. There are 
of course many ways of understanding the guarantee that constitutes the Modal 
Component in such a way that is inconsistent with the Deflationary Demand—it might be 
that the guarantee is understood in terms of non-natural forms, or in terms of a non-
natural capacity for perceiving such guarantees, or in terms of the will of a non-natural 
god, or any number of other options. However, there are also ways of understanding the 
guarantee that are (at least prima facie) consistent with the Deflationary Demand. One 
way would be to go externalist, and argue that an inferring subject does not have to 
have any cognitive access to the guarantee for one of her inferences to be valid. All that 
matters for the guarantee to be in effect is that the actual world be arranged so that 
there are no instances of her inference that are not categorical-propriety-preserving, or 
that the actual as well as nearby possible worlds be so arranged, or that all possible 
worlds be so arranged. Alternatively, one could understand the guarantee in 
teleosemantic terms, whereby a subject’s inferences are guaranteed to be categorical-
propriety-preserving in the sense that the evolutionary history of her species or her 
conceptual apparatus imparts the proper function of being categorical-propriety-
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preserving onto these inferences.243 Or, we could understand the guarantee in terms of 
social practices. Such stories should be familiar enough within the analytic pragmatist 
tradition, so I direct my reader to some representative examples.244 There are surely 
other ways of understanding the guarantee provided by validity that are consistent with 
the Deflationary Demand, but I will end my list here. My point in providing this list is not 
that all conceivable externalist, teleosemantic, or social-practice accounts will meet the 
Deflationary Demand, but instead the weaker point that there are no in principle barriers 
to deflating such accounts to be consistent with the Deflationary Demand. As such, the 
strategy I recommend is to do just this—to pick a way of understanding the guarantee 
and to deflate it until it is consistent with the Deflationary Demand.245 
 The obvious objections to this strategy are that pursuing this strategy will too 
greatly weaken the guarantee that validity provides and that pursuing this strategy will 
deprive us of the tools needed to meet the Objectivity Demand. Concerning the first 
objection, my recommendation would be to accept (all things being equal) the strongest 
guarantee that can be accounted for in a manner consistent the Deflationary Demand, 
but also to recognize and accept that as a naturalist our modal notions will likely be 
                                                       
243 For more on teleosemantics and proper functioning, see Millikan, Language. 
244 See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, especially §198; also Brandom’s 
discussion of regularism at Brandom, Making It Explicit, 26-30 and 37-42; also Brandom’s 
discussion of external and internal interpretation at Brandom, Making It Explicit, Conclusion; 
also Davidson’s account of radical interpretation in Davidson, “Radical Interpretation” and 
Davidson, “A Coherence Theory”; also McDowell’s discussion of bildung at McDowell, Mind 
and World, Lectures IV, V, and VI. 
245 Personally, I am of the mind that the social-practice way of understanding the guarantee 
appears most promising. However, I am also of the mind that alternative ways of 
understanding are simply different from, and not contradictory of, the social-practice way, 
and so an analog to Carnap’s principle of tolerance (see Carnap, Logical Syntax, 51-52) is 
appropriate here: everyone is at liberty to construct their own account of the guarantee that 
validity provides, and far from hindering the development of a theory of material inference 
this will help it flourish. 
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weaker than certain non-naturalist approaches to modality have led us to expect. This 
response will undoubtedly ring hollow to some, but I do not see a viable alternative.  
 Concerning the second objection, my response should be more satisfying. I 
concede that, on its own, a deflated account of the guarantee will most likely not provide 
us with the tools needed to meet the Objectivity Demand. However, the guarantee is 
only one component of material validity, and therefore we can supplement our eventual 
account of the Modal Component with an account of the Representational Component. 
So long as the latter account provides us with these tools without running afoul of the 
Deflationary Demand, then the conjunction of both accounts will likewise do so. Given 
what I have said in the introduction of this section above, my discussion of the 
Representational Component to come, and particularly those paragraphs dealing with 
ideal justification, is best seen as providing us with a scheme for meeting the Objectivity 
Demand. So long as the details of an eventual account of the Modal Component can be 
substituted into this scheme without running afoul of the Deflationary Demand, we can 
be confident that the combined theory of material validity can meet the Objectivity 
Demand and thereby avoid the Pincer Objection. However, my goal for the remainder of 
this section is to establish the conditional—if these details can be substituted into this 
scheme, then the Pincer Objection can be addressed—not to establish both the 
conditional and its antecedent. 
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c. A Schematic, Peircean Approach to the Representational Component 
With my goal for the remainder of this section clarified, let me turn to the first stage of 
meeting this goal: namely, to provide my schematic account of categorical-propriety-
preservation and the Representational Component of material validity. Later, the second 
stage will be my argument that this schematic account provides us with the tools we 
need to meet the Deflationary and Objectivity Demands (assuming that the details 
concerning the Modal Component can be substituted into it); but for now let us focus on 
the account itself. In this first stage, I have been immensely influenced by Peirce’s 
approach to truth and a number of Peirceans’ elucidation of that approach.246 Whereas 
Peirce uses an idealized notion of justification to better understand the notion of truth, I 
use an idealized notion of justification to understand that of categorical propriety. 
However, given that my concern is with material validity there are two noteworthy 
differences between my approach and Peirce’s. First, and obviously, my ultimate goal is 
in understanding categorical-propriety-preservation and not categorical propriety itself. 
And second, I do not argue that truth reduces to ideal justification (as some have read 
Peirce as doing), nor do I argue that an account of ideal justification offers something 
like a pragmatic elucidation of truth (in Misak’s technical sense of the phrase).247 For all 
I say these might be true, but they are not the conclusions of my argument. The 
conclusion for which I argue is the weaker one that the categorical-propriety and ideal-
justification predicates are coextensional. Since my concern is with categorical-
                                                       
246 See in particular Peirce, “Questions”; Peirce, “Some Consequences”; Peirce “Fixation”; 
Peirce, “How to Make”; Misak, Truth; Hookway, “Truth”; Heney, “Reality”; and Legg, 
“Charles Peirce’s Limit.” 
247 See Misak, Truth, 3-45. 
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propriety-preservation and not categorical propriety, the pressing question is not the 
constitutional question of what categorical propriety is but instead the functional 
question of how individual categorically appropriate sentences relate to one another 
within the complex entity we call an inference. To answer this functional question, we 
need only know whether the sentences within an inference are categorically appropriate 
or not, and so our only concern is with the extension of the categorical-propriety 
predicate. Therefore, if we are to use ideal justification to understand categorical 
propriety (as I suggest), our purposes will be served so long as we show the 
coextensionality of the categorical-propriety and ideal-justification predicates. There is 
no need to decide the further issue as to whether their intensions are the same (and 
hence whether categorical propriety reduces to ideal justification) or distinct (and hence 
whether ideal justification provides a pragmatic elucidation but not a definition of 
categorical propriety). 
 
c. i. Inquiry and ‘Inquiry’ 
To see why the categorical-propriety and ideal-justification predicates are coextensive, I 
must first say a few words about how I will be using the word ‘inquiry’. To begin, ‘inquiry’ 
designates a practice that we humans engage in, and the goal that we have while 
engaging in this practice is to attain categorical propriety. However, inquiry is not the 
only practice with categorical propriety as its goal. People dogmatically maintain their 
beliefs, they believe based on faith, they defer to the authority of others with social or 
political power, they alter their consciousness using drugs and other means, they take 
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their arbitrary whims as inspiration, and they do any number of other things all with an 
eye towards categorical propriety. What separates what I call ‘inquiry’ from these other 
practices is the role that justification plays in inquiry. It is tempting to say that inquiry is 
distinctive because it is only when we engage in inquiry that we take justification to be 
our means to attaining categorical propriety, whereas these other practices have no 
regard for justification. This thought is on the right track, but it threatens to overstate the 
difference between inquiry and these other practices. A more careful statement of the 
difference would be as follows: one’s experience engaging in these other practices can 
serve as justifying evidence within inquiry, but these other practices merely produce 
such evidence and do not make use of it themselves. Only what I call ‘inquiry’ makes 
use of evidence. 
 To understand this point about the role of justifying evidence within inquiry, we 
must understand my distinction between a practice’s producing evidence and its making 
use of evidence. As I am using the relevant phrases, a practice produces evidence iff 
there are some people who hold a new (set of) propositional attitude(s) towards some 
content(s) after having engaged in that practice. Alternatively, a practice makes use of 
evidence iff part of the practice consists in people (1) using the contents of their 
propositional attitudes as premises and conclusions within their reasoning and (2) 
actively treating the contents of their propositional attitudes as being under a standing 
obligation to be modified in the face of the contents of any new propositional attitudes 
they gain. (1) ensures that what I call ‘inquiry’ is rational, while (2) ensures that it is 
reflective. 
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 This distinction is all well and good, but why do I think that it distinguishes what I 
call ‘inquiry’ from other categorical-propriety-directed practices? And why do I think that 
what I call ‘inquiry’ has any relation to the practice that is ordinarily called ‘inquiry’? The 
first question is easy to answer: I’m stipulating that out of the categorical-propriety-
directed practices only what I call ‘inquiry’ makes use of evidence.  
 It is the second question that asks for me to go beyond mere stipulation, so to 
answer this question let us consider how my distinction from two paragraphs ago 
applies to some example categorical-propriety-directed practices. First, consider the 
example of dogmatically maintaining a set of beliefs in the face of any potential sources 
of evidence. When this is done perfectly, the person engaging in such a practice gains 
no new propositional attitudes, and so such a practice does not produce evidence. Of 
course, such perfection is rarely if ever achieved in practice; usually, in order to maintain 
the propositional attitudes that she takes to be most important, the person dogmatically 
maintaining her beliefs is forced either to adopt some new propositional attitudes she 
does not already have or to modify some propositional attitudes that she has but takes 
to be less important. It is in such “imperfect” cases that dogmatism produces evidence. 
 This much should be uncontroversial, but what about whether dogmatism makes 
use of evidence. Here, it depends on the details of what is being dogmatically 
maintained and who is doing the maintaining. The standard philosophical example is 
oftentimes along the lines of Peirce’s metaphorical image of an ostrich burying its 
head.248 For example, an everyday person, call him Steve, finds himself believing that 
he is supremely interesting and intelligent, and that everyone ought to fall under the 
                                                       
248 See Peirce, “Fixation,” 3:248-250. 
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sway of his superior personality. Unfortunately, no one actually finds Steve all that 
interesting or intelligent; in fact, many people find him boorish, thanks in part to his 
tendencies to insist that President Obama was born in Africa and to act as though he is 
entitled to the attention of others, especially women. Instead of using these people’s 
reactions as evidence that he has some serious problems concerning how he believes 
and acts, Steve finds it more comfortable to “bury his head” and insist that “he’s just 
telling it how it is” and that “boys will be boys.” The sort of dogmatism that Steve is 
supposed to highlight is the sort that is unjustified—not only are there no good reasons 
to support Steve’s dogmatic attitude, there are plenty of good reasons against it. Cases 
of such unjustified dogmatism are the antithesis of what usually gets called ‘inquiry’, as 
unjustified dogmatism consists in people shutting themselves off to the rational process 
instead of engaging in it. And given that Steve and his unjustified dogmatist peers do 
not make use of evidence while being dogmatic, my stipulations concerning the word 
’inquiry’ put me in line with ordinary usage. 
 However, there are more interesting cases of dogmatism that are not so easy to 
write off as being unjustified. Consider the case of Sally. Sally is a doctor, and her years 
in medical school have led her to believe that immunizations do not cause autism and 
that most doctors agree about this. While practicing medicine, Sally has immunized 
many children who have not become autistic, and she has met innumerable doctors 
who have done the same. When Sally goes home for the holidays, she finds that her 
brother’s new significant other insists that immunizations cause autism, and that there is 
plenty of evidence in support of this “fact.” Sally rolls her eyes and doesn’t respond. This 
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lack of response on Sally’s part shuts her off from the rational process, at least in this 
interaction, and so is another case of someone dogmatically maintaining their beliefs. 
However, her dogmatism is the result of her past inquiries, and not antithetical to them. 
In this manner, her dogmatism is a stage within her ongoing inquiring as a doctor, but 
again this squares with my usage of ‘inquiry’. The reason is because Sally has made 
use of plenty of evidence before dogmatically maintaining her belief—whether she liked 
it or not, this is what medical school and practicing medicine have forced her to do. 
Similar thoughts apply mutatis mutandis to other experts who dogmatically maintain the 
propositional attitudes relating to their respective fields. 
 There are two things to take away from this pair of examples concerning 
dogmatism. First, it is the case that sometimes dogmatism is distinct from inquiry while 
other times it is a component of inquiry. And second, my stipulations concerning how to 
use ‘inquiry’ can capture this phenomenon.  
 More importantly, similar take aways can be had from considering a number of 
other categorical-propriety-directed practices. Deferring to an authority can be 
antithetical to inquiry, for instance as when someone is born into a society that defers to 
a religious leader on all matters and is habituated into doing the same. Or, deferring to 
an authority can be a component of inquiry, as when a non-scientist learns enough 
about science and scientific practice to feel confident deferring to scientists who are 
experts in their fields. Similarly, faith can be antithetical to inquiry, as when someone’s 
faith in the Bible leaves them unwilling to ever take seriously what cosmology, geology, 
biology, and anthropology tell us about the history of the earth. Or, (something akin to) 
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faith can be a component of inquiry, as when a scientist has faith that his novel line of 
research is worth pursuing. I could continue listing examples, but what is important is 
that time and again the cases where a categorical-propriety-directed practice is 
antithetical to inquiry is when its practitioner is not embedding this practice into a 
broader set of practices that involve putting the practitioner’s propositional attitudes into 
rational relations with one another and reflectively updating those propositional attitudes 
based on those rational relations. And when the practitioner does do this, the original 
practice not only ceases to be opposed to inquiry but becomes a component within the 
broader practice of inquiry. In this manner, my stipulations concerning ‘inquiry’ entail 
that inquiry is something of a meta-practice, one that is able to include any number of 
sub-practices within it. This may not be exactly the sense usually associated with the 
word ‘inquiry’, nor the only such sense, but it is at least not so different as to be a cause 
for concern. 
 
c. ii. A Preemptive Objection 
Now that I have outlined what I mean by the word ‘inquiry’, I should address a 
preemptive objection that my reader likely has to my upcoming argument that 
categorical propriety and ideal justification are coextensional. True, my objector 
concedes, inquirers might take justification to be the means for attaining categorical 
propriety; however, justification is at best a reliable yet imperfect means for this 
purpose. As such, the most I can hope to prove is an incomplete overlap between the 
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extensions of the categorical propriety predicate and any justification predicate, and not 
their complete coextensionality.  
 There are two related parts in my response to such an objection. The first is that 
my objector misconstrues the sort of hope that I would recommend that inquirers share. 
I would not recommend a single abstract hope to the effect that producing justification 
through inquiry will eventually lead us to the set of all categorically appropriate 
sentences; instead, I would recommend a set of concrete hopes to the effect that, when 
someone inquires into this particular issue, justification will lead that person to the 
categorically appropriate sentence on this particular issue. Although the issues that 
these hopes are about are different, they have one and the same form, making the 
regulative hope of inquiry a type of hope of which there are many tokens, and the form 
of these hope-tokens is to connect individual cases of justification to individual cases of 
categorical propriety (not the set of all justification-cases to the set of all categorical-
propriety-cases). Such hope-tokens are prima facie appropriate for each and every 
issue into which we can inquire, in the sense that there is no positive in principle reason 
to suspend such hope-tokens before we begin inquiring—any reason to suspend a 
hope-token would have to be a concrete result we reach after we have already begun 
inquiring. All of this is consistent with (any or all of) the hope-tokens not being rewarded 
in the sense of inquiry not settling on a single, categorically appropriate response to the 
issues under investigation within any finite period of time.  
 The upshot of this discussion of the regulative hope of inquiry is that the 
imperfection of justification is not necessarily one of scope, as my objector assumes. It 
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is not an essential feature of any justification predicate that the scope of its extension 
not coincide with that of the categorical-propriety predicate. We know this because we 
can consistently hope for such coextensionality, while were a lack of coextensionality 
essential to justification then the consistency of our hope would vanish—an impossible 
hope is not a consistent hope. Instead, the imperfection concerns whether the individual 
hope-tokens that we have will actually be rewarded, i.e. whether our inquiries will 
actually settle on a single categorically appropriate answer within our life times. 
 
c. iii. A Schematic Argument for the Coextensionality of Ideal Justification and 
Categorical Propriety 
The second part of my response to the preemptive objection is simply my schematic 
argument that ideal justification and categorical propriety are coextensional. As a 
beginning to this argument, let me make the stipulations about ideal justification that I 
mentioned in the introduction to this section, and with which I will be working. To 
understand ideal justification, we must first understand its contrasting notion, that of 
actual justification. For my purposes, there are three points to note about actual 
justification. The first point is terminological. Sentences (or beliefs or some other such 
entities) have an actual-justification status. Since justification is a degreed notion, 
justification statuses can be more or less finely distinguished one from another, and 
since actual justification is a species of justification the same holds for it. For simplicity’s 
sake, unless otherwise noted I adopt the rough-grain approach of only distinguishing the 
two statuses of being actually justified and being actually unjustified. By and large, my 
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usage of ‘actual justification’ will be shorthand for ‘the status of being actually justified’ 
(just as by and large ‘categorical propriety’ is shorthand for ‘the status of being 
categorically appropriate’). Second, actual justification is the sort of justification that 
occurs in actual inquiries successfully carried out by actual inquirers (such as myself or 
yourself). As such, actual justification has the qualities we usually associate with 
justification as such: it is relative to an inquirer and a time (or context), it is fallible, what 
is actually justified for one person at one time need not be actually justified for another 
person at another time, and the extension of a relativized actual-justification predicate is 
(at least contingently) non-coextensional with that of the categorical propriety predicate. 
Third, there are three varieties of actual justification that are important for us—past 
justification, present justification, and future justification. Assuming we have relativized 
to a particular inquirer, past justification is the status of having been actually justified at 
some point in the inquirer’s past, present justification is the status of being actually 
justified at the inquirer’s present point in time, and future justification is the status of 
going to be actually justified at some point in the inquirer’s future.  
 With these points about actual justification noted, we can now outline the key 
points about ideal justification that any account of the Modal Component, if it is to be 
satisfactory, must make possible. The first point is that a sentence has the status of 
being ideally justified iff the sentence would be justified at some point in the future were 
inquiry to be conducted into the issue, and this future justification would be maintained 
indefinitely were inquiry continued indefinitely.  
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 A corollary of this first point is that, according to this account of ideal justification, 
we must idealize from actual justification in two manners. First, we do not have 
immediate cognitive access to the indefinite future, so since ideal justification concerns 
the indefinite future we must cognize this future through inductive means.249 To judge 
whether or not something will be justified throughout the indefinite future, we cannot look 
directly to its justification status in said future because the future has yet to arrive for us. 
The best we can do is to judge based on its past and present justification statuses at 
any time, and to keep an eye out for changes in these statuses as we move forward in 
time and adjust our judgment accordingly. 
 The second manner of idealization is that ideal justification concerns what 
subjunctively would happen in the indefinite future, not necessarily what actually will 
happen. This is where the Modal Component comes into play, as there is a significant 
overlap between the issues that the subjunctive mood raises and that modality more 
generally raises. Unfortunately, adjudicating these issues is outside the scope of my 
present project, and for this reason my notion if ideal justification will be indefinite to the 
degree that it is shaped by its relation to the subjunctive mood. 
 With the notion of ideal justification defined, the second point in my schematic 
argument is that ideal justification is the best sign of categorical propriety for which 
inquirers can hope. As I mentioned above, justification is a degreed notion, so there are 
indefinitely many degrees of justification—i.e. something can be not only justified, but 
well justified or very well justified or very very well justified or so on. As such, the more 
                                                       
249 For the purposes of this argument, I am bracketing any Humean or Goodmanian worries 
about induction (see Hume, Treatise, 61-65 (Book 1, Part 3, Section 6); also Goodman, 
Fact). 
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new evidence that comes in through inquiry without controverting the justification of 
some sentence, the better justified that sentence is. Furthermore, given that ideal 
justification involves a sentence maintaining its justification indefinitely, a sentence 
cannot be any better justified than it is when it is ideally justified (any actual history of 
past and present justification can at best approximate to the goodness of ideal 
justification). Therefore, given that justification is taken to be a sign of categorical 
propriety within inquiry, ideal justification is a better sign of categorical propriety than 
any other sort of justification. Finally, justification is taken as the sole sign of categorical 
propriety within inquiry. To see why this is the case, assume for the purpose of reductio 
that there is something other than justification that is taken to be a sign of categorical 
propriety within inquiry. Either this something else is taken to be a sign because there is 
justifying evidence that it is a sign, or because of some reason not relating to the notions 
of justification or evidence. For instance, we can take our current propositional attitudes 
as a sign of categorical propriety in the sense that we take them to be a sign because 
we have justificatory evidence that they are a sign. This is the case of justified 
dogmatism illustrated by Sally above, but in such a case the evidence we have that our 
propositional attitudes are a sign for categorical propriety transforms our propositional 
attitudes into evidence of categorical propriety, contrary to our original assumption. 
Alternatively, when we take our current propositional attitudes as a sign of categorical 
propriety for some reason not relating to justification or evidence, we are engaging in 
the sort of unjustified dogmatism that is illustrated by Steve. Such dogmatism is 
antithetical to inquiry, so when we engage in this sort of dogmatism we are no longer 
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engaging in inquiry (again, contrary to our original assumption). Both examples lead us 
to contradict our assumption, and a similar argument can be run for pairs of examples 
where we are engaging in other categorical-directed practices other than inquiry. The 
ultimate conclusion is that ideal justification is the best sign of categorical propriety 
within inquiry because it is better than any other form of justification and there are no 
other signs within inquiry besides justification. 
 With the third and final point, we reach the crux of the issue concerning the 
coextensionality of the categorical-propriety and ideal-justification predicates. At this 
point, we should be asking ourselves whether or not it is the case that the 
coextensionality of the ideal-justification and categorical-propriety predicates follows 
from ideal justification being the best sign of categorical propriety for which inquirers can 
hope. This third point is that this inferential connection obtains. To see why, assume 
that such a connection does not obtain, again for reductio purposes. Now, ask yourself: 
if ideal justification is the best sign of categorical propriety yet ideal justification and 
categorical propriety are not coextensional, then what accounts for their difference in 
extension? Since we do not have direct cognitive access to individual categorically 
appropriate sentences within inquiry, but only mediate access through individual cases 
of justification, the only way for us to conceive of the total set of individual categorically 
appropriate sentences is mediately, using our best sign for categorical propriety: ideal 
justification. Therefore, the difference between the extensions of the categorical-
propriety and ideal-justification predicates cannot be accounted for by any difference in 
our manners of conceiving of them, because the extensions of both predicates are 
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conceived in terms of ideal justification. In short, it is not something about ourselves and 
our cognitive apparatuses that accounts for the difference. Therefore, it must be 
something independent of ourselves and our minds that accounts for the difference in 
extension; it must be the world. But once we make this move, we realize that the world 
must be something radically independent from us for it to account for the difference in 
extensions. We must have no hope of conceiving of the world as it really is, because 
justification is the only means through which inquirers can reach categorical propriety 
about the world but the world must be something beyond justification for it to account for 
the difference in extensions between categorical propriety and ideal justification. 
Therefore, the world must be an uncognizable thing-in-itself, which raises a number of 
familiar problems. To name but a few, taking the world to be a thing-in-itself has 
radically skeptical consequences to the effect that we know nothing about the world, 
and possibly that we have no intentional directedness towards the world. Alternatively, 
the notion of a thing-in-itself is (or at least seems to be) internally inconsistent; if ‘thing-
in-itself’ is to be meaningful (as opposed to non-sensical) we must be able to use it to 
cognize its object, but by definition its object is uncognizable. Finally, the notion of a 
thing-in-itself is particularly problematic for those of us sympathetic to Peirce’s dictum, 
“Do not block the way of inquiry.”250 In his “The First Rule of Logic,” Peirce argues that 
“maintaining that this, that, and the other never can be known” and “maintaining that 
this, that, or the other element of science is basic, ultimate, independent of aught else, 
and utterly inexplicable” are paradigms of blocking the way of inquiry; but this is 
                                                       
250 Peirce, “First Rule,” 48. 
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precisely what we are doing in conceiving of the world as a thing-in-itself.251 These 
problems should suffice for concluding that the world cannot be a thing-in-itself even 
though a negative answer to the question from above entails that it must be a thing-in-
itself. Therefore, we should reject the negative answer and conclude that the 
categorical-propriety and ideal-justification predicates are coextensional. 
 Assuming that all three of these points can be cashed out in terms of an account of 
the Modal Component, we can now define material validity in terms of ideal justification. 
First, notice that because categorical propriety and ideal justification are coextensional, 
an inference is categorical-propriety-preserving iff it is ideal-justification-preserving 
(where an inference is ideal-justification-preserving iff either its premises and conclusion 
are all ideally justified or at least one of its premises is not ideally justified). Given this 
equivalence, material validity can equally be understood as either guaranteed 
categorical-propriety-preservation or as guaranteed ideal-justification-preservation.  
 
d. Some Objections to My Peircean Approach 
Before I turn to the second stage in establishing that the schematic account of the 
Representational Component above provides us with the tools for addressing the 
Objectivity Demand without running afoul of the Deflationary Demand, let me consider 
three objections to the first stage. The first objection is to the effect that my focus on 
inquiry is misplaced. As I mentioned above, there are many other categorical-propriety-
directed practices besides inquiry, as well as many non-categorical-propriety-directed 
                                                       
251 Peirce, “First Rule,” 49. See also Peirce, “Questions,” 208-209 and Peirce, “Some 
Consequences,” 213 and 238-242. 
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practices. So, why do I prioritize inquiry in the manner that I do? First, I prioritize inquiry 
over the non-categorical-propriety-directed practices because inquiry is a categorical-
propriety-directed practice and my concern is with understanding categorical-propriety-
preservation and the Representational Component of material validity. Non-categorical-
propriety-directed practices play an important role within our lives, and are rich subjects 
for philosophical thinking, but they are not particularly relevant to my present concern. 
Next, I prioritize inquiry over the other categorical-propriety-directed practices because 
inquiry would appear to be the most successful of the categorical-propriety-directed 
practices at actually achieving categorical propriety. Whether or not categorical propriety 
is intrinsically valuable, we justifiedly expect categorical propriety to be at least 
instrumentally valuable insofar as it facilitates us in pursuing the goals of other practices 
besides inquiry. For instance, when we engage in the practice of construction, we 
expect that categorically appropriate beliefs about the materials and tools with which we 
are working will help us construct sturdy and lasting structures. Or, when we engage in 
the practice of mere rhetoric, we expect that categorically appropriate beliefs about our 
audience will help us convince them to believe as we want them to believe. Similar 
thoughts apply to most every practice in which we engage. Now, it would seem to be a 
brute empirical fact that the products of inquiry are more helpful at facilitating our other 
practices than are the products of any other categorical-propriety-directed practice. The 
best (or at least simplest) explanation of this phenomenon is that of the categorical-
propriety-directed practices inquiry is the best at achieving its goal of categorical 
propriety, hence my focus on inquiry above. 
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 Notice that in addressing the first objection I am attempting to justify my focus on 
inquiry, meaning that I am inquiring about inquiry; this thought leads into the next 
objection and my response to it. My objector will concede for the time being that what I 
have said about inquiry, categorical propriety, and justification is unproblematic, but she 
will ask me what I take myself to be doing in saying such things. If I am engaging in 
inquiry, then there is a circularity in my account insofar as the subject I am inquiring into 
is inquiry itself. Alternatively, if I am engaging in some other practice—call it 
philosophizing—then I should instead be focusing my attention on philosophizing and 
not on inquiry. Given these options, my objector will argue that pursuing the first option 
leads to vicious circularity, while pursuing the second requires that I adopt an inquiry-
transcendent perspective that transforms philosophizing into something pejoratively 
metaphysical. I concede that my objector’s appraisal of the second option is 
appropriate, but find the circularity involved with the first to be relatively unproblematic. 
What would make the circularity vicious would be if I were to lose the justification for my 
claims about inquiry, categorical propriety, and justification once I recognize what I am 
doing as inquiring. True, it is the case that my recognizing myself as an actual human 
engaging in a finitely-extended period of actual inquiring is inconsistent with my taking 
the justification I have provided for my claims about inquiry, categorical propriety, and 
justification as being ideal justification. However, I take the justification for my claims 
about inquiry, categorical propriety, and justification to be actual justification, not ideal 
justification. This does imply that my justification is not decisive or categorical-propriety-
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entailing, but there is no reason to think that my recognizing myself as an inquirer 
engaged in inquiry makes this actual justification any less genuine. 
 The last objection is that there precisely is a reason to think that my recognition 
makes my actual justification less genuine (if not completely disingenuous). My objector 
will charge that although my arguments above establish that ideal justification is a sign 
for categorical propriety—in fact, such a good sign that the categorical propriety and 
ideal justification predicates are coextensional—I have given no reason to suspect that 
actual justification is a sign for either ideal justification or categorical propriety. I have 
said that we must hope that this is so when we engage in inquiry, but this is consistent 
with our hope being unfounded. In response to this objection, I note that actual 
justification and ideal justification are continuous with one another in the sense that ideal 
justification is inductively and subjunctively extrapolated from actual justification. Given 
this continuity, it is simply not the case that actual justification is not a sign for ideal 
justification. True, actual justification is a weaker sign for ideal justification than ideal 
justification is for categorical propriety, a point which is illustrated by the fact that the 
various subject- and time-relativized actual justification predicates are not coextensional 
with the ideal justification predicate. But a weak sign is not no sign at all, and one must 
overlook this point if one is to find the current objection compelling.  
 
e. Resolving the Pincer Objection 
With these objections cleared up, we can now move on to the second stage, that of 
showing how my schematic account of the Representational Component allows me to 
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meet both the Objectivity and Deflationary Demands. Beginning with the Deflationary 
Demand, I take it that the controversial concepts in my account are those of justification, 
induction, subjunctive modality, and categorical propriety. There are good prima facie 
reasons to suppose that all can be consistent with the Deflationary Demand.  
 When we consider justification, Quine has shown us how to redefine this notion so 
that it is consistent with a particularly conservative form of naturalism,252 and the 
Sellarsian metaphor of the space of reasons has shown us how to fit justification into a 
more liberally naturalist viewpoint.253 My point is not to advocate for one option over the 
other, nor to develop a moderate position between that of Quine’s conservatism and 
Sellars’s liberality; my point is simply that, as naturalists, there are options available to 
us and so there is no need for my use of the concept of justification to run afoul of the 
Deflationary Demand.  
 Concerning induction, I have already acknowledged the Humean and Goodmanian 
problems of induction in notes above. However, given the importance of induction to 
most all of our scientific practices, the default position should be to take these to be 
interesting philosophical problems but not decisive objections against the use of 
induction in science. As such, there should be no problems with my use of induction.  
 Moving to subjunctive modality, this is the notion that is most apt for criticism. I 
have had to leave the details about how I account for subjunctive modality nebulous, 
and the naturalistic fortunes of subjunctive modality stand or fall along with those of the 
Modal Component. Since my goal is not to account for the Modal Component here, but 
                                                       
252 See Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized.” 
253 See Sellars, “Epistemology,” especially 248; also Brandom, From Empiricism, 2-4 and 22-
23. 
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simply to show that if it can be accounted for in a manner consistent with the 
Deflationary Demand then I can address the Pincer Objection as a whole, the most I 
can say about subjunctive modality is that it instantiates a problem I have already 
acknowledged as opposed to raising a new problem I have yet to consider. 
 Finally, there is the notion of categorical propriety. I have already discussed this 
notion in Chapter One, where I argued that it is the genus concept of which truth is a 
species. What makes categorical propriety dialectically important is that it has many 
additional species concepts, ones which vary between being deflated and being inflated. 
Therefore, there will be some species of categorical propriety that meet the Deflationary 
Demand, and this is all that I need for my account of categorical-propriety-preservation 
to meet this demand. However, notice that I have been concerned only with the 
extension of the categorical propriety predicate, and not with categorical propriety as 
such. This means that, even if categorical propriety is a non-naturalistic concept, I have 
said nothing positive about it but have instead accounted for what is important about 
categorical propriety when it comes to material validity in terms of justification. This 
opens up the possibility that a non-naturalistic conception of categorical propriety can 
play a merely nominal or common sensical role in inquiry, while justification plays the 
philosophically robust role.254 I mention this possibility only to bring it to light as a 
genuine possibility, not to defend it myself. 
 Moving to the Objectivity Demand, we can see that it too can be met. Given the 
coextensionality of the categorical propriety and ideal justification predicates, a 
                                                       
254 For more on this point, see Misak’s discussion of definition and pragmatic elucidations at 
Misak, Truth, 3-45. 
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sentence will be ideally justified iff it is categorically appropriate and it will be ideally 
unjustified iff it is categorically inappropriate. Furthermore, if we think back to Chapter 
One we can remember that a sentence is CPS-apt iff it is either categorically 
appropriate or categorically inappropriate, and a sentence is a-objective iff it is CPS-apt. 
Putting this together with the previous point, we see that a sentence is CPS-apt iff it is 
ideally justifiable (i.e. either ideally justified or ideally unjustified) and therefore that a 
sentence is a-objective iff it is ideally justifiable. Finally, given that material validity is 
defined in terms of ideal justification, an inference is a-objective iff it is material-validity-
apt (i.e. either materially valid or materially invalid).  
 The argument in the previous paragraph might seem too easily done, because 
although I have established the conceptual claims connecting ideal justification, material 
validity, and a-objectivity, I have left unaddressed the substantive issue of whether there 
actually exist any ideally (un)justified sentences or materially (in)valid inferences. This is 
an unfortunate necessity given my limited aspirations in this dissertation. A full account 
of the Modal Component of material validity would provide us the tools needed for 
understanding the subjunctive aspect of ideal justification, which would in turn give us 
the tools for addressing the current issue. But, as I mention above, providing this 
account of the Modal Component goes beyond the scope of my project. Therefore, the 
best response I can give to the present worry is that once an account of the Modal 
Component is provided, that account will unproblematically deliver us a response to this 
worry—it, together with the relevant facts about us, our linguistic practices, and the 
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world, will imply that some sentences or inferences either are or are not ideally justified 
or materially valid. 
 But even once an account of the Modal Component is provided, might the 
response it delivers still be mistaken? Might it be the case that some or all sentences or 
inferences actually have the opposite status of that implied by the account? The answer 
is that of course this is possible, because any account of the Modal Component will be 
developed by an actual inquirer actually inquiring into the issue and so the account will 
be fallible (as any product of actual inquiry must be). This leaves open the possibility 
that there will be rational disagreements as to what a-objectively is a-objective, but this 
should not be surprising nor is it problematic. This is simply the same benign circularity 
that was at play when I discussed the objection above that threatened to separate 
philosophizing from inquiry. It alone does nothing to diminish the justification that either 
participant in the disagreement has, and so inquiry can consistently continue into the 
issue of what is a-objectively a-objective.  
 
f. Conclusion 
I have spent these last two paragraphs addressing objections to my argument about 
how to meet the Objectivity Demand, and with these objections taken care of we have 
now reached the end of our journey. The ultimate conclusion is twofold. First, 
developing a full theory of material validity would be continuous with the analytic 
pragmatist tradition in semantics (given the considerations from §§2 and 3 above). And 
second, the Pincer Objection can be adequately addressed once an account of the 
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Modal Component of material validity is provided that justifies my three points about 
ideal justification above (given the considerations from the present section). In sum, 
there is hope for a naturalistically viable way of pursuing the analytic pragmatist 
approach to semantics. 
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